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Note: This document is from the archive of the Africa Policy E-Journal, published by the Africa Policy Information Center (APIC) from 1995 to 2001 and by Africa Action from 2001 to 2003. APIC was merged into Africa Action in 2001. Please note that many outdated links in this archived document may not work.

Zaire: IRIN Briefing, 2
Date Distributed (ymd): 961026

[Via the UN DHA Integrated Regional Information Network. The
material contained in this communication may not necessarily
reflect the views of the United Nations or its agencies. UN
DHA IRIN Tel: +254 2 622123 Fax: +254 2 622129 e-mail:
irin@dha.unon.org for more information. If you re-print, copy,
archive or re-post this item, please retain this credit and
disclaimer.]

U N I T E D   N A T I O N S
Department of Humanitarian Affairs
Integrated Regional Information Network

IRIN UPDATE ON SOUTH KIVU - 26 OCTOBER 1996

The information in this report is current as of early this
morning (26 October 1996). An evacuation of international aid
staff from Bukavu is likely today. The situation is very
fluid, and events may overtake this report over the next
hours.

1. THE WIDENING CONFLICT

1.1 The conflict in South Kivu is reaching a peak as the
provincial capital, Bukavu, is squeezed by military advances
from the south and land routes for aid and trade are blocked.
An attack on Bukavu is regarded by the Zairean Camp Security
Contingent as within the capacity of the
Banyamulenge-dominated forces at any time.

1.2 Despite urgings (and even appeals for contributions for
the war effort) from the Zairean Prime Minister and President,
it appears clear that the FAZ are losing territory and
retreating, sometimes even before engaging the rebels. Zairean
forces have been pushed back beyond Nyangezi, less than 30 kms
south of Bukavu, where some 10 Zairean Camp Security
Contingent soldiers were captured mid-week. The
Banyamulenge-dominated forces opposing them now control most
of the area between Uvira and Buakvu, including Kamanyola and
part, if not all of the border with Rwanda.  Zairean forces
occupying Uvira have apparently been defeated by the rebels
during Friday night and Saturday morning after shelling was
reported on the night of the 24th October and in the morning
of the 25th. BBC carried  an interview with a spokesman for
the "Alliance of Forces for Democracy  and Liberation of
Congo-Zaire", who claimed to be in Uvira, having won  the town
with a force of 400 fighters.

1.3 The FAZ have mounted roadblocks in Bukavu city for
checking identification papers and the number of car-jackings
by Zairean soldiers is high - 10-15 UN and NGO vehicles were
seized on Tuesday alone. While the Governor declared himself
"serene" earlier in the week, the FAZ have reportedly set up
defensive positions around the city. A 8pm to 6am curfew was
enforced on Wednesday.

1.4  While the Banyamulenge forces control most of the Rusizi
plain and probably parts of the Haut Plateaux in the west,
some observers expressed surprise that they had climbed the
escarpment road and taken highland areas around Nyangezi on
Wednesday.

1.5  The ultimate objective of the Banyamulenge-dominated
forces is unclear, as the conflict obstensibly began as an
exercise in self-defence. The possibility of some kind of
"master-plan" linking attacks in North Kivu and the South Kivu
conflict is hard to discount entirely.

1.6 Zairean state radio announced that military aircraft are
to be deployed in the South Kivu conflict. Further ammunition
was supplied to the FAZ during the week. Accusations and
denials continue to fly between Kinshasa and Kigali as to the
alleged involvement of Rwandan Patriotic Army forces in the
fighting. Zaire has also protested to the UN Security Council.
There remains no conclusive evidence of RPA involvement nor of
Burundian forces taking part. Other allegations include
reports of anti-Zairean forces using Burundian and Rwandan
territory in the campaign.

1.7 Prompt diplomatic initiatives by the EU, UN and OAU have
yet to bear fruit but talks hosted by Belgium have started in
an attempt to broker a meeting between Zairean Prime Minster
Kengo wa Dondo and either Rwandan Prime Minister Pierre
Celestin Rwigema or Vice President and Minister of Defence,
Paul Kagame. The US, France and EU Special Envoy have lent
weight to Belgian efforts. The UN Secretary-General and the
Chairman of the OAU, have lent their support to the idea of a
regional Conference for Peace, Security and Development in the
Great Lakes Region.  UN Special Envoy, Ibrahima Fall, is
reported to have made progress in persuading Uganda and Rwanda
of the usefulness of the Conference. The UN Secretary-General
has further proposed a mediator to negotiate a ceasefire.
Zairean President  Mobutu is reported to remain in very poor
health in Switzerland, adding  to the general uncertainty.

