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Africa: Variations of Democracy
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Mar 25, 2011 (110325)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
Asking whether North Africa's pro-democracy movements will find an
echo in sub-Saharan Africa is both an inevitable and an
unanswerable question. But given the wide diversity of national
contexts, it is essential also to raise doubts about some of the
generalizations that may emerge in attempts to answer it.
Critically, one must also stress that many sub-Saharan African
countries have in fact made significant advances toward functioning
democracies. In public opinion surveys by Afrobarometer, for
example, including data from 2008 on 19 African countries, 29% of
respondents rated their own country a "full democracy," 30% their
country as a democracy "with minor problems," 25% a democracy "with
major problems," and only 11% not a democracy at all or "don't
know."
These surveys, carried out in four rounds from 1999 through 2008,
include a total of 20 countries, with 19 being surveyed in the most
recent round. The 19 countries are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa,
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Zimbabwe was also surveyed in
previous rounds, most recently in 2005, but not in 2008.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains selected excerpts from two
recent Afrobarometer reports. Note that these are brief excerpts
only. The full papers in pdf format, with tables, graphs,
methodological discussion, and references, along with a wide range
of additional working papers and briefing papers are available on
the Afrobarometer website (http://www.afrobarometer.org).
A detailed compendium of survey results from Round 4 in 2008 can be
found in Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 108, entitled "The
Quality of Democracy and Governance in Africa: New Results from
Afrobarometer Round 4."
For two other AfricaFocus Bulletins posted today on related themes,
see
Africa: Democracy and Despots
http://www.africafocus.org/docs11/dem1103a.php
and
Africa: The Winds of Change
http://www.africafocus.org/docs11/dem1103b.php
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++
Neither Consolidating Nor Fully Democratic: The Evolution of
African Political Regimes, 1999-2008
Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 67
May 2009
[The Afrobarometer is a joint enterprise of the Center for
Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), the Institute for Democracy in
South Africa (Idasa) and the Institute for Empirical Research in
Political Economy (IREEP, Benin). Fieldwork, data entry,
preliminary analysis, and the dissemination of survey results are
conducted by National Partner organizations in each African
country. Michigan State University and the University of Cape Town
provide technical and advisory support services.]
[This Briefing Paper was prepared by Michael Bratton of Michigan
State University (mbratton@msu.edu) and Robert Mattes of the
University of Cape Town (robert.mattes@uct.ac.za)]
Executive Summary
The central questions addressed in this bulletin concern the fate
of democracy, especially as seen by Africans themselves. Do they
say they want democracy, a preference that we call the popular
demand for democracy? And do they think they are getting it, that
is, do they perceive that their leaders are providing a supply of
democracy? Moreover, if there is evidence of democratic development
in Africa, to what extent are democratic regimes established,
stable, or consolidated? We examine whether or not various
countries are approaching a stable equilibrium between demand and
supply - that is, whether they are consolidating - and if so,
whether they are doing so as democracies at high levels of both
demand and supply, as autocracies at low levels of both, or as
hybrid regimes at intermediate levels.
Afrobarometer Round 4 conducted public attitude surveys in 19
countries during 2008. We also report some results from a 2005
survey in Zimbabwe (since a new survey was not possible during
2008). The key findings are summarized below, and described in full
in the text that follows.
Demand for Democracy
Our indicator of demand for democracy combines both those who say
they support democracy as the best system of government, and those
who explicitly reject three authoritarian alternatives: military
rule, one-party rule, and strongman presidential rule.
We find that:
- Overall, across 19 countries in 2008, support for democracy
stands at 70 percent, but there is wide variability, from 39
percent in Madagascar, to 85 percent in Botswana.
- On average, 75 percent reject military rule, 73 percent reject
a one-party system, and 79 percent reject strongman rule.
- However, only 57 percent of respondents reject all three
alternatives to democracy, and fewer than half (45 percent) fully
demand democracy by both rejecting the three alternatives and
explicitly supporting democracy.
