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Sudan: More Resolutions - Actions Delayed
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Mar 27, 2006 (060327)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
"The international strategy for dealing with the Darfur crisis
primarily through the small (7,000 troops) African Union Mission in
Sudan (AMIS) is at a dead end. ... the international community is
backing away from meaningful action. ... If the tragedy of the past
three years is not to be compounded, the AU and its partners must
address the growing regional crisis by getting more troops with
greater mobility and firepower on the ground at once and rapidly
transforming AMIS into a larger, stronger UN peacekeeping mission
with a robust mandate focused on civilian protection." -
International Crisis Group, March 16, 2005
On March 24 the UN Security Council voted unanimously to ask the
Secretary-General to plan ways to reinforce the African Union
mission in Darfur, and to present a report by April 24. But without
substantially increased pressure from the international community,
including the United States and African countries, the Sudanese
government is likely to continue to gain delays in any action to
curb the violence against civilians in Darfur and neighboring Chad.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains a March 17 opinion piece from
allafrica.com by John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen on
"Matching Rhetoric with Action in Darfur," and the executive
summary and recommendations from the latest report from
the International Crisis Group (http://www.crisisgroup.org), which
contains specific proposals on an interim international
stabilization force.
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Sudan, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/sudan.php
For current news and opinion on Sudan, see
http://www.sudantribune.com and http://allafrica.com/sudan
Notable recent statements on Sudan include the statement issued by
the World Bank, United Nations, and the International Monetary Fund
after a donor's consortium meeting in Paris on March 9-10
http://allafrica.com/stories/200603160661.html
and a speech by U.S. House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi after a
visit to the area
http://allafrica.com/stories/200603170788.html
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++++++++
Matching Rhetoric with Action in Darfur
March 17, 2006
By John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen
Mr. Prendergast is Senior Advisor to the International Crisis
Group, the global conflict prevention organization. Mr.
Thomas-Jensen is Crisis Group's Research and Advocacy Officer for
Africa
http://allafrica.com/stories/200603170100.html
Last month, in the town of Mershing, South Darfur, there was
chaos and carnage. On a scorching day in February, four hundred
Janjaweed militiamen attacked, firing indiscriminately on
civilians, destroying homes, and looting livestock. Eight hours
after the initial onslaught, the Janjaweed returned for a second
round of mayhem, assaulting women and children and looting the
town's main market.
Following a terror-filled night, the 55,000 residents of Mershing
fled for their lives. Thirteen infants were trampled to death and
220 children separated from their families in the exodus. The day
after, here in Washington, a senior State Department official
told journalists that "there isn't large-scale organized violence
taking place" in Darfur.
President Bush has called for a doubling of the number of
peacekeeping troops in Darfur and said that the transition from
the current African-led force to a larger, more robust UN
peacekeeping mission will require significant NATO involvement.
This pronouncement is laudable, but likely to be viewed as yet
another example of schizophrenic U.S. policy on Darfur.
The administration's rhetoric has been consistently inconsistent
with its actions and with the reality on the ground. Despite the
government of Sudan and their proxy Janjaweed militias' sadistic
campaign to murder and displace Darfur's non-Arab civilians, some
U.S. officials continue to heap disproportionate public blame on
Darfur's rebel groups for the lack of security. Although the
rebels frequently commit atrocities against civilians and should
be censured, Khartoum's counterinsurgency strategy has caused the
deaths of more than 200,000 people and displaced two million
more.
While U.S. diplomats have credited Sudanese officials with
"acknowledging what's taking place in Darfur," Sudanese President
Omar Hassan Al-Bashir recently said that "the so-called Darfur
conflict is an invention by foreign interests." Indeed, the
Sudanese government has made numerous commitments to disarm its
militias and prosecute war criminals, only to flaunt its
disregard for these obligations by denying responsibility and
continuing to support the Janjaweed. Government helicopters that
provided air support for recent Janjaweed attacks on civilians in
eastern Chad confirm that this patron-killer relationship remains
intact.
Some U.S. officials blame this growing insecurity on "tribal"
violence, the same code language that previous U.S.
administrations used in Rwanda and Bosnia as they twiddled their
thumbs in inaction. Further, "tribal war" denotes anarchy,
removing clear culpability for atrocities.