1.8 Opposition groups from Rwanda (the RDR) and Burundi (CNDD)
have weighed in with statements alleging an over-arching plan
for a "Tutsiland" beyond the borders of Rwanda and Burundi.
Muller Ruhimbika, exiled Banyamulenge leader of the
newly-named Democratic Alliance for the People, said that
Shaba and Kasai-based Zairean opposition groups now support
the Tutsi rebels. This raises the possibility of an even
broader conflict within Zaire. Also the Banyamulenge were
ready for talks, he said in a BBC interview on Thursday. On
Friday, he upped the stakes by saying to "We  are not fighting
for the Kivu region, but for the whole of Zaire...Mobutu  must
go."

1.9 The widening conflict in North Kivu includes border areas
between Uganda and Zaire. Uganda's Major-General Salim Saleh,
Special Presidential Advisor on Military and Political Affairs
in the North has asked parliament to allow government Ugandan
People's Defence Forces to pursue and assault bases of Ugandan
rebels in Zaire and Sudan.

2. HUMANITARIAN IMPACT

2.1 As the crisis broke, all 220,000 refugees grouped in the
Uvira camps were reported to all have fled. Now, however, it
appears that some camps remian more or less intact and the
refugees are still in residence. Those that were abandoned
have since reportedly been burnt. As far as anyone can tell,
four or five camps to the north of Uvira are the ones which
have been abandoned. Figures being used by the humanitarian
community in Bukavu indicate that there are up to 80,000
mainly Rwandan refugees from the Uvira camps on the move. But
some refugees from the Uvira camps have reportedly fled
westwards - and some may have returned to Burundi. Since the
deterioration in security and the evacuation of relief
workers, as many as 140,000 refugees may remain around Uvira
and are unlikely to receive any supplies in the near future.

2.2 The second group of affected people are the refugees of
the southern Bukavu camps, in particular the two at Nyangezi.
A total of 37,000 refugees from those two camps left beginning
Tuesday 22 October. In addition, it appears that Nyantende
camp may also be abandoned (approximately 9,000 more
"displaced refugees" may have moved out).

2.3  The third group of affected people are local Zairean
populations displaced by the fighting. In the whole of South
Kivu, a current "guesstimate" of the numbers suggests 15,000
displaced in Fizi Zone, south of Uvira, 30,000 between Uvira
and Bukavu and 10,000 in the environs of Bukavu. Some urban
Zaireans in Uvira and Bukavu are also leaving town to seek
sanctuary in the countryside. These figures are little better
than guesses, and needs among this group are likely to be
talken care of by relatives. However, the strain of
accomodating displaced family members will, in the medium
term, begin to take a toll on local services in  health and
other sectors.

The hospital in Bukavu is full, with wounded soldiers still
armed,  causing disruption.

3. BREAKDOWN OF POPULATION IN NEED

3.1 Table of current population estimates

Displaced refugees (frm Uvira): 80,000
Displaced refugees (from Bukavu): 46,000
Remaining refugees (at Bukavu): 264,000
Remaining refugees (at Uvira): 140,000

Total: 530,000

3.2 Additional non-food needs are likely for Zairean displaced
in the  mid-term.

3.3 Up to 16,000 of the estimated displaced refugees from both
areas listed above have re-appeared at other Bukavu camps.

3.4 These figures shoiuld of course be treated wiuth caution,
as they are  "best available" estimates.

4.  HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

4.1 The activities of humanitarian agencies are severly
restricted by looting of vehicles in the town, the possibility
of ambushes outside and the threat of a rebel assault on the
town. WFP had a warehouse looted on Wednesday and a staff
member assaulted on Thursday. It is questionable whether the
current level of insecurity can be tolerated by the majority
of aid agencies, and a planned pull-out is being reviewed
constantly. Within these limitations, aid agencies are trying
to assist the displaced refugees on arrival at the Bukavu
camps, continue services to established refugees and give some
support to local structures.

4.2  The displaced refugees are beginning to arrive in
westerly Bukavu  camps, giuded by Zairean soldiers along the
route. This group are - in  general - prevented from entering
Bukavu by Zairean security forces. As  many of the Bukavu
camps are effectively "full" (no unused or suitable  land is
adjacent), UNHCR is encouraging those who wish to stay, to
move  to emptier camps, and Chimanga in particular.

