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USA/Congo (Kinshasa): Conflict Minerals Law

AfricaFocus Bulletin
Aug 2, 2010 (100802)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor's Note

There is little doubt that exports of "conflict minerals" -- including cassiterite, columbite-tantalite, wolframite and gold -- controlled by rebel groups and by units of the Congolese army itself contribute to ongoing conflict in eastern Congo. It is more difficult to say how much difference the new legislation requiring transparency from U.S. companies about the supply chain of these minerals will make.

Reacting to the hype of some of the most ardent advocates of the legislation, some critics say it will make little difference and evades the necessity to confront more directly responsibilities of governments, including Rwanda, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo itself. Of course there is much disagreement among commentators about the distribution of blame among these governments.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains a nuanced discussion of the issue by Jason Stearns, who formerly headed the UN Group of Experts which reported on conflict minerals and says the legislation is to be welcomed although its impact may be limited. His blog (http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/) contains his views, comments, and links to other commentators on the subject.

Also contained in this Bulletin are the remarks by one of the sponsors of the legislation, Senator Russell Feingold, and an extract of the most important provisions from the legislation itself.

For additional background on conflict minerals, see particularly the websites of the Enough Project (http://www.enoughproject.org/conflict_areas/eastern_congo) and of Global Witness (http://www.globalwitness.org/)

Two other AfricaFocus Bulletins released today also deal with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. One, sent out by e-mail and also available on the web at http://www.africafocus.org/docs10/lum1007.php, contains several short articles reporting on new evidence of U.S. complicity in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. Another, available at http://www.africafocus.org/docs10/cgk1007b.php, analyzes the dangers in continuing collaboration of UN Peacekeeping forces with Congolese government troops.

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins related to Congo (Kinshasa), visit http://www.africafocus.org/country/congokin.php

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on U.S. policy, visit http://www.africafocus.org/country/usa-africa.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note++++++++++++++++++++

Feingold Statement on Congo Conflict Minerals and Transparency Amendments to Financial Regulatory Reform Bill

Wednesday, May 19, 2010

http://feingold.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=325061

Mr. President, I am pleased to be an original cosponsor of two amendments to the Restoring American Financial Stability Act that seek to ensure there is greater transparency around how international companies are addressing issues of foreign corruption and violent conflict that relate to their business. Creating these mechanisms to enhance transparency will help the United States and our allies more effectively deal with these complex problems, at the same time that they will also help American consumers and investors make more informed decisions.

Mr. President, I am very pleased that my colleagues agreed yesterday to accept the first amendment, sponsored by Senator Brownback. This amendment specifically responds to the continued crisis in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Despite efforts to curb the violence, mass atrocities and widespread sexual violence and rape continue at an alarming rate. Some have justifiably labeled eastern Congo as "the worst place in the world to be female." Several of us in this body, including Senators Brownback and Durbin and I, have traveled to this region and seen first-hand the tragedy of this relentless crisis. Increasingly, American citizens are also learning of the devastating situation in eastern Congo and are actively engaged to bring about policy changes. I am pleased to see Americans so engaged on this issue.

One of the underlying reasons this crisis persists is the exploitation and illicit trade in natural resources, specifically cassiterite, columbite-tantalite, wolframite and gold. The United Nations Group of Experts has reported for years how parties to the conflict in eastern Congo continue to benefit and finance themselves by controlling mines or taxing trading routes for these minerals. In response to these reports, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1857 (2008), encouraging Member States "to ensure that companies handling minerals from the DRC exercise due diligence on their suppliers." Over a year ago, Senator Brownback, Senator Durbin and I teamed up to author legislation that would do just that: the Congo Conflict Minerals Act, S.891.

Mr. President, Senator Brownback's amendment is taken from that bill, but includes modifications based on discussions with representatives from industry, U.S. government agencies and the Banking Committee. The amendment applies to companies on the U.S. stock exchanges for which these minerals constitute a necessary part of a product they manufacture. It will require those companies to make public and disclose annually to the Securities and Exchange Commission if the minerals in their products originated or may have originated in Congo or a neighboring country. Furthermore, it will require those companies to provide information on measures they have taken to exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody to ensure activities involving such minerals did not finance or benefit armed groups.

