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Sudan: No Easy Ways Ahead
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Apr 25, 2010 (100425)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
"A vote for secession [in the 2011 referendum] is a foregone
conclusion - given overwhelming Southern popular sentiment - but
the time remaining to ensure that the process is orderly,
legitimate, and consensual is desperately short. The potential
flashpoints for a new war are many. Any new armed conflict runs the
risk of becoming rapidly regionalized and difficult to contain, let
alone resolve." - Alex de Waal
This comment comes in the first chapter of a timely assessment by
the Heinrich Boell Foundation of the options for Sudan after the
elections and the forthcoming referendum on Southern Africa. In the
preface the editors note that "in discussions about the future of
the country, and in the day-to-day business of diplomats and
international observers, the perspective beyond 2011 has only
recently started to receive attention." Despite the uncertainties
of completing the steps outlined in the current peace agreement,
the authors explain, it is urgent to begin trying to understand how
to avert Sudan's descent into another war or extended
ungovernability and fragmentation.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin, available on the web but not sent out by
e-mail due to its length, contains excerpts from the preface and
the first two chapters of this extensive report. The full report is
available on the Foundation website (http://www.boell.org/web/index-531.html).
Another AfricaFocus Bulletin sent out today, and available at
http://www.africafocus.org/docs10/sud1004a.php, contains several
reports and analyses of the April 11-15 elections.
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Sudan, see
http://www.africafocus.org/country/sudan.php
For continuing analysis and commentary on Sudan, see
http://www.sudantribune.com and http://blogs.ssrc.org/sudan
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++++++++
Sudan - No Easy Ways Ahead
Edited by the Heinrich Boell Foundation
[Excerpts from preface and first two chapters. The full report,
including references, footnotes, and tables, is available at
http://www.boell.org/web/index-531.html]
Preface
Towards the end of the six-year interim period defined in the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Sudan is potentially sliding
into yet another crisis. The general elections in April - the
first in 24 years - represent a rare test of confidence for the
country's incumbent elites. For many observers, however, the
elections are merely a prelude to the referendum on the future
status of South Sudan scheduled for early 2011.
Both the general elections and the referendum come at the end of
a transitional period that has, in many ways, been more about
stagnation than about transition. The implementation of the CPA
has often been delayed and was marred by a lack of trust between
its signatories: the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement (SPLM). As a consequence, the agreement has
largely failed to realize democratic transformation and to make
the unity of the country attractive. Instead, political tensions
in the run-up to the elections indicate that older conflicts
still persist, and that the referendum will only reconfigure
challenges. The already fragile situation could easily trigger a
new outbreak of violence.
It is therefore of the utmost urgency to prepare for the post-CPA
period in Sudan. In discussions about the future of the country,
and in the day-to-day business of diplomats and international
observers, the perspective beyond 2011 has only recently started
to receive attention. Not all events of the coming years are
fully predictable, of course. Yet it is possible to delineate
potential scenarios, and to identify the political options they
open up for different actors.
The Heinrich Boell Foundation, which has been working both with
civil society partners in Sudan and on Sudan-related issues in
the German context, has put together this publication in order to
reflect on such scenarios. We have been fortunate to bring
together an exceptional and diverse group of authors to discuss
political perspectives for the country. The chapters of this
volume reflect the different backgrounds and perspectives of this
group, but also their shared concern for a democratic and
peaceful Sudan.
In the introductory chapter, Alex de Waal outlines the enduring
features that underlie Sudanese politics, and develops scenarios
for the future of the country after the end of the CPA. He
particularly emphasizes that the current debate around unity vs.
secession may easily obscure an equally important question:
whether or not, after decades of conflict and institutional
decay, Sudan will remain governable at all. Atta El-Battahani,
one of the most respected advocates of democracy in Khartoum,
continues from there. He traces Sudan's largely unsuccessful
attempts at democratic transformation since independence, putting
current efforts into historical perspective. El-Battahani then
goes on to provide a concise and well-informed guide to the 2010
general elections: a brief who's who of the Sudanese political
scene, including all major parties, their internal dynamics, and
electoral strategies.
John Yoh adds a Southern perspective to this picture. His
contribution critically assesses the SPLM's five years as a
"liberation movement in power," and it stresses the urgency for
Southerners to think beyond the 2011 referendum. Yoh's analysis
of Southern Sudan is complemented by Marina Peter's chapter on
the future of the "three areas." People in Blue Nile, the Nuba
Mountains, and Abyei - three regions that challenge the clear-cut
North-South divide in Sudan - are increasingly concerned that the
SPLM's support for independence might leave them high and dry.
Informed by her long-time work with Sudanese civil society, Peter
argues for an inclusive political process that gives the
population of the "three areas" a real say in their future.
The last two chapters focus on the external dimension of Sudanese
politics and conflicts. Roland Marchal disentangles the complex
web of interests, rivalries, alliances, and dependencies that
links Sudan to its neighbors in the region. He then develops
scenarios on how the possible secession of Southern Sudan could
affect this precarious regional order. Finally, Peter Schumann
shows how an initially local conflict became the concern of a
variety of international actors, and outlines the sometimes
conflicting interests of key players. Drawing on his experience
with the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), Schumann argues
that a successful international engagement in Sudan does not
necessarily require an increase in means, but rather a clear
political mandate and an end to the deliberate use of ambiguity
among the main stakeholders.
This publication has been made to challenge the reader to look
beyond the fragmentation of Sudan. There is an urgent need for
political perspectives for the country as a whole, irrespective
of the results of the 2011 referendum. The independence of
Southern Sudan may answer some questions, but it leaves many
fundamental problems unaddressed and creates a number of new ones
- from the issue of citizenship to the distribution of oil
revenues. None of these problems can be solved unilaterally; they
all require the readiness for compromise and cooperation across
borders.
The international community, including Germany, can play a
constructive role in facilitating workable post-CPA arrangements.
The upcoming elections and the 2011 referendum usher in a time of
choices for Sudan: imperfect choices perhaps, but crucial ones
nevertheless. The contributions to this volume concur that none
of the ways ahead is easy and straightforward, and that the risk
of a return to open conflict is very acute. But they also give an
impression of how the decisions taken now may be a first step
away from the problems that have plagued Sudan for decades.
Berlin, March 2010
Kirsten Maas-Albert, Head of Africa Department
Toni Weis, Project Manager
Sudan's Choices: Scenarios Beyond the CPA
Alex de Waal
Introduction
As the interim period of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
draws to a close during 2010-11, Sudan faces two critical tests
of its nationhood: the general elections and the referendum on
self-determination for Southern Sudan. Instead of a dynamic
partnership between the two former adversaries, fashioning unity
out of diversity, Sudan is dominated by two mutually distrustful,
defensive, and exhausted parties that playing a game of zero-sum
politics. Conditions are not propitious for a peaceful transition
to a post-CPA Sudan.
This chapter outlines enduring features of Sudan's political
life, which then form a framework for identifying flashpoints for
the coming year and scenarios for Sudan after 2011.
One abiding feature of Sudan is the lack of a consensus on
national identity, including the ambiguity of key national events
such as independence in 1956 and the CPA in 2005. A second is a
zero-sum political game, in which successive governments try to
fit all constituencies into a common vision or constitutional
framework, and invariably fail. Sudan's political space is not
big enough for its political actors. To the extent that the
country is held together, it is possible through an ongoing
process of dialogue and bargaining under a framework of
persisting impermanence. The third element is the gradual but
relentless erosion of both governmental institutions and the
socio-political mores that maintained cohesive patrimonial
networks, and their replacement by monetized, internationalized,
and factionalized patronage systems.
The chapter then examines scenarios for 2011 and beyond. Two
questions have preoccupied most scenarios up to now, namely unity
versus Southern secession and the question of whether this will
lead to a new war. A vote for secession is a foregone conclusion
- given overwhelming Southern popular sentiment - but the time
remaining to ensure that the process is orderly, legitimate, and
consensual is desperately short. The potential flashpoints for a
new war are many. Any new armed conflict runs the risk of
becoming rapidly regionalized and difficult to contain, let alone
resolve.
Two other neglected aspects of the crisis also loom. One of these
is the question of whether Sudan will become ungovernable,
especially in the event that the rulers in Khartoum and Juba find
themselves unable to meet the financial demands of their
respective patronage networks. A second is whether Southern
secession will set in motion a process of territorial
fragmentation across Sudan as others begin to demand
self-determination.
Enduring Features of Sudanese Political Life
The failed search for national identity
Acclaiming the CPA in January 2005, President Omar al-Bashir
called it 'the birth of Sudan's second independence." This
much-repeated phrase was a decidedly double-edged compliment.
Sudan's national independence, achieved on January 1, 1956, meant
very different things to different people. Prime Minister Ismail
al Azhari led the National Unionist Party, which officially
acclaimed independence as an intermediate step toward unity with
Egypt. Secular nationalists thought otherwise, whereas the
leaders of the Umma Party saw it as restoring Sudan's "first
independence" under the Mahdist state (1885-98). On the even of
independence, Southern soldiers were already in revolt, whereas
Southern political leaders reluctantly agreed to support the
parliamentary vote for independence based on a promise - later
dishonored - that there would be a federal constitution (Alier
1992).
Independence was an irrevocable step and an incomplete
compromise, and failed to resolve the ambiguities of Sudan's
identity. Unsurprisingly, it was the harbinger of recurrent
political crises as Sudanese struggled to resolve the paradoxes
of their nation. Born with an interim constitution, Sudan has
been under provisional governments or emergency rule for most of
the last 54 years (Woodward 1990; Abdel Salam 2001).
The Sudanese have spent more than half a century arguing about
what it means to be Sudanese (Al-Effendi 1991; Deng 1995). The
main axes of debate have been whether Sudan counts as an Arab or
an African nation, and whether it should be ruled by Islamic or
secular laws. The North-South polarity has obscured an equally
important divergence within the North, brought belatedly to light
by the still unresolved Darfur war of 2003/04 (de Waal 2005).
Despite these bitter and bloody contests over Sudanese collective
identity, Sudanese society has been remarkably inclusive over the
question of which people are entitled to count themselves as
Sudanese.
Two revolutionary regimes tried to enforce a permanent order on
Sudan - Nimeiri from the secular left and Turabi and Bashir from
the Islamist right. Both regimes failed, and their failures
exacted a high cost on the country's institutions and
socio-political mores. Both regimes ended up using cash as the
currency for political allegiance - a process of injecting
corruption into the bloodstream of national politics.
The CPA, signed in Nairobi on January 9, 2005, was, potentially,
the most significant political agreement in modern Sudan. As with
independence, however, it also means different things to
different people, and is another interim arrangement - this time
with a specified six-year time frame. The CPA postponed rather
than resolved the ambiguities of Sudan's identity. Most
importantly, it set a deadline for settling the question of
whether Sudan was one nation or two with the referendum of
January 9, 2011.
The ambiguities of the CPA begin with its Arabic translation:
ittafag al salam al shamil. The term shamil (comprehensive) was
intended to imply that it addressed all the key national issues,
and was an opening to an inclusive democratic future. (And indeed
the CPA is a remarkably far-ranging document.) However, shamil
derives from the same root as shumuliya (totalitarianism), and
variants of the term have been used by Nimeiri (to refer to his
one party state) and Turabi ('The Comprehensive Call to God'). In
the context of the CPA, the term shamil implies an agreement
exclusively between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) jointly to monopolize
power.
