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Sudan: Darfur Peace Agreement Detailed
Jul 23, 2006 (060723)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
The real problem with the Darfur Peace Agreement, contends one of
the advisors to the negotiations, is not its detailed provisions,
which are both substantive and the result of significant input even
from factions that eventually refused to sign. It is the lack of
will to implement the accord, whether on the part of the government
of Sudan, the rebels in Darfur, or the international parties that
must guarantee its implementation,
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains excerpts from the first two
articles in a series of commentaries by Alex de Waal on the Darfur
Peace Agreement, appearing on allAfrica.com, and links to the full
set of commentaries. Another AfricaFocus Bulletin sent out today
contains updates and background commentary focused on the failure
of the international community to provide enough resources or
political pressure to make the peace accord anything more than a
meaningless piece of paper.
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Sudan and additional links,
For regular updates see http://www.sudantribune.com
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++++++++
Disarming the Janjaweed and Armed Militia
July 14, 2006
By Alex de Waal
This is the first in a series of articles concerning the Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA), explaining how different parts were
negotiated by the Government and Movement delegations, what the
paragraphs mean, and how they should be implemented. This first
article asks, how are the Janjaweed and other armed militia to be
One of the toughest questions in the negotiations in Abuja that led
to the DPA was how to control and disarm the Janjaweed and other
armed militia in Darfur. The Movements' negotiators raised this
issue time and time again, and went line by line over every
relevant paragraph over many long weeks. Each of the Movements'
negotiators--Ali Tirayo (SLM-Minawi), Mohamed Adam (SLM-Abdel
Wahid) and Tajudeen Niam (JEM)--was closely involved in this issue,
and the GoS security team led by General Ismat al Zain was
extremely professional and examined every detail. Everyone in the
peace talks knew from the beginning that long-term peace and
security in Darfur requires the control of all the militia and
paramilitary forces, some of which have terrorized Darfurians since
the 1980s, and some of which were only recently established.
Security experts agree that the DPA articles concerning the
Janjaweed are some of the toughest parts of the whole Agreement.
For the first time there is a practical plan for controlling and
disarming the Janjaweed. This is a credit to the GoS and Movements
negotiating teams in Abuja and the hard work they put in.
When the Government of Sudan (GoS) signed the "Humanitarian
Ceasefire" in N'djamena in April 2004, it made a commitment to
disarm the Janjaweed. Two months later the United Nations Security
Council passed Resolution 1556 that insisted that Khartoum should
disarm the Janjaweed, within one month. Shortly afterwards, the
Government presented a plan for disarmament to the Darfur Ceasefire
Commission, but the plan was rejected by the African Union and the
representatives of the Movements.
The responsibility for disarming the Janjaweed and other armed
militia falls on the GoS. This principle was laid down by the UN
Security Council. And throughout the Abuja talks, the Movements
insisted that because the GoS had armed these militia, it was
responsible for disarming them too. However, the entire process of
controlling and disarming them is to be supervised and monitored by
the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and the Joint Commission (JC). Both
of these bodies are chaired by the African Union and include
representatives of the SLM and JEM as well as the international
community. At every stage of the disarmament process, all those
represented on the CFC and JC must be satisfied that the GoS has
properly completed its task.
Article 314 of the DPA demands that the GoS produces a plan for
disarming the Janjaweed 37 days after "D-Day", which was 16 May
(eleven days after the signing of the Agreement in Abuja). But the
DPA also spells out in detail how many aspects of this disarmament
are to be done. The Movement negotiators insisted on this, and the
GoS delegation insisted that the provisions should be practical.
The DPA has a detailed timeline and different provisions covering
different armed groups.
The timetable for disarming the Janjaweed is part of the overall
sequence of steps for the Comprehensive Ceasefire and Final Status
Security Arrangements in Chapter 3 of the DPA. There is a simple
principle governing the steps. For every action that the armed
forces of the Movements (SLA and--if it should sign up--the JEM)
are asked to take, the GoS has to take a step beforehand. ...
The DPA spells out a number of the steps that the GoS has to take
in its steps for controlling the Janjaweed and armed militia.
--Paragraph 315 spells out some of the measures the GoS should
take, including restricting Janjaweed to garrisons and cantonment
sites, disarming them of heavy weapons, and ensuring that they
cannot pose a threat to the Movements' assembly sites.
--Paragraph 316 demands that any armed militia that violates the
ceasefire should be immediately disarmed.
--Paragraph 366 specifies that the Janjaweed must be prevented from
moving into any areas in which they can pose a threat to civilians
including especially IDPs.
--Paragraph 367 spells out some of the measures to be taken during
Phase 2 of the Ceasefire (which begins 82 days after "D-Day")
including confiscation of motor vehicles and heavy weapons, actions
to enforce control, and prosecutions.
--Paragraph 417 specifies that the Movements only move their
fighters to assembly sites when the disarmament of the Janjaweed is
verified, after phase 3 of the ceasefire (127 days after "D-Day").