I recognize that this conflict minerals problem is a complex one, given the importance of this trade to the local economy in eastern Congo and given the extensive supply chains and processing stages between the source and end-use of these minerals. The Brownback amendment was narrowly crafted in consideration of those challenges, and it includes waivers and a sunset clause after five years. However, I believe strongly that the status quo in eastern Congo is unacceptable to the people there and it should be to us as well. We have put financial resources toward mitigating this crisis, but we need to get serious about addressing the underlying causes of conflict. The Brownback amendment is a significant, practical step toward doing that, and I thank my colleagues for their support of it. I thank Senator Brownback for his longstanding leadership on these important humanitarian issues.

Mr. President, the second amendment, led by Senator Cardin and Senator Lugar, is different than the Congo amendment, but would complement it. This amendment would require companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges to disclose in their SEC filings extractive payments made to foreign governments for oil, gas, and mining. This information would then be made public, empowering citizens in resource-rich countries in their efforts to combat corruption and hold their governments accountable. In far too many countries, natural resource wealth has fueled corruption and conflict rather than growth and development. This so-called "resource curse" is especially problematic in Africa, and in 2008, I chaired a Subcommittee hearing on this very topic. I said then that we must look for ways that the United States can use our leverage to push for greater corporate transparency in Africa's extractive industries.

In addition to helping countries combat the "resources curse," it is also in our national interest to improve transparency in the extractive industries. The amendment was drawn from an important piece of legislation, the Energy Security through Transparency Act, S.1700. The bill was given this title because enhancing transparency in the extractive industries can have real benefits for U.S. energy security. This will ultimately create a more open investment environment and increase the reliability of commodity supplies. Energy security is a topic that Senator Lugar and his staff have worked on for years, and we all know how central it is to our national security. I thank Senator Lugar and Senator Cardin for their work on this important amendment, and I urge my colleagues to support it.


Why legislation on mineral trade is a good thing

Jason Stearns

July 26, 2010

http://congosiasa.blogspot.com /
direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/2d39t5l

[For additional background analysis by Jason Stearns, see http://alexengwete.blogspot.com/ / direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/y28dwu9]

There has been some debate of late in the blogosphere about the US legislation on improving supply chain due diligence with regards to Congolese minerals. See http://texasinafrica.blogspot.com (direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/2v9jo5o) for an interesting debate on Texas in Africa on this topic. The main criticisms can be boiled down to this:

  • Minerals are not the main issue. Land conflict, communal tensions, state weakness and failed demobilization programs are more important. (Texas in Africa, Pole Institute, http://tinyurl.com/2fadc3r)
  • By tarring the whole mineral trade with the brush of conflict minerals, we could end up in a boycott of a sector that provides livelihoods to up to a million people in the region. (Resource Consulting Services / http://www.resourceglobal.co.uk/, Dan Fahey / http://tinyurl.com/y8pksuq)
  • The way advocates like ENOUGH portray the role of minerals in the conflict is simplistic and often wrong. That kind of advocacy can be dangerous. (All of the above sources)

I have been a critic of the sensationalism of the "conflict minerals" lobby in the US. But I do support the bill (as do many other advocacy groups) both on principle and because it could contribute to rendering the Congolese state more accountable. Here are my responses to some of the criticisms.

1. Minerals were not the origin of the conflict, and many other factors are important. However, proceeds from minerals are a key pillar in financing these groups.

I myself have often chided pundits for reducing the conflict to a spectacle of savage Africans raping the country in order to get their hands on minerals. The conflict began more or less in 1996 (although the roots are much deeper) following the collapse of the Zairian state, the arrival of a million Rwandan refugees after the Rwandan genocide, and as local conflicts over land, identity and power got out of control. Minerals did not play a major role in this initial phase.

Minerals have, however, taken on a large role in the local economy and the conflict since then. In 2008, at the height of conflict in North Kivu, official statistics record around $30 million in tin, wolframite and coltan exports from the province. The real level of exports were probably at least two to three times as high due to smuggling, and this is without accounting for extralegal gold trade, which the Congolese senate estimated to be around $1,2 billion a year, mostly from the eastern Congo.

In 2008, I was the head of the UN Group of Experts. It was clear that the FDLR, Congolese army and the CNDP all benefited from this trade to the tune of millions of dollars a year. Talking with members of armed groups, it was very clear that minerals trade was important to the CNDP, FDLR, some Mai-Mai groups and the Congolese army. While some of this has changed since then (ex-CNDP and other Congolese arm units have taken over many mines previously controlled by the FDLR), minerals still play an important role in the conflict economy. If we assume that access to resources and power plays a key role in the Congolese conflict, then we have to assume that the minerals trade is at the core of the conflict.