From the viewpoint of the NCP, the CPA represented the best deal
for the South and the last and best chance for unity. According
to the NCP leadership, the "one country two systems" formula gave
the Southerners privileged status: The SPLM not only controlled
the South but also had a major stake in the North, including veto
power over key aspects of national political life. The
Southerners, they anticipated, could want nothing better. For the
ruling party and security elites, "making unity attractive"
entailed implementing the wealth-sharing and power-sharing
formulae of the CPA, enabling the SPLM to govern the South, while
also offering material inducements to the Southern elites to
encourage them to believe that their financial interests lay in
continued union.
Among the SPLM and its constituencies, mostly in the South, views
about the CPA diverged. John Garang and his closest followers
genuinely supported the agenda of the "New Sudan," which aimed to
overturn the historical legacy of minority rule and enable the
majority of Sudan's people, who are both marginalized and do not
identify themselves as Arab, to be fully represented at the
center of state power. Garang saw the CPA as opening up the
prospects for a radical transformation of the Sudanese polity. He
argued that, in due course, the NCP would have no option but to
submit to unstoppable political forces of change. For him,
"making unity attractive" meant building the New Sudan, which
would convince Southerners that they need not confine themselves
to ruling the South, but should also enjoy the right to rule the
North as part of a larger coalition.
By contrast, most Southerners saw the CPA as the waiting room for
independence, with the formal commitment to unity no more than a
ruse to ensure that the deal was acceptable to the international
community, including the African governments that have been
strongly averse to tampering with colonial borders. Throughout
the 22 years of war, most of the SPLM rank and file had regarded
Garang's "New Sudan" philosophy as expedient, assuring themselves
that "for what we are fighting, we know."
The SPLM constituencies within Northern Sudan - including
non-Arab minorities such as the Nuba and Blue Nile people -
endorsed Garang's vision of a united and secular Sudan. But most
failed to understand precisely what the CPA entailed for them.
The protocol on the "Three Areas" included a provision for
special status for South Kordofan and Blue Nile states during the
interim period, with a "Popular Consultation" to be conducted
among the elected state assemblies on whether this status should
continue. However, many SPLM supporters in these areas expected
that they would be allowed to vote in the Southern referendum,
joining their areas to a future Southern Sudan. According to the
CPA, this is the case for the people of Abyei only.
Among the non-NCP Northern Sudanese, the CPA meant something
different again. For the opposition political parties, the
provision that counted more than all others was the "mid-term"
elections, heralded as the first free and fair multiparty
elections since 1986. Having been unable to challenge Khartoum
militarily, these parties saw their best chance in electoral
politics. Their misgivings about the CPA were muted by the fact
that they had no alternative but to support it - in the hope that
the elections would work in their favor - and that they would be
able to command the votes of constituents who had supported them
20 years previously.
For the Darfurians, however, already in rebellion as the last
stages of the negotiations progressed, the CPA meant little. The
leaders of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) were sympathetic to Garang's New Sudan
vision. Their political philosophies saw Darfur as a victim of a
dominant center - in much the same way as the South - and
identified the solution as a transformation of politics at the
center. Darfurians placed much faith in Garang as an individual,
and consequently lost confidence when he died. The Abuja
negotiations that led to the abortive Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA) were designed as a buttress to the CPA as a means of
allowing the Darfurians to participate in national political
transformation. When the final round of Abuja talks was underway
(November 2005-May 2006), it was expected that the elections
would be held in 2008 or early 2009, implying that all
power-sharing provisions in the DPA would last for three years at
most, and should therefore be seen as short-term interim
arrangements pending the vote. In fact, none of the parties in
the talks saw the issue in those terms. Despite the clear
language of the CPA, they all treated the power-sharing issues as
though they were a permanent settlement. Rather than seeing the
Darfur crisis as "the Sudanese crisis in Darfur" (African Union
Panel on Darfur 2009) they became introverted and focused on the
specifics of Darfur itself. Instead of the CPA serving as an open
door to democratization, it was treated as an arbitrary ceiling
on the Darfurians' demands. These may have become self-fulfilling
expectations. The lack of special provisions for Darfur - even
while Darfurians were subject to continuing violence and forced
displacement - made a mockery of the inclusiveness implicit in
the English word "comprehensive."
Southern separatists hope that secession will definitively
resolve the clash of identities in Sudan. However, that is
optimistic. The borders are arbitrary and the identities in the
transitional zone on either side are not settled. South and North
have a long common history that will be hard to disentangle. The
partitioning of Sudan will not resolve the debate over Sudanese
national identity, whether Northern, Southern, or combined.
Rather, it will reconfigure that debate.
Zero-sum politics
The successes of the CPA lie in the fact that its arrangements
are uniformly interim - that it consigns everyone to the same
provisional status. The central challenge of CPA implementation
has been how to manage incommensurate aspirations. Success is
possible only with a sense of optimism that expands the size of
the national political and economic space. Unfortunately, under
most circumstances, Sudan's political culture is a zero-sum game
in which any gains by one side are necessarily seen as a loss by
the other. Today, the two principal parties are on the defensive,
mutually sizing each other up, testing one another, and assuming
the worst of one another.
The history of independent Sudan is a succession of efforts to
reconfigure the country's political geometry, privileging some
groups at the expense of others. Usually, those who are excluded
are the Southerners and other marginalized peoples, though in the
mid-1970s it was the Northern sectarian parties and Islamists
that were squeezed out. At some points, governments have tried to
liquidate their opponents physically, for example when Nimeiri
crushed the Ansar and the Communists in 1970-71, and when the
National Islamic Front crushed the civil opposition in 1989-91,
and tried to destroy the identities of the Nuba and other
marginalized people in 1992-93. Southerners have suffered from
violent suppression more than others. More common has been simple
exclusion from power and reward.
However, the only constituency that has been politically
eliminated in Sudan is the Communists, and even that remains,
albeit in vestigial form. The rest are simply too resilient. The
1986 elections reproduced the results of 20 years earlier,
mocking Nimeiri's revolutionary ambitions. Free and fair
elections today might well show that the sectarian parties have
declined in influence, but they will surely remain important
national actors.
One of the features of the turbulent Sudanese political process
is that everything is constantly open for renegotiation. This is
a source of endless frustration to external mediators, who tend
to look for a renegotiation-proof legally binding document. There
is no higher power that can guarantee or enforce any agreement,
and the Sudanese know this well. An inspirational Sudanese leader
can turn this indeterminacy into an advantage by selectively
postponing the most divisive issues and instead focusing on
building a consensus on a cross-cutting political platform,
anticipating that there will be a new reality in place when the
divisive issues re-emerge.
The most inclusionary moments in Sudanese politics have coincided
with economic booms, which allow the government to dispense
patronage liberally, bringing formerly excluded groups into the
ruling coalition without sacrificing those already in power. This
was the case in the 1950s, again during the borrow- ing-fueled
expansion of the mid-1970s, and above all during the mid-2000s
oil boom. The national budget, which was less than $1 billion in
1999, increased at a vertiginous rate after oil exports began at
the end of that year, reaching $11.8 billion in 2007 (World Bank
2007). The SPLM leadership, having passed over the chance to
block oil extraction in the late 1990s, now realized that it
faced a much better-funded enemy while it also had the chance of
enjoying its own share of the money. The NCP could afford to
bring the SPLM into government, and thereby open up more
oilfields and (it was promised) obtain US refining technology,
without a net loss of income. The CPA was made possible by the
oil boom and the positive-sum political calculus that it opened
up.
The CPA was also possible because its two architects were
determined to use the power of the collegial presidency to lead
from the front, making the elections and referendum a plebiscite
on the future, not on the record of the past. At the time when
the CPA was negotiated, the revenue projections made
socio-economic transformation within six years a real
possibility.
A mechanical "implementation" of the main provisions of the
Agreement can only work if it is ancillary to a dynamic
partnership between the NCP and SPLM. The relationship between
the two parties was certain to be troubled. But the mutual
respect between the two vice presidents, John Garang and Ali
Osman Taha, along with their common approach to overcoming
problems by thinking structurally and thinking ahead, meant that
it stood a chance. With Garang dead and Ali Osman weakened, the
CPA was reduced to a formula, requiring constant mediation by
third parties, especially the United States.
The CPA is an extraordinarily complex agreement involving
multiple transitions, from war to peace, from dictatorship to
democracy, and from centralized rule to federalism and potential
partitioning. Under any circumstances, implementation would have
been a major challenge, requiring goodwill and coordination
between the parties along with international stewardship and
resources - in the event these conditions did not exist. Four
events since the signing of the CPA sapped the spirit of the
agreement, and turned CPA implementation into little more than an
exercise in ticking boxes and marking time.
The first and biggest blow to the CPA was the untimely death of
Garang in a helicopter crash on 31 July 2005, just 21 days after
he assumed the post of First Vice President. No other Southerner
could make a convincing case for unity, and his successor, Salva
Kiir, has made no secret of his secessionist sympathies. The
central institution of the CPA, the collegial presidency, failed
to function thereafter: the engine of transformation stalled. As
a consequence, the Government of National Unity (GoNU) has
staggered from crisis to crisis, rarely functioning as a cohesive
unit, with each party blaming the other for bad faith.
The second blow was the failure to resolve the Darfur crisis.
This reinforced the mutual suspicions of many in the NCP and
SPLM, with each accusing the other of betrayal. Critically,
Darfur diverted diplomatic attention and aid resources, and
slowed down and halted the prospects of normalization of
relations between Khartoum and Washington. The issue of an
international military force for Darfur resurrected the specter
of regime change and contributed to a mutual distrust that fed
the paranoia of Khartoum's security chiefs, which in turn fueled
Washington's distrust. Sudan sees any concession to the United
States as giving something for nothing, while any step by a US
Special Envoy that appears to be of benefit to Khartoum is
immediately criticized by the advocacy and Congressional lobbies
as a compromise with evil. Once this particular relationship was
configured in zero-sum terms, any US contribution to making the
CPA into a transformative instrument faded away.
The Abyei dispute showed precisely how the zero-sum political
calculus operated, with neither party ready to explore creative
options, and each defining success as disadvantaging the other.
International efforts to mediate the Abyei dispute, led by the
United States, were premised on a view that a legal agreement,
whether reached by negotiation or arbitration, would represent a
final resolution. In Sudan, no agreement is permanent. As with
any complex border issue, one or other party can find a reason
why what appears to be a final, non-appealable settlement is
incomplete. The Abyei case shows that the content of a formal
agreement is less important than the bargaining process, and that
international guarantees need to be heavily discounted.
