|
Get AfricaFocus Bulletin by e-mail!
Print this page
|
Note: This document is from the archive of the Africa Policy E-Journal, published
by the Africa Policy Information Center (APIC) from 1995 to 2001 and by Africa Action
from 2001 to 2003. APIC was merged into Africa Action in 2001. Please note that many outdated links in this archived
document may not work.
|
Sudan: Peace Process Update
Sudan: Peace Process Update
Date distributed (ymd): 021109
Document reposted by Africa Action
Africa Policy Electronic Distribution List: an information
service provided by AFRICA ACTION (incorporating the Africa
Policy Information Center, The Africa Fund, and the American
Committee on Africa). Find more information for action for
Africa at http://www.africaaction.org
+++++++++++++++++++++Document Profile+++++++++++++++++++++
Region: East Africa
Issue Areas: +political/rights+ +economy/development+
+security/peace+ +US policy focus+
SUMMARY CONTENTS:
This posting contains a briefing on recent developments in the
peace process in Sudan, from Justice Africa, a non-governmental
organization focused on peace and human rights, particularly in the
Horn of Africa. Jstice Africa Partners include the Pan African
Movement (PAM), the Pan African Development Education & Advocacy
Programmes (PADEAP), the Horn of Africa Peace Centre, the
International African Institute (IAI), the Inter Africa Group
(IAG), and the Centre for Democracy & Development (CDD). More
information on Sudan and other JA focus areas can be found at
http://www.justiceafrica.org
Another late-breaking development, not mentioned in the article
below, is the withdrawal of Canadian oil company Talisman of its
investments in Sudan, announced on Oct. 31. See:
http://allafrica.com/stories/200210310096.html and
http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=691
Despite progress in the negotiations, and additional pressure on
Khartoum from the passage of the Sudan Peace Act in Washington (see
http://allafrica.com/stories/200210220379.html, many observers
remain skeptical about the willingness of the Sudanese government
to make peace as long as its access to increased oil revenue is
unimpaired.
Additional articles with recent updates on Sudan can be found at
http://www.africafiles.org/recentarticles.asp?ThisURL=./sudan.asp
These include some of the documents distributed by e-mail from the
the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference (for further
information contact John Ashworth, Coordinator, Sudan Focal Point,
SACBC, P.O. Box 941, Pretoria 0001, South Africa;
Tel: ++27-(0)12-323-6458; E-mail:
sudan@sacbc.org.za )
+++++++++++++++++end profile++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Justice Africa
6 November 2002
Prospects for Peace in Sudan
Briefing for October 2002
Overview
The GoS and SPLA returned to the IGAD peace talks at Machakos in
the middle of October. This relatively speedy return surprised
many who sceptically believed that the logic of war had gained the
upper hand. Unsurprisingly, the talks face considerable
difficulties with substantive disagreements over a wide range of
issues. However, the negotiations are proceeding with a high level
of seriousness. They will not meet the 31 December deadline
initially set by the mediators. Rather, they will break in midNovember
and reconvene for a third major session in January. This
makes it essential to extend the Memorandum of Understanding on the
cessation of hostilities.
The resumption of the negotiations followed intensive military
activity in several parts of the country. This included the GoS
recapture of Torit and a major SPLA/NDA offensive in eastern Sudan,
allegedly backed by Eritrea. Political instability in the
north-east African region remains an important wild card in the
Sudan peace process.
Washington is sending confusing signals about its Sudan policy.
While the State Department is clearly committed to the Machakos
process, there are powerful forces in Congress pushing for a much
harder line on the GoS. The passing of the Sudan Peace Act
signifies this, and serves as a reminder of realignments of U.S.
policy that may accompany a war on Iraq.