Having said that, we must be sure not to reduce the conflict to minerals, minerals, minerals. The charcoal trade around Goma alone was estimated to total $30 million a year by the national park, and armed groups benefit from this, as well. Cattle herding plays a key role in the conflict, as the ex-CNDP in particular has deployed its soldiers to protect tens of thousands of cattle, worth $300-$900 each, many of which have crossed the border from Rwanda. And coffee, tea, fuel and timber also play a large role in the local economy. En bref, armed groups can benefit from any profitable trade in the region, not just from minerals.

Of course, the economy is not the only thing driving the conflict; people don't just fight due to greed. Conflict over land tenure has long antagonized local communities, fueled ethnic divisions and driven youths into armed groups. The immigrations of tens of thousands of Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi to Masisi in the 1930-1960 period further poisoned these communal relations and led many to claim that the descendants of these communities are not really Congolese.

Institutional weakness is another important factor in the conflict, as the Congolese army is desperately corrupt and weak, allowing space for small militia groups to form, often buying weapons from the very army that is supposed to get rid of them. Local land conflicts blow out of proportion because the administration cannot deal with them; military abuses go unchecked because the courts do not have the resources and clout to prosecute.

And yet, I do not see how promoting due diligence in the mineral trade will prevent us from addressing these other issues, as well. Instilling accountability in the minerals supply chain can have positive externalities on the Congolese administration in general by helping to promote accountability, strengthen the capacity of the revenue collection agencies and provide an incentive to the government to crack down on the local power barons who benefit from the trade. In order for this to be the case, however, donor efforts need to focus on working with the relevant Congolese state agencies (Ministry of Mines, CEEC, SAESSCAM, Cadastre minier, OFIDA

Hence, I agree with Pole Institute and Nick Garrett/Harrison Mitchell of RCS that in the end we need to strengthen the state and make the minerals trade more transparent. But I think that a key way of doing this is by implementing audits that will require Congolese traders and the Congolese state to be more transparent in the way they deal with the minerals trade. Without strong incentives, the trade will continue the way it is.

2. In terms of strategy, promoting supply chain due diligence is smart.

We have been trying for years in the United States and Europe to promote greater involvement in the Congolese conflict. Largely in vain. Donors have thrown money at the conflict and deployed a peacekeeping operation there, but for the most part we just don't care enough.

That has changed with the emphasis on sexual violence and conflict minerals. Of course, some of this focus in unsavory in the way it distorts the facts. Indeed, I think the reason there has been such a backlash against "conflict minerals" advocacy has been due to the way these voices depict the violence. As I have said before, militias in the Congo do not rape women just because they want to get their hands on minerals. Most minerals in cell phones do not come from the eastern Congo. The war did not begin as a conflict over minerals. And so on. I find a lot of this kind of lobbying distasteful - we do not need to tweak the facts to get attention, it's bad enough already, just present the facts.

But, for the first time since the beginning of the conflict, this lobbying has prompted a substantive push by legislators in the US. We now have a meaningful piece of legislation asking the Security and Exchange Commission to regulate the supply chain. This will be difficult to implement, but in the end should do something that I applaud: render companies accountable for the conditions under which their product is produced. As a consumer, I do not want my sneakers to be made by 9 year-olds , I do not want my sweatshirts to be produced in abusive workshops. If we can introduce legislation to promote accountability in the business sector in the eastern Congo, it is a good thing.

Yes, I wish we could have greater engagement in strengthening the Congolese judiciary and police. I wish there could be meaningful land reform and that disputes over farming rights could be settled by expert mediators (UN Habitat is beginning to do this). I wish we could have transparent democratic institutions throughout the country. But none of those issues stand necessarily in contradiction with due diligence in the minerals trade. I can't tell you how often I have been in meetings with officials at the State Department, insisting that they help in security sector reform and in paying attention to the return of Congolese Tutsi refugees. Nothing much came of that. Now that we have a chance to help promote meaningful reform in the minerals trade, I think we should seize the opportunity.

Of course, we should remind our interlocutors in Washington, New York, Kinshasa, Kigali, London, Addis and Paris at every step of the way that we want greater engagement on strengthening state capacity, promoting checks and balances, enhancing judicial capacity and independence and reforming the army.

But this does not stand in contradiction to due diligence in the minerals trade.