The fourth development that damaged any positive-sum potential of
the CPA was the decision of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) to seek an arrest warrant against President
Omar al-Bashir in July 2008, and the arrest warrant issued by the
Court in March 2009. The logic of legal accountability for crimes
committed ran counter to the political logic of negotiating the
transformation of Sudanese politics. For the president as an
individual, and for his closest supporters, the overriding
political objective became personal survival. Bashir feared that
once stripped of the security that comes with wielding power, he
would be vulnerable to a successor regime handing him over to The
Hague, just as had happened to the former Yugoslav president,
Slobodan Milosevic. The possibility of a government, whether a
signatory to the Rome Statute or not, executing the arrest
warrant was sufficiently real to influence government thinking
and planning. The ICC issue consumed the majority of the
political energies of the NCP from July 2008 for a year, and gave
the ruling party every reason to delay reform of the security
laws. Most importantly, the ICC challenge turned the NCP toward a
desperate search for legitimacy, and it located the legitimacy it
seeks in the reelection of Pres. Bashir. The "mid-term"
elections, which had initially been envisaged as a mechanism for
creating an inclusive and democratic government, became instead
an instrument for keeping the president in office. The NCP sees
this as an important card to play vis-…-vis the SPLM and the
secessionist demand. If the SPLM disputes the legitimacy of
Bashir's reelection, we can expect the NCP to dispute the
legitimacy of the referendum.
As the national economy has swung from boom to sharp contraction,
the economic space has narrowed too. Conditions are inauspicious
for making irrevocable political choices.
The political marketplace
At independence, Sudan was governed modestly. Khartoum, the
Gezira, and the adjoining areas paid for themselves and for a
renowned professional civil service, and the rest of the country
was run cheaply using the "native administration" system. This is
one manifestation of the profound disparity between the center
and periphery - also marked by profound inequalities of wealth -
which has determined Sudanese politics for the subsequent half
century. A web of social norms regulated political life, giving
Sudan a remarkable elite civility despite the recurrence of
extreme violence, mostly in the remoter rural areas.
Today, Sudan is still ruled by a hybrid of institutions and
patronage systems, but the patronage systems have become
dominant, as successive regimes have either dismantled or
neglected institutions and social norms. They have appropriated
all financial means - including state budgets and international
borrowing to fund gargantuan patrimonies. Nationalist, socialist, and
Islamist revolutions failed to build new and robust political
allegiances, but did succeed in undermining old affinities.
Increasingly, governments used cash to purchase loyalty,
monetizing the patronage system and turning some of the country's
marginal areas, notably Darfur, into a "political marketplace" in
which local leaders auction their allegiance to the highest
bidder (de Waal 2007). Having alienated or destroyed most
political parties in Northern Sudan, Nimeiri used the funds
available from international creditors following the 1973 oil
boom to buy off political competition. In the early 1980s he
opened the door for the army to enter the marketplace, setting up
military-commercial joint ventures. As the bills mounted and the
economy shrank, Nimeiri appealed to Washington for bailouts, and
when his financiers finally baulked at the cost, and demanded
austerity measures, his government collapsed. Fifteen years of
austerity followed, in which state finances shriveled, and
successive governments sought ever more creative ways to pay the
army and build a political base, including calling upon Islamist
financial systems (Brown 1992).
The period of Islamist retrenchment accelerated the
informalization of governance. The institutions that formerly
administered state power have shrunk and been replaced by a
porous system of multiple parallel governing institutions run on
a patronage basis. For example, the national army is no longer
the only significant military power, but is rivaled by security
agencies that have sectarian loyalties. Islamic banks and party
organizations have bypassed the state. Large amounts of the money
available to the ruling group do not pass through any form of
official budgetary scrutiny, but are dispensed directly through
party and security structures (African Rights 1997). The main
pillars of the early post-colonial state have all been
dismantled: the Gezira Board, Sudan Railways, and the civil
service. This has contributed to the decline of trust in
government and the failure of governments to attain legitimacy in
the eyes of the populace.
Sudan's emergence as an oil producer allowed for new claimants to
be added to the patronage systems without shortchanging those
already receiving largesse. It allowed for the creation of state
governments across Sudan, putting tens of thousands more on the
public payroll. Under the austerity programs of the 1990s,
government expenditures were less than 10% of GDP, but rose
quickly after 2003 to reach 23% in 2006, at a time when GDP was
growing from 6 to 10% annually (World Bank 2007).
Although the economy has grown hugely, the benefits have been
distributed very unequally. Khartoum is a middle-income enclave,
while places such as the Red Sea Hills remain among the poorest
on the planet. The allocation of services, employment, and
development projects in Sudan does not follow the logic of need,
but the logic of political weight. In the early 2000s, almost 90%
of infrastructure spending occurred in Khartoum state, in
response to the political leverage of the urban constituency and
the profits to be made from contracting. In the CPA period, about
60% of development spending has been on five major projects, all
of them within the central "triangle" in the North, notably the
Merowe Dam (World Bank 2007).
Reflecting this imbalance is a significant strand of thinking
within the NCP that argues that the central "triangle" of Sudan
can survive without the South and the West of Sudan, and that in
some ways this region would be better off without its troublesome
peripheries. Publicly associated with the name of the former
finance minister, Abdel Rahim Hamdi, this political tendency is
Northern- separatist and Islamist. It has deep roots: In the
nineteenth century, Sudan was divided between central
"metropolitan" and outlying "military" provinces; in the early
twentieth century, the British designated the latter as "closed
districts," investing almost exclusively in the former. The
location of the country's biggest capital investments, such as
the new Nile dams within the "Hamdi Triangle," can be seen both
as an economically rational focus on where the returns are
greatest, but also as an insurance strategy against the
possibility of the breakup of the country. Currently, the
Sudanese ruling group extends its influence across its borders
through the cash dispensed by its security officers. Should
Khartoum be compelled to redraw its inherited borders, it would
continue to exercise this influence across its contracted borders
in much the same way.
While Sudanese are unable to agree on the fundamental political
issues facing their country, the money available to the NCP and
security financiers has made it possible for the ruling group to
remain in power, by dint of patronage alone.
This governing system is highly sensitive to cash flow. When the
budget is expanding, the ruling party can increase its support
base by allowing more members of the elite to benefit, either
directly or through dispensing patronage to them. When there has
been a financial squeeze, turmoil has followed. A clear case is
the fall of Nimeiri, but the eruption of inter-ethnic clashes
across Southern Sudan that followed the dramatic contraction of
the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) budget in 2008/09 is another
example.
Central to the CPA was financial reform to create a federal
system that would guarantee every state sufficient funds to run
its own affairs, including its own capital budget. This has not
worked as planned, especially after changes in the leadership of
the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, and the Fiscal and
Financial Monitoring and Allocation Commission in 2008. The great
majority of the available revenue comes from oil and is centrally
allocated, rather than collected directly by the states
themselves. In this context, federalism serves more as a payroll
and disbursement mechanism and less as a genuine delegation of
authority to the states. A combination of oil revenues and
internationally financed reconstruction in the South was
envisaged as "making unity attractive" so that Southerners would
be ready to vote for unity in 2011. While oil revenues met
expectations, overseas development assistance was disappointing
despite pledges made at the post-CPA Oslo donors conference. US
sanctions remained in place, setting up huge obstacles to Western
companies doing business in Sudan. Although US sanctions were
supposed to exempt the South, in practice the sanctions have
served as a deterrent to any American or European companies
operating anywhere in the country.
Current expenditure has risen far faster than capital expenditure
in the CPA period (World Bank 2007). This is particularly the
case for chapter one spending, on salaries. The public sector
payroll has expanded hugely. Part of the reason for this is that
the CPA itself places major financial obligations on the parties,
especially for salaries, on account of new institutions and new
levels of government. Federalism is a major expense. The "peace
dividend" for many Sudanese has come in the form of public sector
salaries. However, in the context of political competition
between the NCP and SPLM, with the parties preparing for the
eventuality of a new armed conflict, this spending has taken on a
different character. It also functions as the widespread purchase
of loyalty, through keeping large numbers on military and public
sector payrolls, along with off-budget spending to seek the
allegiance of elites. In both North and South, official defense
and security spending has also risen sharply.
On taking over the administration of South Sudan in 2005, the
SPLM inherited weak institutions and possessed no strong
administrative or political structures itself. It preferred to
dismantle the pre-existing NCP security structures and build
anew. It was aided by enormous international goodwill, an
established infrastructure of humanitarian agencies, a
Multi-Donor Trust Fund, and oil revenues that climbed to provide
the GoSS with $1.5-2 billion a year. However, the new GoSS was
constrained by a scarcity of trained personnel and a near
complete absence of its own institutions, or experience in
running a government, at any level. Before the CPA, the SPLM
Secretariat for Finance managed funds of just $100,000 per year
(World Bank 2007: 67). The sheer volume of money available and
the many and varied demands from foreign partners and the local
populace added up to an overwhelming challenge. In addition, the
first priority of the GoSS under Salva Kiir was to repair the
deep rifts that had occurred among the Southern population and
leadership during the war. The Juba Agreement of January 2006,
which brought militia formerly aligned with Khartoum into the
GoSS and SPLM, was an achievement of equal significance for the
South and the CPA itself. It signaled the resolution of a
potential internal civil war within the South. The price of this
was that the SPLA payroll expanded enormously. Many of the
200,000 or more soldiers were "salary parade," paid only in order
to keep their communities and their commanders loyal. The real
fighting strength of the SPLA was considerably lower, but the
price of peace was an inflated payroll. Patronage also served as
a means of securing the North-South transitional area, where the
SPLA recruited among the Arab tribes. This strategy depended on
skill in running a patronage system and on a continuing high
price of oil, given that oil revenues provided more than 90% of
the GoSS budget. Neither could be assured, and when the oil price
plunged and corruption scandals came to light, the credibility
and effectiveness of the GoSS suffered.
The peace agreement has therefore had the ironic unintended
consequence of distorting public spending, entrenching a
patronage-based system of governance, and undermining the growth
of institutions while also drawing spending away from
development.
Intensified political competition - for the elections and even
more so for the referendum on self-determination - has the effect
of drawing more and more resources into the contending patronage
systems. The ruling party - worried to the point of paranoia that
its political hegemony is in jeopardy - will spend ever larger
sums on purchasing loyalties, or at least renting them for the
critical period, while its adversaries, especially the SPLM, will
try to compete. The NCP has decades of expertise on its side and
deep pockets, but people are apt to blame the party and its
leaders, with justification, for most of the setbacks of the last
quarter century. The opposition has popular sentiment on its
side, although it must contend with growing disillusion with the
SPLM performance in government in Juba and the historical record
of the sectarian parties, which is disappointing to say the
least.
The political marketplace in Sudan is not only monetized but
internationalized. Neighboring countries - notably Libya, Egypt,
Chad, and Eritrea - have entered the market as buyers, or
renters, of allegiance. The international community, especially
the United States, has played a significant role, extending funds
and recognition to the SPLM and the Darfur rebel groups. Coming
on top of the domestic political competition - with rival
patronage systems based in Khartoum and Juba funded by oil
revenues - the result has been price inflation in loyalty, to the
extent that it is unclear whether the country can afford the
bill. Should either or both governments find themselves unable to
meet basic patronage obligations, Sudan is likely to tip over
into becoming ungovernable.