...
Supply of Democracy
Our indicator of the perceived supply of democracy combines those
who say that they think their country is a democracy (i.e., those
who say their country is either fully democratic, or a democracy
with only minor problems), with those who say they are either
"fairly" or "very satisfied" with "the way democracy works" in
their country. We find that:
- Across 19 countries in 2008, an average of 59 percent of all
Africans interviewed believed that they lived in a full or almost
full democracy, ranging from 91 percent of Batswana to a mere 14
percent of Zimbabweans (in 2005).
- Satisfaction with democracy is lower, averaging 49 percent across
19 countries.
- The perceived supply of democracy, i.e., those who both believe
that their country is a democracy, and are fairly satisfied with
it, averages 41 percent across 19 countries.
- Across the 11 countries that we can track since 1999,
satisfaction with democracy has declined by 5 percentage points,
from 61 percent circa 1999 to 56 percent in 2008, while the
perceived extent of democracy has risen by a similar margin, from
58 to 63 percent.
...
In sum, there is both good and bad news. The good news is that
democratic attitudes are generally on the rise among the African
populations we have surveyed. If sustained, this up-tick is a
promising portent for further democratization. But the bad news is
that fewer than half of all Africans interviewed demand democracy
and perceive its supply when these indicators are measured
rigorously. As such, the project of democracy building still has a
long way to go.
...
Introduction
Almost 20 years have passed since the Berlin Wall came down, an
event that was followed in sub-Saharan Africa by pressures for
political liberalization and by transitions to multiparty rule. In
addition, more than 10 years have elapsed since the Afrobarometer
embarked on a pioneering effort (starting in Ghana in July 1999) to
conduct surveys of public opinion about these changes. As
democratic experiments have spread across the sub-continent, the
Afrobarometer Network - an international consortium of researchers
- has since accumulated interviews with over 105,000 Africans in
four rounds of surveys in up to 20 countries.
The time is ripe, therefore, to assess the current state of
political development in these countries and to track changes in
public attitudes that have occurred over the past decade
(1999-2008).
...
The Perceived Supply of Democracy
On the supply side, do ordinary people think that they are getting
democracy? One way to generate an answer is to ask, "how much of a
democracy is (this country) today?" Response categories for this
item range on a four-point scale from "a full democracy," though "a
democracy with minor problems" and "a democracy with major
problems," to "not a democracy."
Skeptics might again argue that non-literate people in the
developing world are insufficiently knowledgeable or experienced
about democracy to offer meaningful responses. But, in 2005, fewer
than 10 percent of respondents who had an opinion on the extent of
democracy were unable to define the term. And, while this
uninformed group was slightly more prone to innocently perceive "a
full democracy," their views on the extent of democracy otherwise
resembled the opinions of those who better understood the nature of
the regime.
...
By 2008, an average of 59 percent of all Africans interviewed
considered that they lived in a full or almost full democracy. The
range of responses in Figure 5 is wider for the perceived extent of
democracy than for any other item of opinion considered here. While
the citizens of Botswana again lead the pack (at 91 percent, with
Ghanaians close behind at 83 percent), Zimbabweans trail far below
(at a dismal 14 percent in 2005). With regard to the perceived
extent of democracy, countries can be roughly divided into three
equal-sized groups:
(a) in six countries (from Botswana to Cape Verde), at least seven
out of ten citizens think they have extensive democracy;
(b) in seven other countries (from Zambia to Burkina Faso) citizens
see moderate levels of democratic development; and
(c) and in a last group of seven countries (from South Africa to
Zimbabwe), fewer than half think they live in a full or almost full
democracy.
... It is within this last group that we discern democracies at
risk, for example in Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Madagascar and
Zimbabwe.
...