--Paragraph 457 lays out the timetable for all these activities.
Some of the Janjaweed groups originate from foreign countries, and
have been causing havoc in Sudan. According to the Tripoli
Agreement between Sudan and Chad, signed on 8 February 2006, the
two countries are supposed to disarm all rebel elements from the
other country that are present on their territory. Paragraphs
341-344 of the DPA underline these obligations. But a Janjaweed is
a Janjaweed whatever his nationality: any foreign Janjaweed are
outlaws and the GoS must deal with them under the toughest
provisions of the paragraphs concerning the Janjaweed.
In the peace talks, the Movements argued strongly that some of the
Janjaweed have been absorbed into paramilitary groups including the
Popular Defence Forces and the police. The GoS asked, "Who are the
Janjaweed?" The Movements demanded a mechanism to deal with all the
paramilitary groups in Darfur, whether or not they could be called
"Janjaweed." This was included under a section called "Reform of
Selected Security Institutions".
--Paragraph 446 specifies these institutions, including the PDF,
Border Guards and Border Intelligence, and Police including
especially the Nomadic Police.
--Paragraph 447 specifies what shall happen to these institutions:
their size shall be reduced to pre-conflict levels or below, their
members must be drawn from all communities and they must have the
trust of all communities, and they must be respectful of human
rights and controlled by democratic bodies.
The organization responsible for this is the Darfur Security
Arrangements Implementation Commission (DSAIC), which is set up by
the DPA. The head of the DSAIC is appointed by the Movements and
answers to the Senior Assistant to the President, who is also a
nominee of the Movements. The GoS objected strongly to this,
demanding that the head of the DSAIC should be an appointee of the
GoS (with a deputy from the Movements) and should answer to the
President. However, on the final day of the negotiations--5
May--the GoS accepted the AU proposal, while registering its
reservation. Another provision in the DPA is for a Security
Advisory Team to be provided by a foreign country or international
organization, agreed by the Parties. The GoS was also unhappy with
this provision, but finally accepted it. The Security Advisory Team
will be part of the DSAIC and have an important role in
restructuring these institutions.
At the same time as these paramilitary forces are to be downsized
and reformed, the police force is to be built up, in such a way
that it can truly enjoy the confidence of the people and provide
law and order. More details of this will be covered in the article
on the security of IDPs. ...
When the security arrangements chapter was completed and presented
to the GoS and the Movements in Abuja, the overall reaction was:
"this is a tough deal for Khartoum." Most of the reservations
expressed by Dr. Majzoub al Khalifa, in his speech on 5 May in
which he accepted to sign the DPA, concerned security arrangements.
The Movements were much more pleased--which was not surprising, as
their negotiators had been extremely tough on these issues. Minni
Minawi was satisfied. Dr Khalil Ibrahim said, "The security
arrangements are generally OK." On security arrangements, Abdel
Wahid al Nour said on that morning, "The documents submitted are
acceptable. We have accepted that part." Nine days later, Abdel
Wahid had second thoughts and wrote to the GoS asking for
assurances that the SLM would be fully involved in monitoring the
disarmament of the Janjaweed. Dr Majzoub replied in a letter dated
14 May, and emphasized that the disarmament of the Janjaweed was
guaranteed by the CFC and the DSAIC, both of which included the
SLM. Sadly, Abdel Wahid still refused to sign.
For the Janjaweed to be neutralized and disarmed, and the people of
Darfur to live in peace and safety, much more will be needed than
a signed Agreement. The good faith of the GoS and the Movements is
essential. The African Union and international community have
strenuous monitoring and verification tasks to do. But, as this
article has tried to explain, the DPA is very good start. As this
article has also shown, the security arrangements chapter was
hammered out over many months of hard negotiation between the GoS
delegation and the Movements' representatives, and its most
important provisions are ones proposed, developed or agreed by the
SLM/A and JEM, and agreed by the GoS.
Security For IDPs and Refugees
July 14, 2006
By Alex de Waal
This is the second in a series of articles concerning the Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA), explaining how different parts were
negotiated, what the paragraphs mean, and how they should be
implemented. This article asks, how is security to be provided for
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees? The first article
considered the disarmament of the Janjaweed.
The conflict in Darfur has driven millions of people from their
homes and left them in camps for IDPs in Darfur and refugee camps
in Chad. Apart from the miserable conditions in these camps, and
the sadness and distress of being away from their homes, the IDPs
have faced serious security problems including violence and
harassment. Refugees and IDPs are also fearful that security may
not be guaranteed when they return home.
The Movements' negotiators were deeply concerned about the security
of the IDP camps and raised this at an early stage of the
negotiations in Abuja. The lead security negotiators--Ali Tirayo,
Mohamed Adam and Tajudeen Niam--worked in close coordination on
these points. Article 26 of the DPA is the outcome of their
initiative, with Paragraphs 262-281 painstakingly negotiated over
many long weeks. The United Nations and humanitarian NGOs also had
a big input into these provisions alongside the African Union. The
GoS security delegation led by General Ismat al Zain was tough and
professional, and examined every detail. The outcome is a set of
provisions that are workable and can provide real security
improvements for displaced people, both in their camps and as they
return to their homes.