The Warfront
After a major mobilisation, the GoS counter-attacked and recaptured
Torit. The level of forces mustered was sufficient to overwhelm the
SPLA, which withdrew. This large scale and rapid mobilisation
reflects the increase in the GoS warmaking capacity in recent
years, with its logistics and mechanised warfare capacity enhanced
by oil funds. There was also sporadic intense fighting in various
parts of Upper Nile, and a major escalation in Eastern Sudan (see
below)
A Memorandum of Understanding for the cessation of hostilities was
signed on 17 October. The main issue of difference between the
parties was whether eastern Sudan should be included in the
ceasefire. The SPLA demanded that the ceasefire include all areas.
The GoS opposed this on the grounds that the conflict in that
region was an Eritrean invasion and not an internal affair. The
mediators proposed including the east, on the logic that serious
fighting during the peace talks ran the risk of, once again,
derailing the negotiations. However, the GoS retained the right to
respond to attacks by non-Sudanese parties - i.e. the Eritreans. In
the event, the de facto ceasefire initially covered only the South
and Southern Blue Nile. The GoS attacked the eastern town of Rasa
the same day as the cessation of hostilities was agreed. But this
and subsequent threats of military operations in the east have not
so far imperilled Machakos.
Following the signing of the MoU on the cessation of hostilities,
both parties have accused the other of violations. The most
significant of these was the GoS allegation of an SPLA attack on
Akobo, described by the GoS as under the control of its ally the
SSIM. In reality, the control of Akobo was less clear-cut, and it
was reportedly being used as a staging ground for incursions into
Ethiopia by the Oromo Liberation Front and Gambella Liberation
Front, thereby exposing the populace to the risk of Ethiopian
military action. The attack on Akobo appears to have been the work
of a coalition of local forces, without provable authorisation from
the SPLA command. The GoS has reportedly accepted that the Akobo
attack was not a violation of the MoU. Other reported violations
have occurred in the vicinity of the oilfields, with the GoS
blaming the SPLA for ground attacks and the SPLA accusing the GoS
of airborne attacks. These reported violations are unlikely to
derail the talks. However, they underline th e importance of
ensuring that both parties recommit to the spirit and letter of the
MoU, especially in Upper Nile.
The Return to Machakos
The mediators have been active and effective. The U.S. role has
been complicated by the confusing signals coming from Washington
D.C., so that other IPF mediators, especially the British envoy,
have been required to play a pivotal role in retaining the
confidence of the GoS . Both the African Union and Arab League have
sent observers to Machakos. The presence of the Arab League is an
important signal that Egypt, Libya and other Arab countries
recognise the legitimacy of the IGAD process.
A number of outstanding issues have emerged or re-emerged. The
differences between the parties reflect their assumptions about the
meaning of the July Machakos Protocol. Perhaps some of these
assumptions could have been clarified in July; however this might
have risked losing the momentum of the talks and foregoing the
powerful symbolism marked by the Protocol. The issues postponed
from July are surfacing now, in what is hopefully a more favourable
atmosphere for resolution. The talks will break in the middle of
November, and remain suspended during the remainder of Ramadhan and
the Kenyan Presidential elections in December, to reconvene in
January.
The marginalised areas. The mediators proposed that the questions
of Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile be included in the
agenda for discussions between the parties. The GoS and SPLA have
agreed to these discussions, most probably when the talks resume in
January. The details of this arrangement have yet to be made
public. On this issue, the differences between the parties'
positions remain great.
Wealth-sharing. The mediators have presented papers on this issue.
Progress is dependent upon a prior settlement of the key issue of
power-sharing and the constitutional architecture of the country.
Once the different governmental entities that can receive revenue
have been identified, and the funding mechanisms specified, then
the hard negotiation on the proportions of revenue accruing to each
entity can begin.
Powersharing, including the presidency and ministries. The SPLA
proposed that President Bashir serve as President for the first
three years of the interim period, and John Garang for the second
three years. This was not accepted by the GoS, which instead
proposed Garang as Vice President. Discussions have now moved on to
a detailed consideration of the powers of the vice-president plus
allocation of key positions between the representatives of the
parties. Several challenges arise for progress on this question.