Prospects for Peace
The Government of National Unity
Many Sudanese and international observers fear that the
Government of National Unity - constituting the NCP and SPLM as
the major partners under the CPA and Interim National
Constitution - will not survive until the January 2011
referendum. There are a number of potential major pitfalls during
2010 that could result in the collapse of the GoNU (Clingendael
Institute 2009; US Institute of Peace 2009).
The first challenge is the general elections, postponed from
2008/09 and scheduled for April 2010. Some have advocated further
delay until after the rainy season (International Crisis Group
2009), but this would mean that a new government is unlikely to
be fully constituted in time for the January 2011 referendum.
Simplification of the elections may be an option, for example
making the legislative elections into a straightforward
constituency-based first-past-thepost contest, abandoning the
proportional representation lists.
The mid-term elections were included in the CPA for several
reasons. One was concern that an agreement that excluded the
other political forces in Sudan would be unstable and ultimately
illegitimate. An unfortunate precedent was the 1976 "National
Reconciliation," which undermined the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement,
because the parties newly brought into government refused to
recognize the special status of the South, not having been party
to the negotiations. Specifically, the NCP and SPLM were
persuaded that the historic decision on unity or secession would
be legitimate only if it were presided over by a democratically
elected government. Underpinning this was a principled commitment
to democratization - the idea that an election could be a
transformative exercise.
The logic has now changed to a zero-sum exercise. The collegial
presidency and the de facto North-South confederation mean that
it is not a "winner take all" contest, and the continuation of
the GoNU in some form is close to a foregone conclusion. However,
it may be a "loser loses all" contest. Should President Bashir
lose office, he may face trial in The Hague. Consequently, the
implicit bargain offered by the NCP to the SPLM is that the SPLM
should recognize the legitimacy of Bashir's reelection, in return
for which the NCP will recognize the legitimacy of the Southern
referendum.
The difficulty with such a bargain is that neither party is in a
position to deliver on its own. The SPLM cannot provide a
definitive seal of approval to the election of Bashir, because
there are so many other parties ready and willing to withhold
legitimacy. Nor can the NCP legitimize the Southern referendum on
its own, even if it could adopt a common position to do so. The
SPLM will also, quite reasonably, fear that the NCP will renege
on any promises in the months between the election and the
referendum.
What could make the process manageable is that the two principal
parties need each other - constitutionally and economically. Each
needs the other for legitimacy, and the mutual financial
dependency on oil extracted from the South and exported through
the North requires that they cooperate to a minimum degree.
During 2009, the SPLM acted as government in the South but
increasingly as an opposition party in the North, despite its
senior positions in the GoNU. It speaks much about the oddities
of Sudanese political life that such a paradoxical position is
not only tolerated but widely understood. However, it is
sustainable only insofar as the CPA formula for power-sharing
remains intact, and insofar as the internal political balance
within the NCP and SPLM remains indeterminate. If the elections
disturb any of those balances, then the bargaining over the
formation of a new GoNU could become fractious and even
paralyzed.
Two other events in the final months of the CPA Interim Period
could also provide flashpoints. One of these is the two "Popular
Consultations" to be held in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, in
which the newly elected members of the two state assemblies will
decide whether or not to continue with the autonomous status that
they enjoy under the CPA. For many of the SPLM supporters in the
two states, this is certain to be a disappointment, as the
prospects of a "New Sudan" have faded and the option of becoming
part of the South is not on offer. There are serious tensions,
particularly in the Nuba Mountains, which could witness renewed
violence. The second is the vote of the people of Abyei as to
whether they should join the South. Abyei has already been a
major contention, and the details of who is eligible to vote in
this local referendum could become a significant stumbling block.
Unity or secession
The referendum date of January 2011 is a watershed. Any
government in Khartoum or Juba that presides over a cancellation
or significant delay in the referendum will face a legitimacy
deficit that is probably irredeemable. However, implementing the
outcome of the referendum will be extraordinarily difficult.
There is no doubt that the majority of Southerners favor
secession and will vote that way given the chance. Insofar as any
referendum is a verdict - not just on the CPA but on the entire
55 years of independence and indeed the preceding century of
North-South relations - any other result is inconceivable. Only a
visionary leader able to turn the vote into a plebiscite on the
future would be able to change that logic, especially if he were
campaigning as a Southerner who had managed to win the national
presidency. Since the death of Garang, that is not a prospect.
Secession is unstoppable. It could be slowed down or suspended by
a variety of mechanisms, none of which command popular support
among the Southerners. Postponing the referendum itself would be
possible only with the active support of the SPLM leadership,
which is not currently contemplating any such proposal, and which
would suffer a legitimacy deficit if it were to take this step. A
more realistic option is to extend the post-referendum interim
period. The vote is for secession - a process - not independence,
an outcome. The CPA treats the secession process only as an
afterthought, specifying a six-month period, after which the
South would emerge as an independent state. There is, however, a
vast agenda of business to be completed if separation is to be an
orderly process. Among the key issues are the demarcation of the
border, the citizenship status of Southerners in the North and
Northerners in the South, the division of national assets and
debts, the status of the SPLM in the North and the NCP in the
South, a formula for dividing oil revenue, the position of the
South on the Nile waters agreement, and arrangements for
pastoralist groups that migrate across the internal boundary and
share resources on both sides. Under optimal circumstances,
resolving these questions would require several years of
negotiation. It is most improbable that agreement can be reached
by July 2011. Under these circumstances, a second interim period
in which these issues are negotiated may be an option. The
Referendum Act of December 2009 contains a provision for the
parties to talk about post-referendum relations - an important
opening to deal with this agenda.
The SPLM will face a challenge with the referendum. The movement
contains powerful unionist constituencies, most of them from the
groups in Northern Sudan that supported the SPLM during the war,
such as the Nuba and Blue Nile people. In the case of a
partitioning that is anything other than fully consensual, these
groups - along with the SPLM as a party in Northern Sudan - will
face the prospect of political repression, perhaps worse. The
likely fate of the Nuba and Blue Nile people is the strongest
argument, within the SPLM, for a gradual or delayed process of
self-determination in the South.
War or peace
In early 2010, the GoNU exists largely in name. It does not
function as a cohesive entity, but rather as two antagonistic
parts that work together from necessity alone, lurching from one
crisis to the next. The most senior leaders of the NCP and SPLM,
including President Bashir and First Vice President Kiir, insist
that a return to armed conflict is unthinkable. But their
commitment to peace is a negative one: They fear war rather than
believe in peace. There is a constant subtext of reciprocal
threats of a return to violence, with hardliners on either side
warning that it cannot be ruled out.
At a time when Sudanese citizens expected a peace dividend and
widespread demobilization and disarmament, the governments in
both Khartoum and Juba have expanded their military forces,
spending considerable amounts on military hardware (Small Arms
Survey 2009). They have spent even more lavishly on loyalty
through a hugely expanded payroll: It is better portrayed as a
"security race" than a conventional arms race. Such an
intensified competition is not necessarily a predictor of war,
because it is logical for each side to pursue a policy of
deterrence. Although Khartoum's defense and security budget is
larger and has more men on its payroll, the Southern forces would
be expected to possess stronger motivation to fight in any future
conflict, because they will at long last be fighting for
something in which they strongly believe, namely their own
independent state. This morale factor should compensate for any
asymmetry in numbers and weaponry, and makes the reciprocal
threats credible.
To be effective, deterrence requires credible centralized command
and control on each side, and the diversity of the different
armed formations under the control or sponsorship of Khartoum and
Juba means that this precondition may not be met. Each party
secures the loyalty of multiple armed formations by paying them,
so that cohesive command requires a steady flow of money.
Unfortunately, the loyalty bills are so high - and the revenues
to the governments so volatile - that there is a constant danger
that control systems may break down. Armed conflict could be
triggered, not by a command decision in Khartoum or Juba, but by
a local dispute flaring out of control in the shadow of mutual
distrust and a communication breakdown between the parties.
There are numerous potential flashpoints for future conflict,
including disputes over oil extraction and revenues,
un-demarcated borders and poorly regulated cross-border movements
of pastoralists, the status of Southerners and SPLM supporters in
Northern Sudan and Northerners and NCP supporters in the South,
and the physical proximity of the Sudanese Armed Forces and SPLA
soldiers in Joint Integrated Units.
Should an armed conflict erupt, the political calculus in Sudan
will change rapidly and radically. There are various scenarios
for the forms that a renewed war might take. There could be a
conventional war, or at least a conventional phase in a conflict
that is also fought by mutual destabilization and guerrilla war.
This might consist of a Northern operation to take control of the
oilfields, combined with air attacks on Southern cities to try to
isolate the South from international assistance. The South might
attempt a conventional assault on Northern cities. Alternatively,
both sides might use proxy militia in what would become an
extended and aggravated inter-ethnic conflict. Some Southerners
warn darkly of organized violence against their kin who live in
Northern cities.
Under most scenarios, once armed conflict has erupted, it is very
likely to escalate rapidly as each party pours more material and
human resources into the fighting, each tries to fight on its
preferred geographical and political terrain, and reciprocal
trust collapses along with confidence in any third-party
mediation. It will be difficult for neighboring countries to
remain uninvolved, which in turn will complicate diplomatic
efforts. Egypt has a strong commitment to a united Sudan, Uganda
has deep ties with the South, and most of the other neighbors
have been involved militarily in Sudan in recent years. The
international community's leverage will be reduced to almost zero
during such a stage, and international actions will be focused
mostly on the evacuation of foreign nations, safety of
peacekeepers and aid workers, and responding to humanitarian
crises.
The threat of ungovernability
Today, Sudan's main domestic mechanism for conflict management is
financial patronage. This functions in the shadow of unregulated
political competition between the NCP and SPLM, and between the
NCP and what it sees as an international conspiracy in favor of
regime change. This is leading to a defensive zero-sum political
game in which the NCP and SPLM spend excessively on rival
patronage systems. Apart from war, there is another adverse
outcome to arms races, which is that the economic burden cripples
one party to the point of collapse. It is possible that today's
arms-and-patronage race will end up with the Sudanese parties
bankrupting themselves and making Sudan effectively ungovernable.
Virtually the entire political energies and resources of the NCP
and SPLM respectively are devoted to staying in power, with
respect to one another, their troublesome constituencies, and
regional and international governments. For both parties, the
principal mechanisms for holding on to power include their
defense and security structures, and their patronage networks,
financed by oil revenues that repeatedly escape full accounting.
Sudan's security race resembles a cold war in which each side is
hoping to outspend the other, but at the risk of bringing both
governance systems to a point of collapse. As the referendum
approaches, this race quickens.
One consequence of escalating spending on loyalty - at a time of
reduced government revenue - is scaling back efforts to provide
public goods through investment, such as services and
development. Planned social and economic change is fading,
including efforts to "make unity attractive" in line with the
CPA. Sudanese public discourse is infused with a sense that
public institutions have decayed, and that social mores have
changed (Ibrahim 2008). Commentators - Sudanese and foreign -
concur that gloomy futures are more credible than brighter ones
(Clingendael Institute 2009; US Institute of Peace 2009). Older
Sudanese have nostalgia for a past in which it is believed -
perhaps with exaggeration - that government enjoyed legitimacy
and public trust prevailed, including the latter days of the
colonial era (Deng and Daly 1989).
