|
Get AfricaFocus Bulletin by e-mail!
Format for print or mobile
Africa: KONY 2012, Military Realities
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Mar 14, 2012 (120314)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
"Chasing the leaders, which seems to be the strategy
preferred by both the Ugandan People's Defence Force and the
US military, is a hit or miss approach that will call down
more attacks on unprotected civilians as the LRA
instrumentalise them to send their twisted message and
replace battlefield losses by abducting new fighters. While
the Ugandan/US strategy has produced some attrition, it has
also generated a bloody response and a massive recruitment
campaign that seems to have gone unnoticed." - Philip
Lancaster, co-author of Diagnostic Study of the Lord's
Resistance Army, and former military assistant to Gen. Romeo
Dallaire in Rwanda
The fact is, Lancaster and his co-authors conclude in the
June 2011 study for the International Working Group on the
LRA, neither military nor non-military approaches have
succeeded in "solving" the problem posed by the Lord's
Resistance Army. They note that the 50 experts they
consulted for their study were seriously divided on
approaches,including a long-term "state-building" solution,
more assertive military action, and further negotiations.
The commentaries included in this AfricaFocus Bulletin
provide no decisive evidence for or against these three
approaches, but they do provide relevant background. An
article by Philip Lancaster and brief excerpts from the
Diagnostic Study he co-authored, may be interpreted as
calling for increased military action, but only if it is
preceded by a serious study of the military options and
their potential pitfalls, which has not been done.
The Diagnostic Study researchers do make clear that
community leaders in the affected areas are calling for more
attention to renewed negotiations, in contrast to U.S. nongovernmental
organizations which seem to have faith in a
better-organized "surge" of military action, accompanied by
other supplementary non-military measures. The argument for
military action, most visibly advocated by Invisible
Children, is also argued more carefully and in more detail
by allied groups such as Resolve and the Enough Project, as
well as supported to some extent by Human Rights Watch.
[Update, April 11
The authors of the Diagnostic Study have just published an article
in the Journal of Eastern African Studies with a military assessment
of the requirements for successful military action against the LRA,
incorporating elements of the assessment that were excluded from the final Diagnostic
Study for political reasons. They conclude that "Given that unsuccessful
military operations against the rebels have typically resulted in
LRA retaliations against civilians, the paper urges caution in pursuing
such options and awareness of likely civilian consequences. First,
do no harm."
An abstract of the study is available at
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2012.669591. The
full paper is available to people at institutions subscribing to
the journal, or by payment.
Also included in this Bulletin is a brief summary of a
longer report by Resolve, one of the U.S. NGOs which is an
ally of Invisible Children. While the report presents the
case with far greater nuance than does Invisible Children,
including non-military as well as military components, in my
opinion it still does not explain why they discount the
voices of community leaders calling for greater emphasis on
peace negotiations and why they have faith that the U.S. and
Ugandan troops could do better with a "surge" this time.
Certainly neither the record in the region nor that of U.S.
troops in other parts of the world give good grounds for
such faith.
Finally, a late February report from the UN's IRIN
Humanitarian News and Analysis reports on several
contrasting views on these issues.
Another AfricaFocus Bulletin sent out today, and available
on the web at http://www.africafocus.org/docs12/kon1203a.php, contains a
transcript of a video by Rosebell Kagumire, and short
analytical articles by Mahmood Mamdani and Alex de Waal. An
additional updated list of recommended sources is available
on-line at http://tinyurl.com/7tea5ju
(newly updated April 11, 2012)
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++
How the US-Ugandan strategy of chasing the LRA backfires
While the Ugandan and US strategy of chasing the brutal
Lord's Resistance Army leader, Joseph Kony, has produced
some attrition, it has also generated a massive recruitment
campaign by the LRA.
By Philip Lancaster, Guest blogger / August 23, 2011
http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2011/08/guest-blog-lords-resistance-army-and-us.html
Philip Lancaster, a guest blogger on Jason Stearns' blog
Congo Siasa, was Gen. Romeo Dallaire's Military Assistant in
Rwanda before the genocide in 1994 and served as the head of
the UN mission in Congo's Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration division.