One is the status of the current Vice President, Ali Osman Mohamed
Taha. He would clearly prefer to have the position of second vice
president or similar. However, the idea of him having power
comparable to that of the SPLA leader would not be acceptable to
the SPLA. Another question is the weighting of posts between North
and South, dependant on an assessment of what proportion of Sudan's
population is from the North and from the South. A third issue is
clarification on the respective roles of the Northern and Southern
entities and the national/federal/union government.
There has been substantial progress on this issue. However, it is
likely that the parties will defer final agreement on this issue
until other questions have been settled, as it is a key issue and
also one on which it is possible for last-minute horse-trading.
Location and status of the national capital. This issue is highly
revealing of the assumptions made by the parties. For the GoS, it
is simply unthinkable that Khartoum is anything other than an
integral part of 'North' Sudan as well as the national capital. For
the SPLA, on the one hand it takes the logical position that a ‘one
country two systems' approach demands a national capital that is
not part of either the northern or the southern entities, and on
the other hand has yet to internalise the essential point that once
an agreement is signed, the SPLA itself will become an integral
part of the national/federal/union government.
Security and the national army. This has yet to be discussed in
detail. It is likely that this w ill be the most demanding round of
all the negotiations at Machakos, with the greatest potential to
derail the process. Both parties see their military strength as the
ultimate guarantee on th e successful implementation of any peace
agreement, on the terms they understand.
Comments on Machakos
The mediators are to be congratulated on their persistence,
patience and robust attitude during the interruption and on the
resumption of the talks. They have displayed a seriousness that has
compelled the parties to reciprocate.
The prospects of a very quick movement towards a settlement, in the
timetable originally agreed (by the end of December) are not good.
The SPLA capture of Torit destroyed the nascent trust that was
building between President Bashir and John Garang subsequent to
their meeting in Kampala. The continuation of Ghazi Salah el Din as
head of the GoS team has indicated that Khartoum recognises that it
must negotiate seriously, but it is doing so very cautiously. On
the SPLA side, John Garang has also made it clear that he still
regards the IGAD negotiations as only one track towards the SPLA's
goals among many.
The Machakos talks remain primarily proximity talks rather than
face-to-face negotiations. The parties are chiefly responding to
the proposals made by the mediators, and in turn making their
points and arguments to the mediators, rather than facing each
other across the table. Important processes of mutual confidence
building are therefore at an early stage. The agreements that are
being reached will need to be further elaborated and discussed by
the parties, together, to avoid misunderstandings about their
content. The dangers of incompatible assumptions about the meanings
of the agreements are evident. These dangers are amplified by the
parties' history of how they interpret agreements, and the
indeterminacies of translation into Arabic.
One issue that will need clarification is the status of any
agreements made at Machakos with respect to the Sudanese
constitution. Will the agreement supersede or override the existing
constitution, or will it have to be interpreted in the light of
that constitution?
The SPLA is negotiating both for the strongest possible Southern
Entity, and for a fair share in the National Government. However,
its negotiating strategy seems to focus more on the former than the
latter. This is an essentially defensive strategy. The GoS goals
are chiefly to retain a majority share in power and to achieve
international respectability.
Eritrea and Eastern Sudan
Early October witnessed a significant offensive by the SPLA/NDA in
Eastern Sudan, which captured Hamush Koreb and other adjoining
areas. Sudan Alliance Forces commanders including Abdel Aziz
Khalid played a prominent role. SAF's status vis-a-vis the SPLA
remains ambiguous: it is unclear whether it has been absorbed into
the SPLA or remains an independent entity. According to the GoS,
Eritrean troops and armor participated, and the Eritrean government
played the critical role in the planning of the attack. The attack
was condemned by the NDA Chairman Mohamed Osman al Mirghani.
The SPLA motivation is likely to have been to divert resources and
attention away from the GoS counterattack on Torit, and to have
some victories to claim in order that the return to the
negotiating table is not seen as a concession made from weakness.
In a broader perspective, the attack also reflects John Garang's
preference for keeping his options open: he retains the military
option alongside the search for a negotiated settlement.