S.891 - Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009 (Introduced in Senate)

[Wording of original bill, later incorporated into amendment to financial reform bill, taken from http://thomas.loc.gov.]

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) The Democratic Republic of Congo was devastated by a civil war carried out in 1996 and 1997 and a war that began in 1998 and ended in 2003, which resulted in widespread human rights violations and the intervention of multiple armed forces or armed non-state actors from other countries in the region.

(2) Despite the signing of a peace agreement and subsequent withdrawal of foreign forces in 2003, the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo has continued to suffer from high levels of poverty, insecurity, and a culture of impunity, in which illegal armed groups and military forces continue to commit widespread human rights abuses.

(3) According to a study by the International Rescue Committee released in January 2008, conflict and related humanitarian crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo have resulted in the deaths of an estimated 5,400,000 people since 1998 and continue to cause as many as 45,000 deaths each month.

(4) Sexual violence and rape remain pervasive tools of warfare used by all parties in eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo to terrorize and humiliate communities, resulting in community break down which causes a decrease in the ability of affected communities to resist control by illegal armed forces and a loss of community access to minerals. Sexual violence and rape affect hundreds of thousands of women and girls, frequently resulting in traumatic fistula, other severe genital injuries, and long-term psychological trauma.

(5) A report released by the Government Accountability Office in December 2007 describes how the mismanagement and illicit trade of extractive resources from the Democratic Republic of Congo supports conflict between militias and armed domestic factions in neighboring countries.

(6) In October 2002, the United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo called on member states of the United Nations to adopt measures, consistent with the guidelines established for multinational enterprises by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, to ensure that enterprises in their jurisdiction do not abuse principles of conduct that they have adopted as a matter of law.

(7) In February 2008, the United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo stated, `individuals and entities buying mineral output from areas of the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo with a strong rebel presence are violating the sanctions regime when they do not exercise due diligence to ensure their mineral purchases do not provide assistance to illegal armed groups' and defined due diligence as including the following:

(A) Determining the precise identity of the deposits from which the minerals they intend to purchase have been mined.

(B) Establishing whether or not these deposits are controlled or taxed by illegal armed groups.

(C) Refusing to buy minerals known to originate, or suspected to originate, from deposits controlled or taxed by illegal armed groups.

(8) In its final report, released on December 12, 2008, the United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo found that official exports of columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, wolframite, and gold are grossly undervalued and that various illegal armed groups in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo continue to profit greatly from these natural resources by coercively exercising control over mining sites from where they are extracted and locations along which they are transported for export.

(9) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1857, unanimously adopted on December 22, 2008--

(A) broadens existing sanctions relating to the Democratic Republic of Congo to include `individuals or entities supporting the illegal armed groups . . . through illicit trade of natural resources,'; and

(B) encourages member countries to ensure that companies handling minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo exercise due diligence on their suppliers.

(10) Continued weak governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo has allowed the illicit trade in the minerals columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, wolframite, and gold to flourish, which empowers illegal armed groups, undermines local development, and results in a loss or misuse of tax revenue for the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The development of stronger governance and economic institutions that support legitimate cross-border trade in such minerals would--

(A) help prevent the exploitation of such minerals by illegal armed groups; and

(B) enable the hundreds of thousands of people who depend on such minerals for their livelihoods to benefit from such minerals.

(11) Metals derived from columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, wolframite, and gold from the Democratic Republic of Congo are used in diverse technological products sold worldwide, including mobile telephones, laptop computers, and digital video recorders.

(12) In February 2009, the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition and the Global e-Sustainability Initiative released a statement asserting that--

(A) use by the information communications technology industry of mined commodities that support conflict in such countries as the Democratic Republic of Congo is unacceptable; and

(B) electronics companies can and should uphold responsible practices in their operations and work with suppliers to meet social and environmental standards with respect to the raw materials used in the manufacture of their products.