In addition to a long running insurgency that savaged
northern Uganda for over 20 years, the murder and mayhem
caused by the LRA across south eastern Central African
Republic (CAR), South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) over the past few years was serious enough to
bring both houses of the American Congress to set aside
partisan politics long enough to agree on legislation.
At about the same time, in August 2010, an international
working group comprised of the US, UK, and EU governments
with participation from the United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping and the World Bank, alarmed at the reports of
LRA atrocities, assembled around consensus on the need for
effective coordination across all the agencies and
governments involved.
The UN Security Council weighed in again in July 2011 with a
second resolution calling for the LRA to disarm and praising
the actions taken so far by governments, international
agencies and NGOs to address the harms inflicted by the LRA.
The Security Council particularly praised the efforts of the
AU to organize a coordinated military and diplomatic
response.
But what, exactly, has been accomplished?
More press releases, more declarations of intent to capture
or kill Joseph Kony, more empty assurances of imminent
victory and yet another round of search and destroy
operations led by the Ugandan Army. None of this is new and
all of it has failed in the past.
The Azande people, an historically marginalized ethnic group
of hunters, herders, and farmers living in the border
regions of the Central African Republic, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and South Sudan have been targeted for
special attention by the LRA, are caught in the yawning gap
between rhetoric and action. I am reminded of the feeling of
abandonment felt by the few who stayed on the ill-fated UN
Peacekeeping Mission in Rwanda as the outside world decided
that their reports of genocide must somehow be exaggerated.
Have we all become so cynical that we will let a whole
people suffer like this - again?
While the challenges of taking effective action in such a
complex environment are indeed daunting, it is the shallow
understanding of the military dimensions of the problem that
is so disappointing. We have ample evidence from reports of
the past 20 years that the LRA are a force to be reckoned
with. Ruthless as they are, their tactics are well adapted
to the terrain and the nature of the forces they face. And
yet the proposed military responses under the new AU offers
no new troops, no new thinking and no sign of serious
military technical analysis. A cynic might be led to think
that no one really wants to look at the problem carefully
out of fear of being called to do more than they might want
to.
The LRA make deliberate use of terror to tie up military
forces and survive by hit and run attacks that are wellplanned
and flawlessly executed. The military response from
UN Peacekeeping and national forces has been totally
inadequate insofar as they focus on providing limited static
defense of a small number of civilian settlements. The LRA
just find the ones that aren't protected. Since none of the
armies deployed have a policy of pursuit after attack, the
LRA consistently escape with loot and abducted recruits.
Chasing the leaders, which seems to be the strategy
preferred by both the Ugandan People's Defence Force and the
US military, is a hit or miss approach that will call down
more attacks on unprotected civilians as the LRA
instrumentalise them to send their twisted message and
replace battlefield losses by abducting new fighters. While
the Ugandan/US strategy has produced some attrition, it has
also generated a bloody response and a massive recruitment
campaign that seems to have gone unnoticed.
During interviews conducted as part of some recent research
on this subject, UPDF officers presented slides showing the
numbers of LRA killed or captured but nothing about the
numbers recruited. Subsequent questions revealed that the
UPDF were not really interested in recruitment. One suspects
a repetition of the 'victory by body count' strategy that
failed so spectacularly in Vietnam.
It is clear that there will be huge difficulties in finding
the right kinds and numbers of troops that would probably be
needed to be effective against the LRA. However, it is also
clear that repeating failing strategies, no matter whether
through the AU or some other agency, will not work - unless
exceedingly lucky and Kony and his key leaders are all
killed at once.
As a matter of simple logic, and as a first step, the
question of who needs to act should be informed by an
analysis of what kinds of action are likely to succeed. This
could be achieved by competent technical research conducted
by one of the military forces involved and it would cost
very little when compared with the cost of poorly aimed
military strikes. Yet, it doesn't seem to have been done.