If either party finds itself unable to purchase loyalty at the
going rate, then it will be tempting for them to rent allegiances
by providing clients with a license to loot and pillage other
communities seen as aligned with their adversaries. This is the
formula that has led to a succession of cheap militia-led
counter-insurgency operations, which have devastated large areas
of the Sudanese periphery (de Waal 2007).
Meanwhile, Sudan is undergoing huge and accelerated unplanned
social and economic transformation (Munzoul 2008). It is on the
threshold of 50% urbanization. This process has been marked since
the 1970s through both peace and war. Population data for South
Sudan are contested but it possible that accurate enumeration
would reveal that half of all Southerners are urban residents, in
the South, the North, and neighboring countries. It is clear that
the CPA period has not reversed the urbanization process - if
anything the migration to the cities has increased, while few
displaced people have returned to rural areas. Darfur is a
better-measured example of traumatic urbanization and livelihood
change. It is also more rapid: "South Sudan speeded up" (Ryle
2004). Compared to just 18% urbanized in 2003, more than 60% of
Darfurians lived in towns and displaced camps in 2009. This is
not wholly negative. Sudan's cities, while poorly planned, have
better services than the rural areas, and are more stable and
less violent. The urban economies are dynamic. But this
phenomenon is little studied and less understood. National
economic planning and international development cooperation have
not adjusted to this reality.
A strong and institutionalized government capable of making a
credible policy commitment is necessary to make peace. One of the
special perils of the current scenario is that organizing
violence on a vast scale will reduce both Khartoum and Juba to
factionalized protection rackets, expending all their resources
on trying to retain their hold on sovereign privilege, and
destroying Sudanese society in the process.
Fragmentation
Should the people of the South exercise their right of
self-determination and opt for secession, other Sudanese will
articulate the same demand. In an important respect, it is the
South that holds Sudan together. Many people in the Nuba
Mountains and Blue Nile have already rehearsed their claim to
self-determination (Rahhal 2001). Some militant Darfurians who
have historically the strongest claim to separate statehood -
having been incorporated into Sudan only in 1916 - are also
talking in these terms. Currently, only a small minority of
radicals has openly proposed that Darfur should secede from
Sudan, but in the context of Southern separation, this number is
sure to grow. Sudan's liberation movements - including the SPLM
and the Darfurian rebels, the Sudan Liberation Movement and the
Justice and Equality Movement - have all argued for national
transformation and for reforming central power. But in practice,
they have neglected the politics of the center in favor of
mobilizing in the peripheries - a strategy that has been
described as "liberating the Bantustans" (Abdalla 2009). Among
the ruling elite, there is a vocal minority that argues that they
should be allowed to have their wish, and that it is not worth
fighting for these outlying areas and their truculent
populations.
The Sudan government has already forfeited many of the attributes
of sovereignty. Revising its borders would be another insult,
akin to the many it has received over the last 25 years. But each
abrogation of sovereignty brings an opportunity in which Sudan's
rulers usually identify in due course. Territorial fragmentation
would not be without its advantages. Reduced to the historic
"metropolitan provinces" or the "Hamdi Triangle," the Sudanese
state would be more comfortable in pursuing an Arab-Islamic
agenda. Within this region, Arabism and Islamism are no less
problematic than in the current "greater Sudan." The indigenous
people of this area are a mixture, and there have been waves of
migration from all quarters over the centuries. Nonetheless,
political leaders have defined Sudan's diversity in geographical
rather than social terms, and the logic of territorial
self-determination for the South, and possibly Darfur too, would
legitimize a "self-determination" agenda for the riverain North
based on Arabism and Islamism.
Should this occur, all those who identified with the South,
Darfur, and places such as the Nuba and Blue Nile, would
instantly become foreigners in Khartoum. Stripped of citizenship
rights, they would be rendered even more vulnerable to
exploitation. The state would be empowered to withdraw
entitlement to services such as education and health, and would
probably threaten them with roundup and expulsion.
The Sudan government currently has obligations for the welfare
and protection of its citizens across the whole country. It has
gradually outsourced its humanitarian and service duties to
others, including especially international organizations. The
UN-African Union hybrid operation in Darfur has a protection
mandate. Many Darfurians, along with their international
sympathizers, would like nothing more than for Khartoum to
withdraw its presence from the region, leaving it as the
exclusive responsibility of the Darfurians and the international
community. There are also some in Khartoum who would be ready to
accept the experiment, confident that the ruling elite would
benefit, and that provincial elites and international
organizations would not do a better job of governing these areas.
The partitioning of Sudan will not resolve the identity and
governance challenges of Sudan, but rather reconfigure these
challenges. It is possible that an already complicated situation
could become more intractable.
Conclusion
The chance for the success of the CPA lay in three elements: the
interim nature of political authority, the dynamism of the
collegial presidency in generating a real hope for the future,
and the expanding financial resources following the oil boom and
the hope of donor funds and American investment in the oil
industry. If the CPA were to be implemented in a mechanical
fashion, it would have been doomed to fail, as it could not in
itself have resolve the fundamental political problems of Sudan
but only reproduced them in a way that allowed dynamic leaders to
move the country forward. What has happened is that the letter of
the CPA has been partly implemented, without its spirit, and the
CPA itself is shifting from being an asset to a liability.
The major question preoccupying Sudanese today is whether Sudan
is one country or two, and how the decision will be managed.
State partitioning is a traumatic affair at the best of times and
in Sudan the conditions exist for it to be bitter, contested, and
disorderly. A North-South war in Sudan would undo the fragile
gains of the CPA, possibly leading to separatist tendencies
elsewhere in the country, and dragging neighboring countries into
the vortex.
As the endgame of the CPA is played out, the fundamental question
facing Sudan may not be whether it is one nation or two, but
whether it is governed or ungoverned. The ongoing decline of
trust and legitimacy has created a situation in which staying in
power is the only task that either of the two ruling parties can
achieve. The sheer cost of maintaining two competing centers of
power - each fearing that the other is intent on its destruction
- may be too much for the country to afford. When the cost of a
rival patronage system exceeds the financial capacity of its
sponsor, the simplest way of renting loyalty is to license
plunder. Moreover, if the knock-on effect of a contested
partitioning is the fragmentation of Sudan, then rulers can
declare the victims of such pillage as non-citizens, beyond the
reach of their obligations. Future observers may look back on the
CPA's Interim Period as an interlude of calm, promise, and missed
opportunity.
Sudan Votes: The 2010 Elections and Prospects for Democratic
Transformation
Atta El-Battahani
Introduction
The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January
2005 ushered in a six-year transitional period in Sudan. This
period carried with it the possibility for a meaningful
democratic transformation of the country. However, for a number
of reasons, the agents driving this change have revealed
themselves to be weak, disorganized, and lacking the
organizational capacity to effectively contest the upcoming 2010
general elections.
The weakening of the forces of change in Sudan goes back to early
periods of stalled transitions in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1980s.
Failed transitions steadily eroded already accumulated democratic
assets, with each period of transition tipping the balance of
power away from democratic change agents and more toward
conservative, pro-establishment forces. While general elections
in the past took place under the auspices of "independent"
transitional governments, the 2010 elections are taking place
under an incumbent, NCP-dominated government. Judging from past
elections, and in view of the present balance of power, forces
with vested interest in the status quo are likely to maintain
their positions of power in the upcoming elections - an
eventuality that could have dire consequences for the political
future of the country.
This section, which explores the current agenda for democratic
transformation in Sudan and its background, is divided into four
parts. The first section puts the upcoming general elections in
the context of Sudan's past experience with multiparty elections
and democratic transitions. Part two outlines the run-up to the
2010 elections and the problems, both political and practical,
these entailed. The third section then analyses the goals and
election strategies of Sudan's main political parties. The
concluding part, finally, develops scenarios for the possible
outcomes of the elections.
Sudan's experience with democratic transitions
Sudan is an exceptionally diverse country. According to one
account, it is home to no less than 19 main nationalities
(majmoua'a gawmiyya) and 597 ethnic groups (majmoua'a airgiyya)
(Beshir 1988). Socio-economic changes, together with natural and
man-made disasters (desertification, famine, and civil war), have
resulted in some significant changes in the numerical and
demographic weight of these ethno-national groups. However, these
changes have by no means obliterated ethno-national diversity.
Differentiation along national and ethnic lines has been further
sustained by cultural, linguistic, religious, social, and
political differences. There are an estimated 115 dialects in
Sudan today, with 26 of them as active languages, each spoken by
more than 100,000 people (Ahmed 1988: 7-18). About 52% of the
population are Arabic-speaking, while 48% speak other languages.
Diversity also expresses itself sharply in religion, with Islam,
Christianity, and other religions professed by different sections
of the population. Religious heterogeneity is further sustained
by the prevalence of sectarian cleavages within Islam - the
religion of the majority (Beshir 1988).
At the risk of oversimplification, these different and often
conflicting socioeconomic, ethnic, and cultural interests have
led the people of Sudan to coalesce into three major political
blocs: a pro-Arab/Muslim conservative alliance; radicals in the
center (both left- and right-wing parties); and ethno-regional
forces in the periphery. While the establishment has historically
found political representation mainly in the Umma Party and the
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), radicals include both Communists
and Islamists, and ethno-regional forces are represented, among
others, by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The
Communists primarily drew support from workers and farmers, the
trade unions, and the women's movement, whereas Islamist support
came mainly from the lower urban class, professionals, and the
new business class.
The interactions between these different political camps have
shaped Sudan's history since independence, and they continue to
shape the debate around democratic transformation today. To
understand the current "transitional" phase in Sudanese politics,
it is thus necessary to briefly look at the three prior attempts
at democratic transformation in the country.
First transition: 1953-56
At the time of independence in the early 1950s, Sudan was faced
with three major constitutional problems: the constitutional
status of Southern Sudan; the constitutional status of Sudan
itself (i.e., whether the country should be linked with Egypt in
some form, or whether it should become fully independent); and
the task of reshaping state institutions to be more responsive to
the socio-economic development of the country. However, with the
issue of self-determination for Sudan rapidly approaching, the
second problem overshadowed the other two and became the dominant
issue in the elections for a new Constituent Assembly. The main
task of this body was to decide on the future constitutional
status of Sudan, and to prepare the country and its people for
independence during a three-year "transitional period" (Bechtold
1976: 176-77).
The National Unionist Party (NUP) won the elections in 1953 and
formed the country's first post-independence government. However,
instead of now granting federal status to the South and attending
to socio-economic development in the country at large, the energy
of the new government was drained by its protracted conflicts and
squabbles with religious, sectarian leaders on the one hand, and
by fending off external pressures on the other. Barely two years
after independence in 1956, the NUP-led government was succeeded
by an Umma-PDP1 government, which was in turn overthrown by a
military coup in 1958.
Second transition: 1964-65
The new military regime under General Ibrahim Abboud (1958-64)
laid down the foundations for state-led economic development and
adopted an independent foreign policy that led to cooperation
with both the Western and the Eastern blocs. However, the
draining of government revenue by the continuing civil war in the
South as well as growing frustration and resistance among trade
unions, the urban classes, and intermediary groups damaged the
prestige of military rule. Communists and radical leftist
elements formed the United National Front (UNF). With support
from the trade unions and students, a successful general strike
neutralized middle and lower ranks of the army and eventually
brought down the military regime on October 24, 1964.