In response to the Sudanese allegations of an Eritrean invasion, an
African Union fact-finding mission was despatched to both
countries. This has yet to report. However, both the Libyan
government and the U.S. have reported that no Eritrean troops are
currently present on Sudanese soil. There has also been speculation
that Eritrea's strategy was to complicate the Machakos process,
thereby gaining time and advantage for Egypt and Libya to relaunch
their initiative. If so, this did not succeed. One outcome of the
sharp deterioration in relations between Sudan and Eritrea has been
increased cooperation between Sudan, Ethiopia and Yemen in support
of Eritrean opposition forces, based in Sudan and Ethiopia. The
leaders of the three countries met in Sana'a for a summit. Several
armed groups have come together under the banner of the Eritrean
National Alliance, and are present in Sudan and Ethiopia. With the
ongoing Eritrean attempts to destabilise Ethiopia using the OLF,
this underlines the risks of a regional conflict in the Horn.
Khartoum
Following the GoS recapture of Torit, the mood in Khartoum returned
to a broad consensus in favour of peace. The GoS appears united in
this stand, though divisions still exist on what the government
should settle for, and what lines it is not prepared to cross. The
parties outside government are divided between those who would like
a seat at Machakos, and those who are waiting for an agreement to
be concluded. Most appear to hold that political activities proper
will resume when peace is achieved.
Student politics has been emerging as the focus for active
opposition to the GoS. The Islamists have always been highly
sensitive to the political mood among students. When it faced the
prospect of losing control of the Khartoum University Student Union
to a coalition that included NDA parties and the Popular National
Congress (followers of Hassan al Turabi), the GoS decided to
suspend the Union. It also detained some of its members.
Momentum is building behind European economic engagement including
expanded aid programmes and private sector investment. In an
important sense, the GoS is already beginning to see the peace
dividend. The U.S. Sudan Peace Act is a significant rejoinder to
this.
The South
The SPLA-SSDF agreement has been underwritten by a further meeting
between John Garang and Riek Machar. This confirms the SSDF
support for Machakos and is a rebuttal to GoS attempts to divide
the Southern groups. However, the GoS policy of 'divide and rule'
continues unabated, and Khartoum has indicated that it will
continue to regard agreements with Southern factions as valid
despite Machakos.
A meeting in Entebbe, Uganda, of civil society organisations from
both South and North, convened by the churches, adopted a set of
important statements in support of the peace process. Of particular
significance was their adoption of a Referendum Protocol for the
exercise of self-determination in Southern Sudan.
The Region
Kenya faces a close-fought electoral contest in December. The
Kenyan opposition has proved unexpectedly united and poses a
threat to President Moi's designated successor, Uhuru Kenyatta, in
the presidential elections. For the Chief of Staff, General
Sumbeiywo, this is not a good moment to be overwhelmingly
preoccupied with non-Kenyan activities. During the Machakos recess
after mid-November he will doubtless be primarily concerned with
his main job, running the Kenyan army. Sudan is not an issue in
the elections. However, should the opposition candidate, Mwai
Kibaki, win the election, or should the outcome be contested, it
seems probable that Kenya will have difficulties in providing the
focus and energy necessary to maintain the momentum at IGAD.
However, it is in the interest of all Kenyan groups to continue to
take the lead in the peace negotiations, and to cooperate closely
with the international facilitators.
In Uganda, the LRA is still very much in evidence. It has not only
survived the Ugandan army offensives in Equatoria but has regrouped
and launched counter-attacks into Uganda, increasing in scale and
ferocity. The Defence Minister's claim that the LRA would be wiped
out before Christmas seems unlikely to be realised. After a report
in the newspaper The Monitor that the LRA had shot down an army
helicopter, the Ugandan government ordered the paper closed (it
reopened shortly afterwards). This reflects a high level of
government sensitivity over its inability to defeat the LRA.