Even the wealth of intelligence available from the UPDF has
not been shared with the other armies now engaged and so
each of them, including the UN Peacekeeping forces, are
learning about the LRA the hard way. And learning very
slowly.
Nor does anyone appear to have conducted a formal command
estimate of the LRA problem. Normally, no serious army would
take on any mission without analysis and yet the forces
engaged against the LRA seem to be operating on the premise
that it's easier to fight than to think. Surely this must
have something to do with political interference with what
should be a normal military staffing action. Isn't it time
they are allowed to devote some thought to the battle plan
before more civilians pay the price for the inevitable next
round of blunders?
As frustrating as the problem of the LRA is, it is also a
fascinating mirror reflecting political dynamics in the
West. The nub of the political problem could be understood
as a manifestation of the hypocrisy of our times. It is as
simple as the old children's story about a village of mice
deciding that the solution to their cat problem is to make
it wear a bell. The problem seems solved until one of them
asks who is going be the brave soul to hang a bell on the
cat. In the LRA case each affected state has other
priorities and no third party state is willing to commit
political or military resources to give either the UN or the
AU a real hope of success.
But everyone involved is too polite to point out that
neither organization has the capacity it needs and won't
unless someone steps up to take the responsibility to ensure
that it does.
"Who shall bell the cat?" But, it would seem, in this case,
we haven't even started looking for a bell.
International Working Group on the LRA
Diagnostic Study of the Lord's Resistance Army
June 2011
Philip Lancaster, Guillaume Lacaille, Ledio Cakaj
http://www.tdrp.net/PDFs/LRA_DiagnosticStudy_1.pdf
[Brief excerpts only This 59-page study is an essential
resource for anyone wanting to understand the policy options
available. But it is difficult to summarize and reaches no
clear conclusions apart from the fact that both military and
non-military approaches taken to date have not worked and in
fact are likely to continue to not work, in terms of a
definitive end to the insecurity created by the Lord's
Resistance Army. Particularly striking is their conclusion
that no one, including none of the armed forces involved,
has prepared a serious military estimate of what would be
required.
Its relevance for the U.S. debate is that it makes clear
that the primary reliance on military approaches, as
advocated by the activist U.S. NGOs involved, is only one of
three approaches debated among both local and international
experts.]
There is little political consensus on what could or should
be done about the LRA. This Study identifies three distinct
points of view, thereafter referred to as "school of
thoughts". Adherents of the first school of thought share
the belief that putting the LRA on the agenda of the
international community as a critical political issue is
counterproductive. Indeed, they see the LRA first-andforemost
as a symptom of the general lack of local capacity
to enforce state authority in remote areas of fragile
states. Called the state building school, the main argument
supporting its view is that the LRA is a criminal
organization that would continue to exist in some form until
the LRA-affected countries' security institutions are
improved through long-term international technical
assistance. The second school of thought, categorized
according to its support for a decisive military solution,
includes representatives from a set of agencies and
interests who see no other solution to the LRA challenge
except for the application of military force, including the
targeting of the group's leadership. Finally, there are
those who think that the best hope for an end to the
violence is through the recourse to negotiations with
members of the LRA as part of a comprehensive strategy. The
depth of disagreement is both divisive and unhelpful but is
unlikely to be resolved without much further discussion
grounded on a more exhaustive analysis than is currently
available.
...
The need to understand better the causes and correlations
linking behaviors of both the LRA and the set of military
forces arrayed against them is critical to developing
coherent policy. At the moment, calls for strong action
against the LRA from agencies such as Human Rights Watch
(HRW) and the Enough Project compete with calls for
negotiation from the network of European NGOs for advocacy
on Central Africa (EurAc) and regional religious and
cultural leaders. Groups from both sides of this divide urge
the need for a coherent and coordinated strategy yet each
grounds its arguments on different perspectives that reflect
fundamental differences in belief about both the evidence
available and its interpretation. Given the number of lives
already lost in the midst of what appears to be a policy
morass, it is urgent that a serious attempt be made to
better understand all the relevant factors affecting the
full range of policy alternatives, including the possibility
of negotiation, and the challenges and limitations
associated with all other approaches.