Sudan's ruling party has traditionally employed a
divide-and-destroy strategy to eliminate enemies, and claims of
anarchy in Darfur are self-fulfilling. Sudanese military
intelligence agents manipulate local ethnic divisions and
exacerbate tensions, and then the government blames the bloodshed
on lawlessness and tribalism. The U.S. government must recognize
that ethnic violence is not the root cause of the conflict but a
deliberate tactic of the barbaric braintrust in Khartoum.
What is behind all this rhetorical contortionism? The answer is
simple: the Bush administration wants to look tough on Darfur
without jeopardising Khartoum's cooperation on counterterrorism.
Many of the Sudanese military intelligence officials who offer
information to the CIA are the principal perpetrators of atrocity
crimes in Darfur, responsible for arming, training, and
unleashing the Janjaweed on innocent civilians. But the
administration cannot justify this moral sacrifice on national
security grounds: it is in U.S. interests to oppose a regime it
accuses of genocide.
It is not too late for this administration to act. The U.S. and
European Union are leading the international effort to deploy a
robust UN force. The African Union's recent communiqu? has paved
the way for UN deployment. While the UN prepares its mission, the
U.S. must do three things urgently:
- First, the administration must work with congress and with
other donor nations to ensure that the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS)
is fully funded until the UN deploys. The U.S. should also
provide logistical support and assist the AU with intelligence
gathering to enhance the mission's ability to protect civilians
and monitor an enhanced ceasefire agreement.
- Second, President Bush should appoint a special envoy to
increase the level of pressure on the warring parties to
negotiate an enhanced ceasefire agreement, reach a comprehensive
political settlement through the AU-facilitated Abuja
negotiations, and persuade Sudan to accept and the AU to confirm
transition of AMIS into a strong UN peacekeeping mission. Without
U.S. leadership and pressure, the peace process and the
transition to a robust UN force have little chance to succeed.
- Third, the U.S., in consultation with the AU, should work with
its allies to identify a nation or nations to lead an advance
UN-Mandated stabilization force of some 5,000 troops to buttress
the AU and focus on the Chad-Sudan border enhancing civilian
protection efforts. President Bush needs to secure greater U.S.
support for this intervention.
Some of the residents of Mershing have returned to their homes,
but many have chosen not to go back for fear of further Janjaweed
attacks. Speaking about Darfur, President Bush said recently
that, "There has to be a consequence for people abusing their
fellow citizens." One could hardly blame Mershing's displaced and
vulnerable civilians for thinking that the President's comments
are more hollow rhetoric that leave them with no homes, no
future, and no hope.
To Save Darfur
Africa Report N 105
International Crisis Group
http://www.crisisgroup.org
Nairobi/Brussels, 17 March 2006
Executive Summary and Recommendations
The international strategy for dealing with the Darfur crisis
primarily through the small (7,000 troops) African Union Mission
in Sudan (AMIS) is at a dead end. AMIS credibility is at an
all-time low, with the ceasefire it could never monitor properly
in tatters. In the face of this, the international community is
backing away from meaningful action. The African Union (AU)
yielded to Khartoum's pressure on 10 March 2006 and did not ask
the UN to put into Darfur the stronger international force that
is needed. If the tragedy of the past three years is not to be
compounded, the AU and its partners must address the growing
regional crisis by getting more troops with greater mobility and
firepower on the ground at once and rapidly transforming AMIS
into a larger, stronger UN peacekeeping mission with a robust
mandate focused on civilian protection.
The battlefield now extends into eastern Chad, and the escalating
proxy war between Sudan and Chad threatens to produce a new
humanitarian catastrophe on both sides of the border. Inside
Darfur humanitarian access is at its lowest in two years,
civilians continue to bear the brunt of the violence, and
political talks are stalled. Fighting is most intense and
civilians are at greatest risk in West Darfur along the
Chad-Sudan border, where a major invasion by Chadian rebels
appears imminent, and in southern Darfur in the Tawila-Graida
corridor.
The Sudanese government bears primary responsibility for the
deteriorating situation. It is still making little effort to
stabilise matters, rein in militias or secure roads from bandits
and rogue elements. In violation of numerous commitments, it
still uses offensive air power, supports militias and stokes
inter-communal violence as part of its counter-insurgency
campaign.