Diverse Trajectories
A major result of this analysis is that African political regimes
are diverse along at least two dimensions. With regard to the
nature of the regime, some are nearly democratic, a few seem
autocratic (at least in the eyes of their citizenry), while most
fall into an intermediate hybrid category. A common African regime
type is electoral democracy, meaning democratic in institutional
form (e.g. elections), but lacking some essential attribute of
rights or accountability. With regard to the likelihood of change,
some regimes - including some hybrids - have attained a stable
equilibrium, but more are unconsolidated.
...
Voting Intentions in Africa: Ethnic, Economic or Partisan?
by Michael Bratton, Ravi Bhavnani and Tse-Hsin Chen
Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 127
January 2011
Abstract
This paper offers a first comprehensive account of popular voting
intentions in Africa's new electoral democracies. With reference
to comparative aggregate and survey data from 16 countries, we show
that competitive elections in Africa are more than mere ethnic
censuses or simple economic referenda. Instead, Africans engage in
both ethnic and economic voting. Not surprisingly, people who
belong to the ethnic group in power intend to support the ruling
party, in contrast to those who feel a sense of discrimination
against their cultural group. But, to an even greater extent,
would-be voters in Africa consider policy performance, especially
the government's perceived handling of unemployment, inflation, and
income distribution. Moreover, a full account of the intention to
vote in Africa also requires recognition that citizens are
motivated--sincerely or strategically--by partisan considerations;
they vote for established ruling parties because they expect that
incumbents will win. We show that voters attempt to associate
themselves with prospective winners because they wish to gain
access to patronage benefits and to avoid retribution after the
election. These dynamics are most evident in African countries
where dominant parties restrict the range of electoral choice.
Introduction
When Africans consider their voting choices, do they do so on
ethnic or economic grounds? On one hand, advocates of identity
voting draw attention to a citizen's sense of belonging to cultural
collectivities--like ethnic and linguistic groups--that aggregate
individual choices into blocs of votes. On the other hand, backers
of interest-based accounts of voting argue that each citizen
appraises the performance of government and uses the opportunity
of periodic elections to punish or reward incumbents.
In new electoral democracies in the developing world, and
especially in the multi-ethnic societies of sub- Saharan Africa,
voting motivations may not be quite so clear-cut. For if Africans
vote ethnically, why do so many African presidents hail from
minority ethnic groups? And if Africans vote economically, why are
incumbents routinely re-elected even when economic conditions are
bad? The literature on voting behavior in Africa is therefore
divided: some country studies report that ethnic attachments trump
economic calculations, whereas, in other analyses, popular
evaluations of government performance overshadow attachments to
language and tribe. A definitive arbitration of this debate is long
overdue.
We present systematic, cross-national evidence to the effect that
economic interests play a larger role in African elections than
has hitherto been recognized. We also consider alternative
formulations. Perhaps voting intentions in new African democracies
are driven by other factors, such as the partisan calculations
made by clients in search of patronage. If so, then voters will
seek to gain access to the positive benefits that ruling parties
can bestow and to avoid the negative sanctions that can follow from
supporting opposition groups. When voters express close
identification with the ruling party, they may be either sincere or
strategic. But, either way, they epitomize a widespread popular
recognition that incumbents at the helm of dominant parties are
most likely to win in African elections.
...
A Reinterpretation
On the basis of cross-national research in Africa, we argue that
the distinction between ethnic and economic voting is overdrawn.
Based on data from Zambia and Kenya, some analysts argue that the
structure of ethnic groups in society is a more formative
influence on vote choice than the economic calculations of
individuals (Posner and Simon 2002; Erdmann 2007; Author 2008).
Using evidence from Ghana, others have countered that popular
evaluations of government performance trump the pervasive tugs of
language and tribe (Jeffries 1998; Bawumia 1998; Youde 2005; Fridy
2007; Lindberg and Morrison 2008). But the only cross-national
voting studies yet completed in Africa do not reach agreement about
the relative importance of group loyalty (Norris and Mattes 2003)
or instrumental rationality (Author et al. 2005). As stated
earlier, this debate requires adjudication, given that both
patterns of voting behavior are evident in African elections. These
complex contests cannot be reduced to a one-dimensional construct,
for example as an ethnic census or an economic referendum. It
remains to be seen whether ethnic or economic considerations--or
some other influences--are paramount in driving a multivariate
explanation. But, at minimum, we argue that African
voting intentions do not adhere to media stereotypes of Africans as
exclusively ethnic voters nor to the popular assumption that
elections always and everywhere are about "the economy, stupid."