...
This study is grounded on the belief that none of the
current strategies in use by the forces and agencies in the
region are adequate to the challenge presented by the LRA
and that a rigorous study of the history of the LRA, the
operational context, the potential for a negotiated
solution, the relative capacities of the forces available
and the political issues affecting the availability of
resources as well as the likelihood of their use is the
first step to generating more creative and effective
solutions. It is the view of the study team that
humanitarian work can only mitigate a situation that
requires, ultimately, a comprehensive resolution, including
political/ security/ and development aspects, if basic
conditions of human dignity are to be restored to the
affected region.
...
The LRA is now widely considered to have lost its political
relevance in Uganda and to have been reduced to a "survival
mode" of operations. However, its survival has been at the
cost of at least 2,000 dead, 2,800 or more abducted and over
350,000 displaced. It succeeded in generating this much harm
during the period since the start of OLT, in other words,
while on the run from a US-supported military operation by
up to 4,500 UPDF soldiers who were supposedly operating in
loose collaboration with UN peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO),
Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC),
Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and Armed Forces of
Central Africa (FACA). It should be remembered that victory
has too often been declared in Northern Uganda only to have
the LRA reappear.
...
Local community leaders committed to keeping the door open
for dialogue with the LRA Since the end of 2008, the
prominent public figures who led the negotiations with Kony
have disengaged from the issue of the LRA. Several European
activists and academics who witnessed the Juba process
indicate that-if a possibility would arise-resorting to
less-known individuals to conduct discreet mediations would
be more effective in re-establishing contact with Kony than
using high-profile personalities. The same sources report
that the priority given to forced disarmament since OLT also
temporarily marginalized local community leaders involved in
the Juba talks.
Indeed, a coalition of local leaders from the four LRAaffected
countries still intends to play a larger role.
Almost three years into the military operations, community
leaders denounce the lack of commitment from their
respective governments, militaries and from the
international community to make the protection of the
population a priority.43 Some religious authorities and
traditional chiefs are skeptical of the prospects of
eventually neutralizing the LRA though military means, and
have begun looking into ways to reengage the LRA at an
individual level. The core message for rebel fighters and
abductees is that it is still possible to return to their
community of origin. Incentives and sensitization are
directed to LRA members as well as to the receiving
communities.
Reflecting demands articulated by these community leaders, a
coalition of NGOs, EurAc, has reintroduced the concept of
dialogue with the LRA to European audiences. Since October
2009, IKV/Pax Christi coordinates a regional network
involving religious authorities from all the LRA-affected
countries. Several national initiatives are also underway:
one with the Justice and Peace commission in Yambio
supported by Cordaid, one with religious leaders in Dungu
supported by IKV/Pax Christi, and one with the Acholi
Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in Northern
Uganda supported by Conciliation Resources. ...
Peace Can Be
New Report Argues Deployment of Advisors Creates
Unprecedented Opportunity to End LRA Atrocities
Resolve
http://www.theresolve.org
For this statement, and a link to the full report, see
http://www.theresolve.org/peace-can-be--3
February 21, 2012 (Washington, DC) - Despite the political
pressures of an election year, the United States government
must continue to prioritize efforts to help combat the
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and actively work with central
African governments to arrest LRA leader Joseph Kony and put
an end once and for all to the group's atrocities in the
region, argues a report issued today by Washington-based
human rights organization Resolve.
"2012 is a make or break year for President Obama's efforts
to see an end to LRA violence," says Resolve Executive
Director Michael Poffenberger. "The LRA has relentlessly
attacked civilians for over two decades. The President's
decision to deploy U.S. military advisors to the region
creates a limited window of opportunity to finally see these
atrocities come to an end."
The Obama Administration released the first-ever White House
strategy to address the LRA in 2010 and built on that effort
by deploying 100 advisers to the region late last year,
helping the Ugandan and other regional militaries protect
civilians and apprehend senior LRA commanders.