The Ugandan government's basic problem with the LRA is domestic. It
has simply failed, during nearly seventeen years in power, to
resolve the political issues of northern Uganda. However, the
possibility of resumed secret support from the GoS to the LRA,
after the former's return to Torit, utilising Southern Sudanese
militias as a go-between, cannot be ruled out. One of the
casualties of the SPLA's Torit operation was the trust that had
been developing between Kampala and Khartoum.
Ethiopian policy towards Sudan remains discreet. Ethiopia is
strongly supportive of Machakos, which it sees as the best chance
for peace in a united Sudan. Relations between Addis Ababa and
Khartoum continue to improve, in large part because of their common
interest in containing Eritrea and possibly replacing the
government in Asmara. Thus far, the close relationship between John
Garang and President Afeworki has not led to an estrangement
between Addis Ababa and the SPLA, but the SPLA leadership would be
well advised not to discount such a possibility. If such an
estrangement were to occur, it would happen quietly but
decisively.
Washington
The Sudan Peace Act has been passed into law and signed by
President Bush. This is a much watered down version of the bill
passed by Congress. It includes neither capital market sanctions,
nor material support for the SPLA. Its sanctions are limited to
freezing the assets of 12 Sudanese companies in the U.S., and a
requirement that the GoS prove its readiness to negotiate for peace
every six months, failing which the U.S. Administration will take
much harsher steps. It authorises $100 million to spend on
assistance programmes in SPLA-controlled areas, and requires the
State Department to collect information on alleged war crimes. It
also provides for $300 million in support for the peace process
(which will need separate Congressional authorisation). The
administration regards the Act as non-binding because of its
insistence that the executive retains power over foreign policy
decisions.
The passing of the Sudan Peace Act reflects internal Washington
politics, and the continuing power of the anti-Khartoum coalition,
rather than any realignment in the Administration's position.
However it is a powerful piece of symbolism. It demonstrates the
State Department's lack of command over foreign policy.
The Sudan Peace Act sends confusing signals to Khartoum, which
interprets it as indicating bad faith by the peace negotiators. It
has been roundly denounced by the GoS. There is the risk that
anti-peace elements in Khartoum may take the Sudan Peace Act out of
context and use it to rally support to try to block agreement at
Machakos. However, so far it has not imperilled the ongoing
negotiations. The Sudan Peace Act also runs the danger of
misleading the SPLA leadership, holding out the promise that the
U.S. may give unilateral support to the SPLA sometime in the
future. Neither party should be allowed to use the Sudan Peace Act
as a pretext for negotiating in bad faith.
The calculations of both sides may be thrown out by any U.S. attack
on Iraq. Neither party appears to be taking this into their
calculations, although the SPLA is constantly receiving
encouragement from the same political forces in Washington that
advocate an attack on Iraq. The onset of any U.S. attack on Iraq
may prove the de facto deadline for achieving agreement at
Machakos.
Conclusion
The slow but steady progress at Machakos still represents the best
chance for peace in Sudan. The substantive issues are being
progressively resolved. While the parties remain at the negotiating
table, the differences between their positions narrow, and the
logic of achieving a settlement grows stronger. If the mediators
and external facilitators can sustain the pressure and maintain the
momentum during the November-January recess, and start the talks on
schedule in early January, the chances for a settlement are good.
Many factors, internal or external, could still derail the peace
process. At this stage it is essential that the Machakos process
continues to be well-funded, with sufficient personnel seconded to
it by the mediators and the external facilitators. Compared to the
costs of an ongoing war, the Machakos peace process is extremely
good value.
The recess in the talks from mid-November to early January is an
opportunity for exploring options and building consensus on a
range of key issues, including the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue
Nile, wealth-sharing, and security questions. Sudanese civil
society organisations should continue to mobilise in support of
Machakos, to maintain pressure on the parties to reach a
settlement.
This material is being reposted for wider distribution by
Africa Action (incorporating the Africa Policy Information
Center, The Africa Fund, and the American Committee on Africa).
Africa Action's information services provide accessible
information and analysis in order to promote U.S. and
international policies toward Africa that advance economic,
political and social justice and the full spectrum of human rights.
|