Paragraphs 263-269 of the DPA are concerned with setting up
Demilitarized Zones (DMZs) around IDP camps. The reason for this is
that many camps--especially the smaller ones away from the major
towns--suffer from attacks by armed elements, resulting in people
being killed, injured and raped, and property stolen. The
Movements' delegates insisted that each camp should be surrounded
by a DMZ so that IDPs can move in safety, and the camps themselves
are better protected from attack. The GoS agreed. ...
One basic principle is that AMIS [African Union Mission in Sudan]
should decide on how big the DMZs should be and where their
perimeters should lie. ...
Another basic principle is that no armed persons should be allowed
in the DMZ. This doesn't include off-duty soldiers, who might live
next to an IDP camp--or even in a camp itself. They can go home
through a DMZ as long as they don't take their weapons. This
doesn't exclude the police either. Policing functions need to be
carried out in these zones. During the negotiations, one proposal
made was that AMIS civilian police should do all the police work in
DMZs. But the African Union soon realized this wouldn't work. AMIS
simply doesn't have enough police officers, and its officers also
don't have the legal powers to arrest people. Instead, the GoS and
Movements agreed that Sudanese police officers would do the police
work, under AMIS monitoring. In camps in areas controlled by the
Movements, AMIS along with the Movements' police liaison officers
will do the policing.
Security inside the IDP camps was another big concern. Each day,
the AMIS officer working with the AU Mediation received a situation
report from Darfur, and most days it would include a report of
violent incidents inside IDP camps. How should IDP camps be
policed? The GoS police officers in the talks insisted that, as a
matter of law, only Sudanese police should be allowed to undertake
policing activities. But they also recognized that their policemen
didn't enjoy the trust of the IDPs themselves, and simply couldn't
do the job. The Movements' delegates at first demanded that AMIS or
UN police should be brought in--but this wasn't practical.
An excellent compromise was agreed between the GoS and the
Movements. This is found in Paragraphs 272 and 273. This provides
for a "Community Police" force to be established. The Community
Police are to be selected from the community itself and will work
with community leaders. The training is to be done by AMIS, and the
security situation and the policing itself are to be monitored by
AMIS. The GoS will grant the Community Police legal authority, and
cases for prosecution must be handed over to the regular judicial
authorities, where they can be investigated and prosecuted under
The basic concept behind "Community Police" is a transitional
arrangement until a properly professional police force is
established, respected by all and able to ensure law and order
across Darfur. The Community Police drawn from the IDPs can be an
important part of that new force. As the IDPs return home, their
Community Police will return with them, providing security for the
returning IDPs, and bit-by-bit become an integral part of the
reformed police force in Darfur.
Establishing and training the Community Police in IDP camps is one
of the main responsibilities for the AMIS civilian police officers
in the coming weeks and months. The AU has already requested that
its civilian police units be strengthened for this purpose. The
Community Police should give immense confidence to the IDPs that
their basic security needs will be met. Paragraphs 274-279 specify
that all police units in Darfur should pay special attention to the
needs of women and children, including women police officers and
special counters to deal with reported crimes against women and
Speaking in the final session of the Abuja talks on 5 May, Abdel
Wahid al Nour said that the security arrangements provisions were
accepted. A few days later, however, he changed his mind and asked
for clarification, and wrote to Dr Majzoub al Khalifa on 14 May
asking for an assurance that "SLM/A shall contribute in the process
of ensuring the safe return of refugees and IDPs to their homes
including mounting joint patrols for this purpose." Dr Majzoub's
reply the same day was: "the request of the Liberation Movement as
to be part of the evaluation of the process [of security of return
of IDPs], such objective is absolutely, seriously and
uncompromisingly agreed upon."
Dr Majzoub did not respond specifically on the question of "joint
patrols"--units comprising both Sudan Armed Forces and
Movements--an issue newly raised by Abdel Wahid that week. However,
three points can be made regarding this. One, the Community Police
will return with the IDPs. Two, in any area that has been
recognized by the DPA as controlled by the Movements, the
Comprehensive Ceasefire ensures that the Movements remain involved
in ensuring security. And third, the DPA provides for the
integration of 4,000 Movement combatants into the army into units
in which they comprise either one third or one half of the
soldiers. The DPA doesn't specify where these units should be
deployed, but there is no reason why they should not be deployed in
areas of returning IDPs and refugees....
Leadership for Implementing the DPA
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the DPA and the East Sudan Peace
Darfurians in the Civil Service and Education
The Question of Land
The Future of the Movements' Combatants
The Comprehensive Ceasefire
Community Peace and Reconciliation
Guarantees for the DPA
How to Include the Different Darfur Movements
The Transitional Darfur Regional Authority
Compensation and Assistance to Victims
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