Security elements from Khartoum are supporting the well-armed
Chadian rebels in Western Darfur, while President Deby in
N'djamena scrambles to bolster his position by reaching out in
turn to the Darfur rebels. A failed coup attempt against Deby on
15 March further underscored the fragility of the Chadian regime.
Clashes in eastern Chad between Sudan-backed insurgents and Deby
loyalists would not only have drastic consequences for civilians
of both countries but could also lead to the complete breakdown
of peace talks in Abuja and reignite all-out war in Darfur. But
the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), the principal rebel group, has
increased its ceasefire violations over the past six months, and
some elements are more committed to the battlefield than to the
Abuja talks. Insurgent dissension plays into Khartoum's hands and
contributes to growing lawlessness.
The AU failed earlier this month to take the timely and decisive
action required to reverse these trends. Instead it extended the
AMIS mandate to 30 September 2006, neglected to amend it for
better protection of civilians and made no provision for either
more African or UN troops to come into Darfur to stabilise the
situation over the next half-year. While it repeated its previous
acceptance in principle that AMIS would eventually have to be
replaced by blue helmets, if only because donors' willingness to
subsidise it is running out, it appeared impressed by Khartoum's
complaint that anything other than an African mission would
amount to colonialism and its threat that Darfur would become a
"graveyard" for any multinational force sent without its
agreement.
The AU did usefully commit to making a stronger diplomatic push
to deliver an enhanced ceasefire and a peace agreement at the
Abuja talks in the next six weeks. It will be important for the
U.S., the European Union (EU) and the UN to follow up
consultations held in Brussels in advance of that decision and
lend their full weight to the effort. But it would be a mistake
to delay strengthening international forces on the ground in the
belief that such agreements as desirable as they would be would
remove the need for them. Any agreements would be fragile,
requiring proof of goodwill by the parties, vulnerable to
multiple spoilers and unlikely to forestall the looming border
conflict, which has its own dynamics.
The U.S., the EU and others need, therefore, to act without delay
on three fronts to:
- provide the necessary financial and technical assistance to the
AU through at least September 2006, and to help AMIS implement
the key recommendations for internal improvements outlined in the
December 2005 Joint Assessment Mission report and affirmed by the
AU on 10 March;
- do the heavy diplomatic lifting to persuade the AU and the UN
Security Council to authorise the immediate deployment of a
stabilisation force, ideally some 5,000-strong, as part of a
phased transition to a UN mission to be completed in October
2006, to focus on monitoring the Chad-Sudan border and deterring
major cross-border attacks, and on bolstering AMIS's ability to
protect civilians in the Tawila-Graida corridor; and
- persuade the Security Council to authorise immediate planning
for a UN peacekeeping force of at least double the present size
of AMIS, equipped to fulfil a more serious military mission,
provided with an appropriately stronger mandate, and ready to
take over full responsibility on 1 October 2006.
This is not ideal. Crisis Group has long contended that because
AMIS has reached the outer limits of its competence, and a UN
mission authorised today would not be fully ready to take over
from it for some six months, a distinct and separate
multinational force should be sent to Darfur to bridge that gap
and help stabilise the immediate situation. We have argued, and
continue to believe, that NATO would be best from a practical
military point of view. Unfortunately, political opposition to
this in Khartoum, within the AU and even perhaps within the
Atlantic Alliance itself, means it is not achievable at this
time.
What we now propose, therefore, is a compromise driven by the
urgent need for a more robust force in Darfur. A militarily
capable UN member state - France seems most promising since it
already has troops and aircraft in the area - should offer to the
Security Council to go now to Darfur, wearing blue helmets, as
the lead nation in the first phase of the incoming UN mission. It
could be joined from the outset by forces from one or two other
militarily capable UN members (and would probably need to be if
the desirable target of around 5,000 personnel for this force is
to be achieved). This stabilisation force would be a
self-contained, separately commanded UN mission with identified
functional or geographic divisions of responsibility that would
work beside AMIS and through a liaison unit at its headquarters
until arrangements were in place for a 1 October transition to
the full UN mission. That full mission would need to be recruited
from the best AMIS elements as well as a wider circle of Asian
and other member states - no easy task at a time when several
large UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and elsewhere have
exhausted the capabilities of many contribution candidates.
The U.S. and other NATO states should respond generously and
quickly to requests from it or AMIS to provide logistical help as
well as regular access to satellite imagery, air mobility and
close air support, especially to deter or react to egregious
movements of men or heavy weapons in the border area.