Shaken by the ascendency of Communists and radical forces, the
conservative/ traditional political bloc fought back, mobilized
rural-based, religious masses, besieged and defeated the
transitional October government, and replaced it with a
government more in tune with the wishes of the political
establishment. Elections organized in the 1960s were all won by
Umma and the DUP. They led to the creation of coalition
governments that succeeded only in undermining changes and
wasting public resources. As in the 1950s, party squabbles were
the rule of the day. In an attempt to ostracize the forces of the
radical bloc, the ruling traditional parties banned the Sudanese
Communist Party (SCP) and expelled its members from parliament.
They continued to undermine all proposals for solving the
"Southern problem" and went on the offensive by proposing a
presidential republic under an Islamic Constitution. To prevent
this from happening, the radicals in the armed forces again took
over in a bloodless coup in 1969.
Third transition: 1985-86
Having wrested power from the traditional political parties, the
leader of the coup, Jafaar Nimeiri, fell out with his erstwhile
supporters in the Communist Party. In 1972, he struck a deal with
the Southern rebels and signed the Addis Ababa Agreement, thus
ending a long-standing civil war. However, this era of
North-South d‚tente was short-lived. A few years later, in 1977,
Nimeiri patched up his differences with the traditional parties
as well as the Muslim Brothers in what became known as "national
reconciliation." Amid growing protests against the economic
reform policies of the late 1970s, and fearing a possible
overthrow of his regime, Nimeiri called himself Imam of Muslims
and adopted sharia law. This move alienated his support base in
the South and contributed to the formation of the SPLM in 1983.
Nevertheless, a broad-based popular movement succeeded in
overthrowing the Nimeiri regime in 1985. However, the intifada
(popular uprising) government influenced by radicals once again
upset the conservative and traditional parties, who were not
interested in meaningful change. General elections were organized
in 1986 from which Umma, the DUP and the National Islamic Front
(NIF) emerged victorious. According to Hamid (1988), looking at
the events of the late 1980s, "any veteran observer is bound to
be gripped by a profound sense of d‚j… vu." The similarities
between the reactions to the short-lived revolution of 1964 and
the uprising of 1985 were indeed striking:
The political malaise permeating then paralyzing the body politic
in the late 1980s is like an uncanny recurrence of the same
affliction that plagued the country in the late 1960s: the same
disarray of the same coalition governments of the same political
parties; the same instability that is symptomatic of an
unworkable political system and an unpredictable political
process. The bankrupt economy, drained by a costly civil war,
corruption and mismanagement is even worse than the recurrent
economic crises of the 1960s. It is as though history is
repeating itself with a vengeance (Hamid 1988).
Again, this deadlock was resolved by undemocratic means. In June
1989, the Islamists in Sudan took over power in a coup d'‚tat to
counter a perceived threat posed by the SPLM and the marginalized
regions, thus marking the most violent confrontation between
North and South yet.
Fourth transition: 2005-11
After their accession to power, the Islamists created a new
balance of political forces in Sudan, reshaped state
institutions, redefined the terms of political debate, made
inroads into civil society and, above all, imposed Islamism as
state ideology. Against this new orthodoxy, the idea of a "New
Sudan" - proposing a restructuring of power at the center and
opening up the state for ethnic and regional groups on the basis
of an inclusive concept of citizenship - was introduced by the
SPLM and gained support in the South, but also among radicals in
the North.
Violent confrontations between North and South intensified in the
period between 1989 and 2005, claiming more than 2 million dead,
4.5 million internally displaced, and 600,000 refugees in
neighboring countries. The costs to cover humanitarian and
emergency work alone were estimated at about US$2 million per
day. In the face of this tragedy, the regional neighbors of
Sudan, as organized in the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD), and the international community joined
efforts and brought the warring parties to a negotiating table.
In January 2005, the CPA was signed by the National Congress
Party (NCP) and the SPLM. The Agreement was seen as a compromise
between two diametrically opposed forces, but with the potential
of "making unity attractive" for the country and fostering
democratic reform.
Five years after the signing of the CPA, the results are
sobering. The nature of government in Sudan has not become less
authoritarian, and prospects for unity seem very dim. As in the
prior attempts at democratic transition in Sudan, there is reason
to fear that hopes for fundamental change will be short-lived
(see table 1). However, there is still a chance that the upcoming
general elections will correct this negative picture. Despite the
bleak outlook, the elections of 2010 do matter for Sudan's
political future, and they may prove to have a lasting effect on
the country after all.
The run-up to the 2010 general elections
As one of the key elements in the strategy to develop a more
equitable, stable, and inclusive political system in Sudan, the
election is central to the timetable of the CPA. It is intended
to demonstrate the possibility of a democratic political system
in a unified country.
The relevance of past elections
Belief in the transformative power of multi-party elections has
long been a driving force in development policy. In recent years,
however, this belief has increasingly come under scrutiny. The
ballot, it has been argued, has been fetishized, encouraging an
empty performance of electoral behavior that leaves the
fundamentals of politics unchanged. It is yet possible, according
to this argument, to still have a ballot deny the population the
essentials of democracy: access to justice, governmental
transparency, and freedom of expression and association.2
Nevertheless, Sudan's forthcoming election is not simply a
post-conflict imposition by the international community. In a
way, elections can be an authentic moment of national cohesion
and participation. As the brief overview of Sudan's experience
with democratic transitions has shown, this idea has roots in
Sudanese political experience, most notably in the 1953
"self-government" election. Like the upcoming 2010 general
elections, the election of 1953 was held under difficult
circumstances, with much suspicion and tension and with limited
time and resources. Nevertheless, it confounded skeptics by its
peaceful, orderly nature and by the high level of participation
by voters. It laid the foundation for Sudanese independence in
1956. Today it still offers an inspiring model of national
participation; it gave voters a new sense of citizenship, and
gave to the many public servants who were involved in running it
an experience of working together in the interest of a new
nation.
It is true that multi-party elections have not so far produced a
stable and lasting government in Sudan. However, failures of
government should not be construed as evidence of any fundamental
unsuitability of elections to Sudanese circumstances. Sudan's
political instability has many causes. Shortcomings of
leadership, a difficult colonial inheritance, and complex
regional politics have all played a part. That elections have not
fulfilled their promise of remaking political culture has been
partly a result of the sheer size of these challenges. But it has
also been a consequence of problems in the electoral process,
which have undermined the possibility that elections might create
a new relationship between citizen and state, and which have also
become visible in the run-up to the 2010 elections.
These problems have been of two kinds. The first has been
malpractice. This has been widespread and massive under
authoritarian regimes, ranging from the stuffing of ballot boxes
by election staff and the switching of boxes after voting has
taken place, to less flagrant but equally problematic forms such
as intimidation, the use of government resources in campaigning,
interference in news media, and the deliberate exclusion of
candidates deemed unsuitable by the ruling party. On the whole,
however, in multi-party elections, malpractice was normally the
work of candidates and their agents, not of officials.
Alongside these malpractices, Sudan's elections have also been
undermined by problems of resources. Elections by secret ballot
are a very complex logistical exercise and a major challenge for
the administrative capacities of the Sudanese state. Problems
include the size of the country, wide variations in levels of
education among the population, and widespread suspicion of
government. Besides this, there have been two principal
deficiencies in administration: a serious shortfall of trained
staff, and an insufficiency of transport. In the past, levels of
participation in multi-party elections have thus been low in the
South, West, and East of Sudan - that is, in most parts of the
country outside the central riverian area.
Preparations for the 2010 elections
Sudan's history shows the potential role that elections may have
in political life - as genuine moments of participation that
evoke the idea of a democratic Sudan. But this potential has not
yet been realized, and there is a strong possibility that the
forthcoming election will suffer from a combination of all the
weaknesses that have undermined previous elections. There is
widespread public skepticism and suspicion of possible
malpractice, based on people's experience in previous
authoritarian elections; and there are immense logistical
challenges.
One such challenge concerns the 2008 population census, on whose
basis the electoral register is established. The census results
have been publicly disputed by leading SPLM politicians, as well
as other observers. According to the SPLM, the census was
politically manipulated to reduce the number of Southerners both
in the South and in the North: The number of Southerners in
Khartoum, for example, was put at about half a million, whereas
at least one and a half million is a more realistic figure.
A second major concern in the run-up to the elections has been
the voting in unstable regions. In places such as Darfur, where
rebel groups haven threatened to attack election officials and
disrupt the voting process in the Nuba Mountains, Abyei, and
other parts of South Sudan, it is questionable whether the
current security situation is propitious to a peaceful and
orderly election process.
Even if elections do take place in these areas, the likelihood of
post-election violence cannot be ruled out, particularly in case
the NCP and Omar al-Bashir emerge victorious. Given the
politically (over)charged campaigning period, the outbreak of
violence in major urban cities, including Khartoum, is also quite
possible. Yassir Arman, the SPLM presidential candidate, has
already expressed concern over his personal safety, following an
attack on his life earlier last year.
Finally, concerns have been voiced about the professionalism and
impartiality of the Sudanese administration. As Willis et al.
(2009) point out, civil servants in particular play a crucial
role in guaranteeing a fair and orderly voting process. However,
the quality of the Sudanese civil service has suffered
dramatically from almost four decades of direct control by the
ruling parties of the day - the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU)
during the Nimeiri years (1972-85), and the NCP since 1989.
Repeated purges and politically motivated dismissals have taken a
toll on the civil service's professionalism, neutrality, and
competence. The NCP's influence is felt and exercised right from
village committees to district and towns councils, public
corporations, and ministries. The ruling party's record of
controlling civil servants, in addition to its grasp of the
media, casts a doubt over the prospect of free and fair
elections.
Sudan's political parties: internal dynamics and election
strategies
Notwithstanding these actual or potential drawbacks, the National
Elections Commission of Sudan (NEC) is now set to hold elections
according to schedule, in the first half of April 2010. The
Sudanese government, political parties, and the international
community are all engaged in pre-election maneuvering. The focus
of observers is mostly on the NCP and the SPLM. However, the
Sudanese political landscape is more diverse than this; and if
past experience is any indicator, then the Northern opposition
parties in particular should not be underestimated (see table 2).
The following section therefore provides an overview of the main
parties contesting the 2010 elections and introduces their
electoral strategies, the support base they appeal to, and their
expectations regarding the outcome of the vote.
The National Congress Party
The NCP was formed in 1998 as the successor of the NIF, the party
of the Muslim Brotherhood that took power in the coup of 1989. By
signing the CPA and agreeing to take part in democratic
elections, the NCP was in a similar situation to other ruling
single parties in Africa that had agreed to similar
transformations and then sought to retain as much power as
possible through the ballot box.
At the NCP National Convention in October 2009, the authority of
al-Bashir and the hard-line faction was asserted and so-called
moderates were kept away from the more influential positions in
the party. Al-Bashir is currently both chair of the party and
head of government; in early 2010 he retired from his position as
commander-in-chief of the army to stand for the presidential
elections - but for some reason still appears in a military
uniform.
