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Southern Africa: Food Crisis
Southern Africa: Food Crisis
Date distributed (ymd): 020625
Document reposted by Africa Action
Africa Policy Electronic Distribution List: an information
service provided by AFRICA ACTION (incorporating the Africa
Policy Information Center, The Africa Fund, and the American
Committee on Africa). Find more information for action for
Africa at http://www.africaaction.org
Region: Southern Africa
Issue Areas: +economy/development+
This posting contains two brief documents on the food crisis in
southern Africa: (1) a press release from ActionAID releasing their
new report on the famine in Malawi, and (2) an interview with a
World Food Program official with an overview of the threat of
growing famine later this year.
The first report in particular raises the issues of the factors
leading to greater vulnerability to famine in the region than a
decade ago, particularly noting the damaging effects of forced
liberalization of the agricultural sector and undermining of
national and regional food security schemes. Without denying the
effects of both natural factors and policies of national
governments, the ActionAID report notes the responsibility of
"donor" pressure to change agricultural policies as well as the
additional burden of AIDS.
These reports follow the early June summit of the Food and
Agriculture Organization in Rome, which was conspicuous by the
absence of leaders of Western countries. They also follow the May
decision by the U.S. Congress to boost subsidies for U.S. farmers
by more than $5 billion a year. European and U.S. agricultural
subsidies allow agricultural exports from rich countries to be sold
far below the cost of production, thus undermining small farmers in
Africa and other developing regions.
Other recent sources with background on world trade and
agricultural policy include:
Food First on the World Food Summit
NGO/CSO Forum for Food Sovereignty
Foreign Policy in Focus on
U.S. Farm Bill, World Food Summit, and WTO Agriculture Agreement
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy on
WTO Agriculture Agreement
Malawi food crisis report - it was a disaster waiting to happen
ActionAID Press Release, 14 June 2002
For further information contact Jane Moyo, ActionAid London Press
Office on +44 (0)20 7561 7614/7633 or +44 (0)7753 973 486
ActionAid today releases a substantive evidence-based report that
for the first time traces the causes of Malawi's food crisis.
Alarmingly, some of the core contributory factors are still in
Malawi is facing the prospect of a second round of famine unless
lessons are learned quickly and responsibilities accepted. Yet
understanding what has led to the widespread hunger and deaths
this year has been clouded by the public trading of blame by the
Government of Malawi and the International Monetary Fund.
The ActionAid "State of Disaster" report shows how society in rural
Malawi, already highly vulnerable, is breaking down. Incomes have
plummeted and life expectancy rates have dropped by 15 years.
Rural people no longer have the capacity to cope when harvests are
poor, leading to hunger and starvation. Mounting evidence that
farming communities are reeling after ten years of increasing
poverty and record levels of HIV infection has been ignored.
- The immediate trigger for the food crisis was localised flooding
in February and March 2002 but the underlying reasons were mainly
political and economic
- Rigid and prescriptive IMF and donor-led economic policies and
practices compounded government planning, policy and
- There was limited investment in the rural economy, 70 per cent of
Malawians live in rural areas
- Little thought was given by major donors to the impact of
economic liberalisation on the lives of poor rural families
- The Malawian government pushed through the commercialisation of
the agricultural sector with inadequate support being given to the
A series of damaging miscalculations by the Malawian government and
donors aggravated long-term policy failures. These were:
- The strategic grain reserve, Malawi's buffer against famine, was
sold off in its entirety
- Private traders were effectively allowed to profiteer from the
sale of the grain reserve, buying maize cheaply and hoarding it
until prices rose before reselling it for exorbitant profits
- Rationing was imposed without any form of identification system
being put in place and was therefore open to abuse.
The other key component of the famine was the strain on relations
between donors and the Malawian government because of allegations
of economic mismanagement and governance failures. This fatally
delayed donors' response to the food crisis just as food shortages
were beginning to bite.
Sakou Jobe, ActionAid Malawi's Country Director said: "We cannot
underestimate the enormous power wielded by international
institutions such as the IMF, WTO or even donors such as DFID and
USAID. They have massive influence. The government of Malawi has
been guided by their policies and conditions of investment. All
parties must recognise their shared responsibility for what has
gone wrong and work to put it right."
Despite the policy failures and mistakes, disaster might have been
averted if there had not been an over-calculation of the root crop
harvest in Malawi. It was assumed that potatoes and other tubers
such as cassava would act as a substitute for maize, the staple
crop. Donors and the government were lulled into a false sense of
security and predicted that food availability would be more than
adequate. This proved to be wrong.
Sakou Jobe says: "We realise this report will be challenging for
all involved. Famine is always about policy failure and Malawi's
food crisis is no different. It was a disaster waiting to happen.
This report is about getting organisations and governments to
accept their responsibilities and take action. Everyone has a
right to live free from hunger. We must not loose sight of the
fact that millions in southern Africa are still hungry."
Interview With WFP Regional Food Vulnerability Expert
UN Integrated Regional Information Networks
[excerpts; full text of this interview and other IRIN news on the
food crisis by country and region available on the IRIN web site.]
June 7, 2002
Close to 13 million people in six countries in Southern Africa are
in need of food aid from now through to March next year, the worst
humanitarian crisis the region has faced since the 1992 drought.