(13) Notwithstanding the extensiveness of the supply chains of technological products and the extensiveness of the processing stages for the metals derived from columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, wolframite, and gold used in such products, companies that create and sell products that include such metals have the ability to influence the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo by--

(A) exercising due diligence in ensuring that their suppliers provide raw materials in a manner that does not-- (i) directly finance armed conflict; (ii) result in labor or human rights violations; or (iii) damage the environment;

(B) verifying-- (i) the country from which the minerals used to derive such metals originate; (ii) the identity of the exporter of the minerals; and (iii) that all appropriate tax payments are made; and

(C) committing to support mineral exporters from the Democratic Republic of Congo who-- (i) fully disclose their export payments; and (ii) certify that their minerals do not-- (I) directly finance armed conflict; (II) result in labor or human rights violations; or (III) damage the environment.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY

It is the policy of the United States, as affirmed by the Democratic Republic of Congo Relief, Security, and Development Promotion Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-456; 22 U.S.C. 2151 note) and consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1857 (2008), to promote peace and security in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo by supporting efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, other governments in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, and the international community--

(1) to monitor and stop commercial activities involving the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo that contribute to illegal armed groups and human rights violations in the Democratic Republic of Congo; and

(2) to develop stronger governance and economic institutions that can facilitate and improve transparency in the cross-border trade involving the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo in order to reduce exploitation by illegal armed groups and promote local and regional development.

SEC. 4. INVESTIGATION, REPORTS, AND STRATEGY REGARDING COLUMBITE-TANTALITE, CASSITERITE, WOLFRAMITE, GOLD, AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO.

(a) Support of Mandate of United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo- The President, acting through the Secretary of State, the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and other appropriate United States Government officials, shall use the voice and vote of the United States at the United Nations Security Council to renew the mandate and strengthen the capacity of the United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo to investigate links between natural resources and the financing of illegal armed groups, and ensure that the Group of Experts' recommendations are given serious consideration.

(b) Map of Mineral-Rich Zones and Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo-

(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, consistent with the recommendation from the United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo in their December 2008 report, work with other member states of the United Nations and local and international nongovernmental organizations-- (A) to produce a map of mineral-rich zones and armed groups in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo; and (B) to make such map available to the public.

(2) UPDATES- The Secretary of State shall update the map required by paragraph (1) not less frequently than once every 180 days until the Secretary of State certifies that no armed party to any ongoing armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo or any other country is involved in the mining, sale, or export of columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, wolframite, or gold, or the control thereof, or derives benefits from such activities.

(c) Guidance for Commercial Entities- The Secretary of State shall, consistent with the recommendation from the United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo in their December 2008 report, work with other member states of the United Nations and local and international nongovernmental organizations to provide guidance to commercial entities seeking to exercise due diligence on their suppliers to ensure that the raw materials used in their products do not-- (1) directly finance armed conflict; (2) result in labor or human rights violations; or (3) damage the environment.

(d) Strategy-

(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, working with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy to address the linkages that exist between human rights abuses, armed groups, and the mining of columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, wolframite, and gold in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

(2) CONTENTS- The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A plan to assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and other governments in the region in establishing and effectively implementing the necessary frameworks and institutions to formalize and improve transparency in the trade of columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, wolframite, and gold.

(B) An outline of assistance currently being provided and an assessment of future assistance that could be provided by the Government of the United States to help the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo strengthen the management and export of natural resources in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

(C) A description of punitive measures that could be taken against individuals or entities whose commercial activities are supporting illegal armed groups and human rights violations in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

(e) Annual Human Rights Reports- In preparing those portions of the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices relating to the Democratic Republic of Congo or countries that share a border with the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Secretary of State shall ensure that such reports include a description of any instances or patterns of practice that indicate that the extraction and cross-border trade in columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, wolframite, or gold has negatively affected human rights conditions or supported specific human rights violations, sexual or gender-based violence, or labor abuses in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo, during the period covered by each report.

(f) Annual Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development Investment Committee Report- In preparing the United States' annual report to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Investment Committee, the Secretary of State shall include a description of efforts by the United States to ensure, consistent with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, that enterprises under United States jurisdiction are exercising due diligence to ensure that their purchases of minerals or metals are not originating from mines and trading routes that are used to finance or benefit illegal armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

(g) Authorization of Appropriations- There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State for fiscal year 2010 such sums as may be necessary for the Secretary to carry out the provisions of this section.

(h) Definitions- In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES- The term `appropriate congressional committees' means-- (A) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(2) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS- The term `Human Rights Reports' means all reports submitted by the Secretary of State to Congress under sections 116 and 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n and 2304).

SEC. 5. DISCLOSURE TO SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF ACTIVITIES RELATING TO COLUMBITE-TANTALITE, CASSITERITE, AND WOLFRAMITE INDUSTRIES.

[Amends Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require disclosure to the SEC of the origin of imports of columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, or worlframite]


AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

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