Although the NCP has created a dynamic and aggressive party, it
is well aware that it is widely loathed by a much weakened middle
class and the poor. Many Sudanese are also aware of the growing
gap between rich and poor, with the former often regarded as
nouveau riche rather than established figures of wealth. This is
especially the case in the neglected, if not exploited,
peripheral areas of the country.
In its electoral campaign, the NCP has been using its structural
advantages to the full. More than any other party, the NCP is
able to finance major election campaigns and to use its influence
and networks to buy and co-opt support at the local level. The
party is focusing its efforts on what it considers the
Arab-Islamic heartland of Sudan: a decisive voting bloc of some
25 million citizens from the Northern States down to
Sennar/Gezira, where both economic growth and literacy rates are
comparatively high. It has also built up its organization, which
has been active on the ground with well-paid staff, especially in
areas that are being courted by its rivals, such as Darfur, Blue
Nile, and the East.
The NCP hopes to win over this base of voters through the
attraction of foreign investment, the development of a
comprehensive infrastructure, the creation of jobs, the
exploitation of natural resources, the boosting of the region's
overall economy, and, of course, the launching of large-scale
election campaigns. It allegedly has a war chest of $500 million
set aside for the task and is confident that it can become the
largest party. The NCP has three main sources of funding: revenue
siphoned off from the state (as a regime it is highly corrupt);
businessmen who have benefited from NCP patronage, with the help
of Islamic banks; and Sudanese and others outside the country,
especially in the Gulf. NCP patronage has been targeted at the
lower-middle-class entrepreneurs, who have risen in numbers and
wealth especially since oil exports started.
The NCP presents itself as the defender of Islam in the Sudanese
society, but it is also aware that it will be challenged on this
ground by other parties. Another line of campaigning is to
project itself as the party of progress, at a time when other
parties appear less active, if not paralyzed. Economic growth
apart from oil has largely focused on the central areas of
Northern Sudan, from north of Khartoum down to the Gezira area
between the two Niles.
The NCP is aware that a united opposition could represent a real
challenge: hence its vehement attack on the Juba Coalition of
Forces, an umbrella organization of opposition groups. At the
same time, it is on the lookout for a strong ally in Northern
Sudan, which could help broaden its geographic base and
legitimize its continuity after the elections. The NCP aspires to
become the centerpiece of a broad Northern Sudanese Islamic
alliance, which would include a strong popular party of the North
- either the DUP or the Umma Party - as well as its current
allies and proxies (splinter groups of the Muslim Brotherhood,
Ansar as-Sunna). The DUP, with its strong support in Northern and
Eastern areas, would be the more attractive partner, since the
Umma Party's traditional support base in Darfur and Kordofan has
been disrupted by the conflict in Darfur.
At the same time, the NCP needs to increase its support in the
marginalized East and West. A deal with the DUP - largely
supported by the Eastern Sudanese population - would consolidate
this achievement, enabling the NCP and its partners to secure the
support of most political forces active in the East and North.
Darfur presents more of a challenge. Given the ongoing war, only
a small percentage of the Western Sudanese population is actively
supporting the NCP. However, the NCP plans to engage in further
peace talks with the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories
aiming at the rebels' cost-effective neutralization. The Eastern
Sudan peace process has shown that the NCP is capable of striking
deals with rebels without addressing the root causes of the
actual conflict and, therefore, without having to make tangible
concessions: posts, compensation and promises to launch
development programs normally do. As long as the rebel movements
are not united, this strategy is likely to guarantee at least a
certain amount of popular support, particularly among the non-Fur
tribes.
In the long run, the NCP's survival lies in preserving its own
access to resources and economic development. This is a major
motivation for its efforts to maintain a united Sudan. However,
since neither unity nor international donor funds can be taken
for granted in the long term, the NCP is pursuing a parallel
strategy to increase the economic independence of the North by
investing heavily in the development of the so-called Hamdi
Triangle (Dongola-Sinnar/Kordofan Axis), in addition to a
relatively small corridor in the strategically important East
(mainly the area around Port Sudan).
The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
Despite recent efforts to revitalize its national profile,
including a series of allegedly successful campaigns in the
Northern states, the SPLM remains a party of the South. Although
there are still major gaps in organizational capacity, the
Movement's structure is relatively elaborate and well-funded
compared to any of its competitors.
Since 2005, the SPLM has suffered from splits and internal
divisions, most recently a break-away faction by Lam Akol under
the name of SPLM-Democratic Change. The internal realignment of
forces within the SPLM is dominated by a conservative
disengagement camp on the one side and a radical engagement camp
on the other. The former focuses on the path to Southern
secession and favors appeasing the NCP in the Interim Period so
as not to jeopardize the 2011 referendum. The latter still
embraces the vision of a New Sudan and favors a unity between
Northerners and Southerners, as well as a more assertive approach
to the NCP on CPA implementation. The SPLM National Convention in
May 2008 seemed to reflect an equilibrium between the two camps.
However, the party's political behavior since then indicates a
steady move within the rank-and-file of the SPLM toward the
conservative option, that is, secession.
The SPLM believes - probably with justification - that it can
expect to win a landslide majority in Southern Sudan. It is true
that insecurity, delays in providing public services and
allegations of high-level corruption as well as high- handedness
from some Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) officials have
partially eroded the surge of popular goodwill that followed the
signing of the CPA. An increasing minority of Southern Sudanese,
mainly among those based in the "urban centers" of the South, has
begun cautiously to voice its criticism. However, the SPLM/A
still enjoys the bonus of being seen first and foremost as the
liberation movement that brought about peace. Hence, as long as
the situation on the ground remains bearable and tribal tensions
in the party's leadership are under control, much of the
population is expected to acquiesce under SPLM rule, partly owing
to the lack of alternatives.
A strong election victory in Southern Sudan would be likely to
assure the SPLM a continuation of its current representation in
national institutions, somewhere around the 30% mark. In case of
free and transparent elections, a 30% share at the national level
would make the SPLM one of the most influential political powers.
As such, additional votes from the North are likely to be
welcome, but not desperately needed to facilitate the party's
representation in the government.
It is therefore not surprising that the SPLM's efforts to develop
its Northern Sector have so far been somewhat half-hearted. Many
Northern Sudanese who once saw the SPLM as a possible secular
alternative to the traditional opposition parties have become
disillusioned by its weak performance and apparent disinterest in
national politics. Unlike in early 2005, the SPLM in the North is
no longer seen as a catalyst for nationwide change (Hikmat:
2009).
Despite its support of the Juba Coalition of Forces, the SPLM
appears to be in favor of preserving its unequal partnership with
the NCP, rather than engaging in alliances with the Northern
opposition. However if the NCP were (against all predictions) to
lose its power position in elections, the SPLM would need to
identify post-electoral Northern allies. The Sudanese Communist
Party (SCP) and some factions from the DUP would be the most
likely candidates, in preference to the national Umma Party,
which lacks a secular wing and is dominated by Imam al-Mahdi and
his family.
In the South, it is not yet clear whether the SPLM/A is committed
to supporting a liberal political environment and political
inclusiveness within the structures of the GoSS. There has so far
been little meaningful dialogue with Southern opposition parties.
Instead, the SPLM/A's efforts in dealing with non-SPLM/A groups
in Southern Sudan have mainly focused on the integration of other
armed groups (OAGs) into the SPLA - that is, military rather than
political efforts, not aimed at facilitating democratic
pluralism. Some observers have stressed that except for
SPLM-Democratic Change, most of the Southern "opposition" parties
are actually SPLM proxies, existing to create a "fake atmosphere
of political pluralism." The real political opposition -
alienated segments of the Southern population - has so far failed
to organize itself (BBC 2009: online).
The Democratic Unionist Party
The DUP comprises a sectarian-based group, drawing its support
from followers of the Khatmiyya sect, and a secular-oriented,
urban, commercial and middle-class group. Its broad and loose
organization gave the party a relatively democratic
organizational structure, albeit by default.
Since the Islamists took over power in 1989, the DUP has suffered
from divide-and-rule tactics by the NCP and is currently split
into more than four splinter groups. Moves to unite the party
have not borne fruit so far. One factor often cited is the
intention of its patron, Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani, to combine
both the spiritual and the political leadership of the party. The
DUP is also divided over a number of issues, including the
problem of how to engage with the Government of National Unity
(GoNU). Though formally the leader of the National Democratic
Alliance (NDA) - an umbrella organization of opposition groups -
al-Mirghani has avoided taking a decisive position vis-…-vis the
NCP, preferring to keep his options open.
The DUP will hope to improve its leverage through elections. The
party has considerable financial resources inside and outside
Sudan, which will enable it to campaign. The secular wing of the
party includes a number of influential Sudanese businessmen who
are willing to contribute to funding planned campaigns. In
addition, the DUP enjoys long-standing links with Egypt, though
the latter no longer looks at the party as the only guarantor of
its interests in Sudan.
The DUP's traditional geographical strongholds are in the greater
Khartoum and Gezira areas as well as in the far North and the
East of Sudan. However, in recent years the DUP has lost a
considerable number of voters from Eastern Sudan to the Eastern
Front, whose leading figures were formerly DUP party members.
Al-Mirghani is holding talks with both the NCP and the SPLM and
will not hesitate to raise the flags of the opposition to the NCP
if it suits his own interests. Yet, a post-electoral coalition
with the NCP and other parties seems possible and only a few
party members would protest it on grounds of principles. Other
less likely post-election possibilities include a coalition
government of the sectarian competitors, possibly with the SPLM,
or even a coalition of the DUP and the Sudanese Communist Party
(SCP), not necessarily under the umbrella of the NDA.
The Umma Party (Umma)
Like the rival DUP, Umma is a party of the establishment and has
suffered considerable fragmentation resulting from the NCP's
divide-and-rule tactics. Small splinter groups have been part of
the NCP-controlled government since 1999. Umma is headed by Sadiq
al-Mahdi, Sudan's last elected prime minister, who was overthrown
by the Islamists in the 1989 coup.3 Al-Mahdi's decision to run
against al-Bashir in the 2010 presidential elections has been
widely interpreted as a boost to the relevance of the elections,
turning them into "a real contest for power" (de Waal 2010:
online).
The Umma Party faces something of an ideological and
organizational dilemma. On the one hand, it is known for Sadiq
al-Mahdi's widely publicized rhetoric on democracy and political
pluralism; on the other, the party is organized along traditional
lines, with the politico-religious importance of the Mahdi family
paramount. It appears that the party is struggling financially,
with the al-Mahdi family having a monopoly over property and
financial resources, whilst losing the support of several
influential non-Mahdi businessmen due to undemocratic leadership.
Al-Mahdi has reportedly reached out to "his old Oxford contacts"
- the Moroccan and the Jordanian royals - to secure possible
funding (Hikmat 2009).
The party has power bases in Khartoum, Kordofan, White Nile, and
in Darfur (especially South Darfur), rooted mainly in traditional
Ansar sectarian constituencies in rural, underdeveloped areas. In
Darfur, Umma has suffered from the appeal of the various rebel
movements, especially to younger supporters. The party's power
strategy is not to compete directly with the rebel movements, but
rather to strengthen traditional leaders (e.g., the Baggara in
its heartland of South Darfur), and to use the support of the
loyal Ansar leadership (White Nile, Gezira). Due to financial
constraints, al-Mahdi - as Imam of the Ansar - can provide little
more than moral support to tribal leaders.