Nicholas Haan, Regional Programme Advisor of the World Food
Programme's (WFP) Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping unit, was
WFP's technical coordinator in the inter-agency food assessment
missions that detailed the extent of the emergency. He spoke to
IRIN on the factors that have tipped the six countries - Zimbabwe,
Malawi, Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique - into crisis.
Q: There is a quantitative difference between the last great
Southern African drought in 1992 that affected some 18 million
people and the current food situation. But the current crisis has
been described as a "complex emergency". What is the qualitative
difference between the two emergencies?
A: It is quantitatively different because the number of people who
need food this year is not as great as those in 1992. But
qualitatively [this year] is very different. 1992 was almost
exclusively a drought-related emergency and a very long-term
drought at that. This year it's complex. There are political
factors - Zimbabwe stands out. The land reform programme has had a
very strong effect on production levels. In Malawi, the sale of the
strategic grain reserve definitely affected prices last year which
affected farmers' ability to purchase food and therefore effects
household food security.
So there are these qualitative dimensions, and not to even mention
HIV/AIDS. HIV/AIDS is very different this year. There were very low
values in 1992, now we are having prevalence rates in adult
populations of around 25 percent, in some places even higher. So
this has a direct effect on production and direct effects on
Many households by December normally depend on purchasing their
food. That number is around 80 percent of poor households who
depend on purchasing their food from December through March.
Without income coming into their households [because of illness due
to HIV/AIDS] - that might come from remittances from South Africa,
from income from working on a neighbour's farm, from working on
estates - without that income, the household cannot afford maize,
it cannot afford food. So HIV/AIDS has direct effects. Plus the
increased demands on caregivers' time is very critical. And it's
particularly women and the elderly caregivers in the household.
Because now they have to spend their time not only taking care of
other household members, but also the production activities that
they normally do.
Q: Perhaps related to HIV/AIDS is also the problem of deep poverty
- households in Malawi even in a good year cannot even cover all
their needs. What has happened?
A: In terms of production, poor households are not producing the
food that they need for the whole year. That's why I mentioned that
normal food stocks will take households up until around December
and then they start purchasing. The question is whether or not they
can afford it at that point. Yes, the macro-economic situation in
all six of these countries [identified as facing crisis] is on a
downward slide, and that has direct effects on not only the macro
economy but trickle down effects on households.
We see it in Malawi very, very clearly, with the average daily
labour rate called "ganyu" - it refers to casual labour, a
widespread and common means of getting income. That daily wage rate
has not changed in five years, it's about 20 kwacha [US 27 cents]
per day. But the inflation rate in Malawi has been outstanding [May
2001 it was 30 percent]. So you have this inflation rate, to which
all the other prices get adjusted accordingly - fuel transport,
maize prices, they're all directly linked. But the casual labour
rate hasn't budged - its a precarious situation.
Q: In terms of the interviews you made during the recent crop
assessment missions, how did people perceive their situation?
A: It depends on where the household gets their income. Farmers who
depend on cash crops for export face very volatile global markets.
Tobacco for example. This year the tobacco prices are down
significantly, they are at 70 kwacha per kg - it's about half of
what it was last year. So that puts them in a very vulnerable
position with regards to global market prices.
The household income of 50 percent of Malawians is 15-20 kwacha per
day, spread out across the year. And yet maize prices last year
were reaching 30 kwacha per kg. A household of five people needs at
least two kg, so that's 60 kwacha and you are making around 20
kwacha. But even that's a little misleading because 15-20 kwacha
per day, the average daily household income, is spread out across
the whole year. When households get cash crops they sell them and
spend the money. Come December, come the hungry months - December,
January, March - they don't have that money available. Again, what
they're depending on at that time is ganyu - casual labour. If the
agricultural season is poor, if the planting season is poor, it has
direct effects on the current situation because if the planting
season is poor, it means the labour opportunities which people are
so reliant on are not there. ...
Q: You were saying that things could still go wrong this year which
could increase numbers in need, could you elaborate on that?
A: Absolutely. All of these countries have experienced stress years
last year, Malawi was more pronounced - but all of them. Zambia
did, Zimbabwe has quite a continual crisis, farmers in Swaziland
were also harvesting green maize, and all of these situations
received a tremendous amount of attention in March/April. But
that's too late at that point, because the harvest was happening in
April. So the crisis that many people [humanitarian workers] came
out to see, if they got there in May, had largely been alleviated
by the natural process of having a harvest. The situation we're in
right now is a post harvest situation. By far, the majority of
people do have some harvest - there were some who were actually
devastated to the point they have nothing left - but the majority
do have some harvest. The question is how long will those food
stocks last? Most of those food stocks will take people through to
at least September/October. Therefore, currently we came out of a
bad situation, we have a current alleviation of that problem, but
we foresee a very severe problem coming up in the future,
especially starting around September and even more so in December.
... We, WFP, do not have those resources right now because
September needs will be high, and as I noted, many people's food
stocks will have run out at that time. So to avert a crisis,
resources need to be mobilised now. We're still in time, but any
delay, or any changes to the assumptions we have made regarding
winter harvesting, regarding government policies or several other
factors, then the crisis will be much larger.
This material is being reposted for wider distribution by
Africa Action (incorporating the Africa Policy Information
Center, The Africa Fund, and the American Committee on Africa).
Africa Action's information services provide accessible
information and analysis in order to promote U.S. and
international policies toward Africa that advance economic,
political and social justice and the full spectrum of human rights.