LRA forces currently comprised of 200-300 fighters and
commanders, down from as many as 10,000 in the 1990's, have
been skillful in adapting and evading efforts to defeat
them. After a military surge led by the Ugandan government
reduced the group's core capacity in 2009, regional efforts
have faltered, allowing a small number of LRA fighters to
have an outsize impact on the civilian population. 465,000
people have been displaced as a result of the group's
attacks in an area the size of France which includes parts
of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African
Republic, and the newly-formed Republic of South Sudan.
"Joseph Kony and senior LRA commanders remain a very real
threat to peace and stability in central Africa, and have
proven they can survive half-hearted efforts aimed at
defeating them," Ronan added. "While it's a huge step
forward, President Obama's LRA strategy runs the risk of
becoming another well-intentioned but ultimately
unsuccessful effort unless additional steps are taken
immediately."
In "Peace Can Be: President Obama's Chance to Help End LRA
Atrocities in 2012," Resolve argues that only progress in
reducing the LRA's threat to civilians should drive
decisions made about the deployment of U.S. forces and other
policy measures. "This kind of bold leadership from the
White House may be threatened by political attacks made in
an election year. But persistence could provide a real
victory for the Administration's commitment to stop and
prevent mass atrocities," added Poffenberger.
The report, based on three months of research conducted in
late 2011 in remote areas of central Africa impacted by LRA
violence, also argues that the U.S. needs to augment the
troop deployment with additional steps, including:
- High-level diplomacy, in partnership with the African
Union, to overcome a breakdown in cooperation among regional
governments;
- Deployment of helicopters to help regional military
respond to reports of LRA attacks and movements; and
- Investments in civilian infrastructure, including early
warning systems, and programs focused on securing peaceful
defections from LRA ranks to complement military
investments.
Uganda: Questions Over Progress Against the LRA
24 February 2012
IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis
http://allafrica.com/stories/201202241437.html
[ This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the
United Nations ]
Johannesburg - The US believes its military intervention in
central Africa in pursuit of Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA) is having the desired effect, reducing attacks
and improving civilian protection - although analysts have
reservations.
In 2011, the US deployed about 100 troops to the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR),
South Sudan and Uganda to assist the region's military
forces in killing or capturing Kony and his senior command,
following President Barack Obama Administration's
announcement in November 2010 to deal decisively with the
armed group.
Karl Wycoff, the US deputy assistant secretary for African
affairs, in a telephone briefing on 22 February, told IRIN:
"Over recent months the military of Uganda, CAR, DRC and
South Sudan have continued to carry out operations against
the LRA. We are supporting them in these efforts. We are
providing logistical support to help the Ugandan military
sustain its forward operations against the LRA. We are
funding, for example, some airlift, fuel and other transport
support for their troops. In the DRC we trained and equipped
a Congolese battalion that is now operating in LRA-affected
areas of the DRC and we are also working with the UN
peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO [UN Organization Stabilization
Mission in the DRC]."
About US$40 million has been provided by the US so far in
support of the Ugandan military effort.
MONUSCO and Congolese forces were involved in recent
operations to prevent any repeats of the LRA's 2008 and 2009
Christmas massacres, he said, and the US was also providing
support to CAR and South Sudan military forces.
"With our support, these four military forces continue to
make progress in reducing the LRA numbers and keeping them
from regrouping. We believe it is critical the militaries in
the region continue to work together to keep the pressure on
the LRA and protect their own citizens. As we have seen in
the past, the LRA will exploit any reduction in military or
diplomatic pressure to regroup and rebuild their forces,"
Wycloff said.
Still dancing to Kony's tune
He cited UN statistics saying that in 2011 there were 278
attacks attributed to the LRA and more than 300 abductions,
but in the second half of the year, which coincided with the
deployment of US troops, incidents "appear" to have
decreased - although about 465,000 people in the region were
displaced or living as refugees in 2011 because of LRA
activities.
Rear Admiral Brian Losey, commander of Special Operations
Command Africa, believed the drop in attacks was a result of
the US and local military operations and the "numbers of
[LRA] fighters have been reduced to 200 or so... We do not
have a specific timeline with this mission, nor is it openended."