The accord signed on 10 February 2006 in Tripoli by the
presidents of Chad and Sudan accepted the need for a border
monitoring force. The AU and the Security Council should build on
this by passing the necessary resolutions. Simultaneously,
planning should begin for the handover from AMIS to a Chapter VII
UN peace-support operation and money be identified to guarantee
that AMIS can remain in place until this happens. At the same
time, the AU should continue to play a lead role at Abuja, while
the wider international community pursues accountability by
enforcing the UN sanctions regime and facilitating the work of
human rights monitoring mechanisms and the International Criminal
Court (ICC). A lasting solution to the Darfur conflict can only
come with a three-part strategy to produce physical security, an
inclusive political agreement and an end to impunity.
The consequences if these steps are not taken are all too easy to
foresee: tens of thousands more lives lost, spill-over of the
conflict into Chad and proxy wars that destabilise a wide swathe
of Africa.
Recommendations
To the African Union:
1. Request the immediate deployment of a UN-mandated
stabilisation force to help bolster the AMIS troops and focus on
the Chad-Sudan border and the Tawila-Graida corridor.
2. Seek quick negotiation of a single, enhanced ceasefire
document to remove the ambiguities of the existing overlapping
agreements.
3. Begin immediately to map the location of forces in Darfur so
as to manage and enforce the ceasefire better.
4. Begin immediately identifying, defining and profiling the
government-allied militias.
5. Improve the reporting mechanisms and procedures for monitoring
ceasefire violations and urgently revive and upgrade the
compliance and sanctions mechanisms of the ceasefire.
6. Negotiate a series of humanitarian ground rules, in
collaboration with the UN, to help hold the parties accountable
for the protection of humanitarian operations in their respective
areas.
To the United Nations Security Council:
7. Authorise a two-phase intervention in Darfur under Chapter
Seven of the Charter, with the following elements:
(a) for the first phase, to be accomplished within a month, a
lead nation would serve as the advance element of the full UN
mission by sending the bulk of an initial 5,000 troops to Darfur,
with three main stabilisation tasks:
i. interdiction of military activities across the Chad-Darfur
border;
ii. protection of civilians in Darfur, primarily in the
Tawilla-Graida corridor; and
iii. rapid-reaction support of AMIS forces until the transition
to a full-fledged UN peace support operation in October 2006.
(b) for the second phase, immediate planning for a peace support
operation of some 15,000 troops none of whom should be diverted
from the mission of the existing UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) with
a mandate emphasising civilian protection, ceasefire enforcement
and monitoring of the Chad-Sudan border, to take over from AMIS
as of 1 October 2006.
8. Strengthen the existing sanctions regime by implementing the
recommendations in the 30 January 2006 report of the Panel of
Experts.
9. Authorise the Secretariat's peacekeeping department (DPKO) to
begin planning on an urgent basis and together with the AU both
phases of this operation, with priority tasks to include:
(a) identifying areas for early cooperation in Darfur, such as
immediate deployment of UN experts to help support the
establishment of a functioning ceasefire commission secretariat
and the deployment of human rights monitors and translators,
including women, to help improve the reporting capacity of AMIS;
and
(b) identifying the lead nation to deploy in the initial phase to
support AMIS by performing the tasks set out in recommendation
7(a) above and serve as the advance element of the full UN
mission.
To Donor Governments:
10. Convene an early pledging conference to ensure that AMIS is
fully funded until the UN mission can take over in October 2006.
To the U.S., the EU and its member states and others with a
strong interest in regional peace and stability:
11. Undertake major diplomatic efforts to:
(a) persuade Sudan to accept and the AU to confirm transition of
AMIS into a strong UN peacekeeping mission as of 1 October 2006
and request in the interim dispatch of an advance force of some
5,000 blue-helmets to assist AMIS by performing essential
stabilisation tasks;
(b) persuade the Security Council to authorise a mission of some
15,000, including the strongest AMIS elements and with a strong
Chapter VII mandate focused on civilian protection; and
(c) identify the lead nation to contribute the bulk of the
advance element to assist AMIS and perform essential
stabilisation tasks immediately upon Security Council
authorisation, and be prepared to help with all necessary
material and logistical support.
12. Concurrently with efforts to strengthen international forces
on the ground, pursue the other elements of a coordinated
three-part strategy to resolve the Darfur conflict by:
(a) reinforcing AU efforts to negotiate an enhanced ceasefire and
a political settlement at Abuja, including by naming special
envoys; and
(b) seeking accountability and an end to impunity by enforcing
the Security Council's sanction regime and supporting human
rights monitoring mechanisms and the work of the ICC.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues,
with a particular focus on U.S. and international policies.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
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