The Umma Party may aspire to a post-electoral coalition with the
SPLM, and could prove an attractive partner in certain
circumstances, including stabilization of the situation in Darfur
and a modified SPLM outlook on the unity of Sudan. If an alliance
with the SPLM is impossible to establish (e.g., due to strong
secessionism in the SPLM), Umma is likely to intensify its
cooperation with the PCP, and/or engage in an alliance with the
NCP against the South. However, the evidence is that such a
coalition would only materialize at the last minute and in the
absence of other options.
The Sudanese Communist Party
Despite formal subscription to Marxism, the SCP has in recent
years adopted a social democratic agenda. After 40 years, the
fifth General Congress of the Party in 2009 has decided to keep
the name of the party, support the current (old guard)
leadership, and also make a clear commitment to democracy and the
principle of freedom of religion. In comparison to the
traditional parties, the SCP is organizationally sophisticated,
and - contrary to the criticisms of its Islamist archenemies -
enjoys structures that allow a certain degree of democratic
decision-making. To some extent, the SCP enjoys support in the
universities, as well as among intellectuals and professionals.
However, the party has never fully regained its original identity
as a broad-based national movement, following Nimeiri's efforts
to cripple it in the 1970s, and subsequent Islamist oppression
throughout the 1990s. The party today is a vocal pressure group
represented in parliament rather than a popular party. The SCP is
financially weak, but enjoys some backing from its supporters in
the diaspora. It is not clear the extent to which this Communist
diaspora stands ready to fund the SCP's electoral campaigns.
In elections, the SCP has declared that it will focus on a few
key urban constituencies, and some marginalized regions (i.e.,
South Darfur) with the aim to secure three to four seats in the
National Assembly. This would be sufficient for the SCP to
guarantee that the party can continue to function and have a
voice in the parliament. The party is in favor of a system of
"mixed representation," which would allow them to join the race
with independent candidates (more likely to find popular support,
as many Muslim Sudanese still have reservations against the
communist due to their alleged atheism).
The leadership of the party declared that they have no interest
in engaging in any kind of pre-electoral alliance at the national
level. The SCP slogan is "yes to coordination, no to alliance,"
meaning that they do not refuse collaboration with other parties
if related to specific issues, for example, despite the SCP's
understandable problems with the Popular Congress Party (PCP),
the parties have recently presented a joint position on Darfur.
Depending on the results of elections, post-electoral
arrangements may include collaboration with the centrist
political parties (DUP, Umma), though not necessarily under the
umbrella of the NDA, and the SPLM.
The Popular Congress Party
The PCP's core supporters are old Islamist cadres who broke away
from the NCP along with Hassan al-Turabi in 1999. Most of the
influential businessmen of the Islamic movement then opted to
join the powerful NCP, which clamped down on the PCP after the
split. This - combined with al-Turabi's reduced access to
Islamist financial sources abroad - means the PCP faced serious
economic problems.
The PCP now participates vigorously in the Juba Coalition of
Forces, but it is not clear if all PCP members support this
rainbow-coalition politics or agree with al-Turabi's newly
adopted liberal line. The PCP's linkage with the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) is less strong than in the early days of
the Darfur conflict. Despite the common Islamist heritage, many
Zaghawa members of JEM in particular blame Turabi for what
happened in Darfur. Al-Turabi, as former chief ideologue of the
Islamist regime, is held ultimately responsible for the
empowerment of the regime in 1989.
The different factions/groups of the PCP are not likely to pursue
different strategies in the run-up to elections. This being said,
however, it is also possible that individuals or PCP networks may
seek to engage with former colleagues of the NCP. As events of
last December have shown, al-Turabi is determined to continue to
reach out to other opposition parties - ranging from Umma to the
SCP - to facilitate his own political survival whilst hampering
the NCP wherever possible.
Southern opposition
Southern opposition parties are fragmented and disunited, and
political programs in effect have not had a political impact
except for the call to join one of the two major parties: the NCP
or SPLM. The Sudan African National Union (SANU) and the two
factions of the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP I and II),
are largely seen as proxies of the SPLM, while the Southern Sudan
Democratic Forum has been accused of being both co-opted by the
NCP and being a one-man show funded by Southern Sudanese
diaspora. All three parties clearly lack popular support.
Complaining that the SPLM is not contributing to a competitive
political environment in the South, both SPLM-Democratic Change
and Southern Sudan Democratic Forum so far have failed to
organize themselves properly and have had difficulties attracting
segments of the Southern population to their ranks. It remains to
be seen how far these and other non-SPLM forces will translate
into an effective political force in the run-up to elections.
Scenarios for possible election outcomes
The Sudanese general elections of 2010 are particularly
far-reaching in their scope: Besides the national presidency and
parliament in Khartoum, the Sudanese are also called to vote for
the South Sudanese presidency, state governors, the Southern
parliament, and state assemblies (BBC 2009). In the absence of
reliable pre-election opinion polls, all predictions of the
election results are bound to contain a large element of
speculation. This is particularly true for the current political
climate in Sudan, which has become increasingly tense and
volatile in the run-up to the elections. However, if the voting
does take place on schedule and proceeds in an orderly manner, a
number of scenarios for its outcomes can be drawn.
Presidential elections
The presidential elections have turned into a hotly contested
race, and they have consequently been the focus of much media
attention. The stakes are high for the NCP to seek a confirmation
in office of the current president, Omar al-Bashir. Not only
would this consolidate the NCP's hold on power, it would also
deal a blow to the ICC's attempts to bring al-Bashir to court and
give some sort of retroactive legitimacy to the NCP's ascension
to power by unconstitutional means in 1989.
Al-Bashir stands as the main contender against a number of
opposition presidential candidates, among whom Yassir Aman (SPLM)
and Sadiq al-Mahdi (Umma) are the most serious rivals. The
nomination of presidential candidates by a number of opposition
parties seems to be part of a strategy by opposition parties to
deny al-Bashir early victory in the first round. If, in a second
round, all opposition parties were indeed able to forge a
"rainbow coalition" and rally behind a common candidate, this
could represent a serious challenge to the NCP's plans. Against
this tactic, the NCP has threatened to harden its position on the
implementation of CPA issues that are still unresolved (border
demarcation, status of Abyei, use of oil pipelines, etc.) - all
in the hope of driving a wedge between the SPLM and opposition
forces in the North.
Government of Sudan
The most important question concerning this election - besides
doubts over the NCP's willingness to guarantee free and fair
elections in the North - is whether the NCP will garner enough
support to consolidate its dominant role in Sudanese politics, or
whether it will be forced to enter into a coalition with other
parties. Three scenarios are possible:
The first scenario sees an undisputed NCP victory against a
fragmented opposition. Using its accumulated wealth, efficient
government-led party machinery, mobilizing its urban and rural
constituencies, and scaring off its opponents, the NCP may win a
clear majority in a "reasonably free and fair" election. The SPLM
might, in this case, reveal its character as a Southern political
force unable to wield much support outside its territory proper,
while disagreements between the Northern opposition parties would
prevent them from playing a greater role. However, even if it
wins a majority in the legislative elections, the NCP might still
be forced into a second round in the presidential elections.
Since it cannot afford to lose the latter, the NCP might offer a
relatively high price for support by the DUP and smaller
political parties, in exchange for seats in parliament or state
governor positions.
In a second scenario, the NCP emerges as the strongest party, but
is forced to enter into a coalition with one or more of the
Northern opposition parties. For this, the NCP would have to
succeed in driving a wedge between the SPLM and the Northern
opposition parties, scaring or buying off opponents and confining
the SPLM to the South. The NCP has never closed the door on a
coalition that would bring it closer to the major Northern
parties, especially Umma or the Democratic Unionist Party. The
NCP strategy in this case would be dominated by scare politics,
portraying itself as defending Northern interests against
radicals in the North and emerging regional forces in the South,
Darfur, and the East.
A third scenario, finally, sees the SPLM join a coalition of
Northern parties and regional forces in order to defeat the NCP.
Both the Northern opposition and regional movements in Darfur and
the East would, in this case, be working toward forging a
coalition or alliance with the SPLM. This constellation would
make the SPLM the "king-maker" in Sudanese politics: They would
be in a position to make or break the electoral coalition. Both
the NCP and the opposition parties are trying to woo the SPLM
leadership, and the latter have not yet decided what offer on the
table to accept. The worst thing that the NCP fears is a strong
alliance between the SPLM and Umma - hence the NCP's ceaseless
efforts to scare the SPLM by pointing out that Umma has never
recognized the CPA and will not deliver on CPA commitments. It
remains to be seen whether Darfur rebel groups would join the
electoral process.
Government of Southern Sudan
The results of the elections in South Sudan are unlikely to cause
much surprise. The SPLM stands a good chance of securing a
landslide victory on all levels of the elections. Since he is
running undisputed, the confirmation in office of Salva Kiir
Mayardit as president of the government of Southern Sudan is also
largely taken for granted. However, as described above, the
SPLM's dominant position in Southern Sudanese politics is not
only based on popular support, but also on its practice to deny
rival political parties equal chances.
Conclusion
The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 raised
high hopes for a democratic transformation of Sudan: a transition
from war to peace, from one-party to multi-party rule, from
authoritarianism to inclusive government. Five years later,
however, little of this has materialized. Tenets of
authoritarianism and militarism still remain intact. As in the
country's past transitions, this has contributed to the further
erosion of earlier gains with respect to democracy and civil
society. The present transitional period, therefore, does not
hold any conclusive signs for a steady, cumulative build-up for
democratic change.
The NCP has instead evolved into a sort of "hybrid regime,"
opening up to some degree while successfully combining democratic
procedures with autocratic practices. The SPLM/A, on the other
hand, has yet to undergo a structural transformation from a rebel
army to a political party, and as a government still has to
create institutions that are more responsive to the needs of its
citizens. Equally, the regional rebel movements of the West and
the East have not yet been able to be transform into functioning
political parties. They are lacking both political programs and
organizational structure. Nevertheless, unlike the rather passive
and powerless traditional parties, rebel movements - due to their
dynamic and pro-active nature - currently seem to be more
attractive to the population of Sudan's peripheries, and
especially the younger generation.
Hopes are now pinned on the general elections to do what the
transition period since 2005 has failed to do. However, the shape
of Sudan's political parties is sobering. The SPLM is punching
below its weight in national politics, while the formerly
influential Northern political parties seem disorganized and lack
a clear political program. Parties with a more sophisticated
party structure, like the SCP or the PCP, are lacking in popular
support or, in case of the latter, sincere commitment to the
fundamental principles of democracy. A strong opposition alliance
still has to materialize. However, this seems to be difficult, as
traditional political parties are increasingly forced to compete
with the more dynamic rebel movements of the peripheries.
Despite all this, the 2010 general elections can be a genuine
moment of political participation and national cohesion at a
difficult but critical juncture in Sudanese history. However, it
is hard to see how they could make up for all that has been
missed in terms of democratic transformation since the signing of
the CPA.
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