The present study attempts such a resolution by departing from
previous efforts in several important ways.
First, the scope of the study is not limited to one election in one
country, which has been a hallmark of the literature on Africa to
date. Instead, we employ Afrobarometer Round 3, a large
cross-national set of survey data with identical indicators for
23,039 adult citizens in 16 countries. ...
Second, the object of explanation is a citizen's intended vote
choice rather than proxies like presidential popularity, which were
too often used in prior research. The main advantage is that voting
intentions are a better guide to actual voting behaviour though,
obviously, the reliability of this indicator decreases with
temporal distance from the next election.
Third, we recognize that rival concepts--ethnic identity and
economic interest--are multi-dimensional and that their various
aspects may have differential explanatory power. We therefore seek
to capture the richness of each concept by measuring several
facets with alternative indicators. By decomposing the broad
concepts of ethnic identity and economic interest, we hope to cast
light on the mechanisms that lead our respondents to arrive at an
intended vote choice.
Fourth, we propose a multi-level explanatory model in a bid to
account for variance in intended voting behavior across countries
as well as among individuals. Guided by prevailing theoretical
debates, we explore the influence of relevant social, economic and
political differences at the country level.
Finally, we emphasize that the intention to vote among Africans may
be driven by political considerations rather than by ethnic or
economic factors. Analysts have long recognized that partisan
identification--a voter's underlying allegiance to a political
party--explains a great deal about individual attitudes and actions
(Campbell et al. 1960; see also Shively, 1980; Lewis-Beck et al
2008b). Indeed, recent studies of electoral participation in
African countries have confirmed the central mobilizing role of
political parties (Author 1999; Kuenzi and Lambright 2007) and the
stability of partisan alignments (Lindberg and Morrison 2005;
Young 2009).
Thus, one would also expect voters to plan to vote for the party to
which they say they feel closest. To avoid the obvious circularity
in this relationship, we refine the concept of partisan
identification in this study by distinguishing sincere and
strategic voting. Sincere partisans are individuals who intend to
vote for a party out of deep attachment or ingrained habit; they
express partisan loyalty without reference (sometimes even in
direct contradiction) to the party's actual performance. We expect
to find many such "uncritical citizens" among the adherents of the
long-standing ruling groups in former one-party African regimes
(Chaligha 2002; Mattes and Shenga 2007).
Alternatively, we contend that the structure of incentives in
Africa's neopatrimonial regimes (Clapham 1982; Nugent 1995; Author
1997; Wantchekon 2003; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Erdmann and
Engel 2007) also gives rise to strategic voting. In Africa's
"winner take all" politics--where electoral victory conveys
political control over state-dominated economies--the credibility
of patronage parties depends on their ability to actually attain,
hold, and exercise power. Since opposition parties are novel and
weak, an incumbent ruling party can make the most credible
patronage commitments. Under these circumstances, an individual's
expressed preference of "closeness" to a ruling party may therefore
be deeply instrumental, reflecting a calculation that incumbents
will routinely win. Regardless of real preferences, strategic
partisans will also associate themselves with the ruling party in
the hope that they will be rewarded--or at least not punished
--after the election.
...
Conclusion
This article confirms that conventional theories of voting behavior
provide leverage as starting points for understanding the outcomes
of multiparty elections in sub-Saharan Africa. Using survey and
aggregate data gleaned from more than 23,000 would-be voters in 16
African countries in 2005, we show that, to measurable degrees,
Africans seek to engage in both ethnic and economic voting.