The important thing now is what Kony is actually doing and
as far as anyone can tell, he is still in control and
calling the tune the rest of us dance to
However, Phil Lancaster, one of the authors of the 2011
International Working Group on the LRA report, Diagnostic
Study of the Lord's Resistance Army and former head of the
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration division of
the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC), predecessor to MONUSCO,
told IRIN, "Estimates of core numbers have bounced between
250 and 150 for the past 18 months.
"He [Wycoff] doesn't know any more than anyone else what is
going on inside the LRA... The important thing now is what
Kony is actually doing and as far as anyone can tell, he is
still in control and calling the tune the rest of us dance
to."
The LRA, which relies on forced recruitment, and more often
than not the use of child soldiers, to bolster its ranks,
has largely operated with a core strength of about 250
fighters from its inception in the 1980s, say analysts.
A 22 February briefing note by the Small Arms Survey (SAS),
Lord's Resistance Army Update said although in 2012 there
had been no reported attacks in South Sudan or CAR since 18
January, "raids in northeastern DRC have increased this
year".
"At least 12 attacks were reported in the first two weeks of
February, all in or near areas where LRA groups have
attacked during the last three years. Ngilima, Bangadi,
Dungu and areas around Faradje have been consistently
targeted by LRA combatants, indicating a return to old
bases, particularly in Garamba National Park," the update
said.
Lack of regional cooperation
The SAS update also questioned the level of cooperation
between regional forces and the DRC, considering President
Joseph Kabila's government antipathy towards Ugandan troops
on its soil. Of the four contributing military forces,
Ugandans are viewed as the most professional.
"Ugandan troops are not officially allowed to enter the DRC,
even though the Congolese army units located in areas with
an LRA presence are notoriously incapable of dealing with
the rebels... This refusal to allow Ugandan troops, and by
association US advisers, to enter the DRC has impeded the
Americans' drive to remove top LRA commanders from the
battlefield," the SAS update said.
Resolve, a US-based advocacy NGO, said in a February 2012
report, Peace Can Be. President Obama's chance to help end
LRA atrocities in 2012, questioned Uganda's commitment to
continued operations against the LRA, as its border regions
were no longer threatened by the armed group and since 2009
it has withdrawn more than half its soldiers dedicated to
the pursuit of Kony and his senior commanders.
Uganda's military is also heavily committed to the AU
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which in recent days has seen a
renewed emphasis by the international community to resolving
the conflict in the country.
Measuring success against the LRA in terms of reduced
attacks was also questioned.
"In the second half of 2011, the LRA dramatically reduced
its attacks, particularly those involving killings of
civilians. Regional military forces interpret these trends
as a sign that the rebel group's capacity has been severely
decimated. However, the LRA's proven ability to protect its
core commanders and to regenerate itself if given the
opportunity should inspire caution.
"LRA commanders may be intentionally reducing violence
against civilians in the hopes that renewed US and regional
initiatives lose momentum. If current initiatives fail to
break apart the LRA's command structure, the group will be
poised to survive indefinitely and eventually replenish its
strength in the tri-border region," the report said.
Resolve said the US commitment was also threatened by the
2012 presidential campaign as "the Obama Administration may
encounter domestic pressure to withdraw the US military
advisers before they have achieved their objectives."
Among Resolve's recommendations to end the "predations" of
the LRA, was "convincing" Uganda to devote more troops to
the fight, increasing "intelligence and aerial mobility
support to the Ugandans", and "especially to ensure that
Congo [DRC] allows the Ugandan military conditional access
to Congolese territory affected by the LRA".
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic
publication providing reposted commentary and analysis on
African issues, with a particular focus on U.S. and
international policies. AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by
William Minter.
AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus@igc.org.
Please write to this address to subscribe or unsubscribe to
the bulletin, or to suggest material for inclusion. For more
information about reposted material, please contact directly
the original source mentioned. For a full archive and other
resources, see http://www.africafocus.org
|