Thus elections in Africa are much more than mere ethnic censuses or
straightforward economic referenda. The complexity of voting
motivations is evidenced by unforeseen facts: contra the stereotype
of ethnic voting, many African heads of government hail from
secondary or minority ethnic groups; and converse to the economic
voting thesis, incumbent presidents often gain reelection despite
the poor performance of African economies. It is therefore
necessary to move beyond confirmatory results about single-factor
explanations in order to make several original claims.
First, our systematic cross-national test of the relative
importance of different voting rationales yields an unexpected
result. Regardless of the commonplace trope that Africans voters
are motivated mainly by ethnic solidarities, we find that economic
interests are uppermost. Without denying that ethnic sentiments
play a role in shaping vote choice, we note that rational
calculations about material welfare are apparently at the
forefront of voters' minds. We take this observation as a positive
sign that African politicians cannot count indefinitely on
cultural appeals to kith and kin but, in order to be consistently
re-elected, must also establish a track record of social and
economic delivery.
Second, by distinguishing various dimensions of economic interest
and ethnic identity, we cast light on the mechanisms that drive
the formation of voting preferences.
As for economic interests, we note that voter expectations about
the future health of the economy outweigh any other past, present
or future evaluation, especially of personal living standards.
Thus, while we confirm that Africans resemble the sociotropic
voters so common in other parts of the world, we also insist that
they think about the economy more like future-oriented "bankers"
than backward-looking "peasants." Of course, one wonders whether
popular expectations about Africa's economic future are based as
much on hope as on realism. Offsetting this concern, however, we
note that, for the Africans we interviewed, rational assessment of
actual government performance at macroeconomic policy management is
the principal economic influence on intended vote choice.
As for ethnic identity, an individual's membership in the largest
ethnic group and distrust of ethnic strangers play almost no role
in shaping a vote for the political status quo. Instead, an
individual's membership in the ethnic group that currently holds
political power is a powerful factor explaining a vote for the
ruling party.
Conversely, an intention vote for the opposition is driven mainly
by whether an individual feels a collective sense of ethnic
discrimination. In this regard, the principal line of ethnic
cleavage in the context of electoral competition is whether
individuals are "insiders" or "outsiders" to the prevailing
distribution of political power.
Third, we cannot discount an individual's partisan attachments. But
we take a distinctly instrumental interpretation of overt
expressions of party identification. Because the distribution of
development resources in a winner-take-all system depends upon
political connections, voters have a strong incentive to declare
fealty to the incumbent, including by saying they will vote for
him. Their hope is that, by overtly (but not necessarily
sincerely) demonstrating political loyalty, material rewards will
follow. Especially where one party is dominant and opposition
parties are weak--the only contextual factor that we have found to
be important--it is simply too risky to come out openly and
express an intention to vote against an incumbent.
Fourth, the incentives for reelecting incumbents turn out to be
positive as well as negative. On the positive side, the perception
that incumbent politicians are able to make credible campaign
promises to deliver patronage after elections leads to a
measurable increase in ruling party support. On the negative side,
some would-be voters state an intention to back the ruling party
because they worry about harmful repercussions from agents of the
state. For reasons of self-protection, some unknown but probably
substantial proportion of these citizens therefore follows through
with actual votes for the party in power.
Fifth and finally, we trace voting intentions to a feature of
African political institutions at the country level. Our
multi-level model suggests that African citizens are much more
likely to vote for incumbents in places where there is a low
effective number of parliamentary parties, that is, where dominant
parties continue to stride the political stage. In places with
weak oppositions -- like, inter alia, Tanzania, Namibia,
Mozambique, and even Botswana and South Africa -- voters have a
restricted range of political choice; they essentially face the
narrow option of endorsing or rejecting some form of de facto
single party rule. It is for this reason that instrumental
expressions of partisanship are so widespread among African
electorates. Thus, even as African voters increasingly seek to
hold political leaders accountable for economic performance, they
encounter the institutional constraints of party systems inherited
from a postcolonial past.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with
a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
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