4.3 Chimanga, managed by CARE, is the most westerly of the
Bukavu camps, and had a population of about 18,000 before the
crisis broke. So far, about 2,000 displaced refugees have
arrived there. Larger numbers of refugees (7,000-14,000) have
arrived at camps along the route, but protest at having to
move further. They are building shelters on the edges of the
current camps, and are accepted by the other refugees. Aid
agencies are planning to porvide water and high-protein
biscuits along the road if security permits.

4.4 The UNHCR, however, has urged the Rwandan refugees to
seriously consider retunrning home in a message from Ms Ogata
braodcast to the region on 25 October.

5. HUMANITARIAN IMPLICATIONS

5.1 The current land routes to Bukavu seem likely to be closed
or  unreliable for the near future. If the roads to Uganda,
north of Goma  become safer, Bukavu could then be supplied by
barge from Goma. The road  between the two provincial capitals
is unsuitable for any truck carrying  more than 10 metric
tonnes, and even then it is a rough road.

5.2 The southern route through Uvira (itself supplied either
by barge from Kigoma, Tanzania, or in the past, overland
through Burundi) seems likely to be closed for some time
unless there is a resolution to the fighting one way or the
other.  There are alternative land routes - through Rwanda,
but since April 1995, the Rwandan Government has blocked the
transit of refugee relief supplies through its territory. On
its past record, it would be surprising if Rwanda were to
relent now.

5.3 Monthly food requirements for the 310,000 refugees of the
Bukavu caseload plus the additional displaced refugees from
Uvira could be over 6,000 metric tonnes per month. The World
Food Programme intends to operate an airlift from Uganda to
Bukavu, using a C-130 transport aircraft. The first flight of
food was planned for Saturday, carrying nutritional biscuits
or CSB. However, the supply of the current caseload in South
Kivu with a general raytion would be prohibitively expensive.
An attempt to supply even a half ration by air could cost well
over $100,000 oer day. A single C-130 flight from Entebbe to
Bukavu costs between $12,000 to $15,000.

5.4 Other relief items may be deliverable by barge from stock
in Goma, but in general, further supplies will have to come by
air. However, Bukavu airport is a 40-minute drive north of the
town and so is vulnerable to being cut off too.

5.5 The delivery of food and other relief items to Bukavu is
only one  part of the story. If Bukavu remains cut off, the
effects of a de facto  blockade will begin to show in fuel
shortages, inflation and perhaps  additional population
displacement and looting. Diesel is already in very  short
supply.

5.6 The contortions required to "classify" the affected
populations in  South Kivu are one aspect of the humanitarian
system's sometimes  overlapping mandates: refugees, internally
displaced persons (IDPs) and  recipients of "development aid".

5.7 The UNHCR message urges Rwandan refugees to make a virtue
of a  necessity, and go home where their security and dignity
are assured by  the Rwandan government and attested to by the
international community.  While reassuring them that the
choice is theirs, in a "terrible"  situation, UNHCR urges them
to ignore "malicious rumours" when deciding  where to go. If
the rebels control the southern land border between  Rwanda
and Zaire, however, there may not presently be a safe corridor
for  refugees willing to return.

 6. CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Reliable information on the number and location of the
displaced and refugees of all groups is very scarce. Also,
details of the progress of the fighting is almost
non-existent. The few foreign journalists in Bukavu are
constantly harrassed and asked for bribes. A foreign
correspondent (with a valid visa) leaving Bukavu on Friday had
to pay a total of $500 in bribes at seven checkpoints along
the airport road and at the airport itself. Another
journalist, fully accredited with Kinshasa was locked up
overnight earlier in the week.

6.2 The size, composition and location of rebel forces is also
hard to confirm. Even displaced refugees interviewed at
Nyamirangwe could not report actually seeing rebel troops.
Several camp populations made decisions to move on hearing
shooting or after the Zairean troops pulled out. They do not
seem to have fled in panic in disarray, but rather with
trepidation, planning and forethought.

6.3 While the situation for the displaced refugees appears
precarious,  the needs of the remaining Uvira caseload (mainly
Burundian Hutus) may in  fact be greater and more urgent,
given their location near the centre of  the conflict, and the
complete absence of international aid or monitoring.

6.4 Insecurity may increase in Bukavu, either from a direct
attack, or a  breakdown in discipline by already jumpy Zairean
troops, and trigger an  evacuation of aid workers. Already,
armed soldiers are paid by agencies  when moving around the
city, but car-jackings continue. Soldiers are  sometimes
reported to want the cars to move themselves and their
families  out of the area.

6.5 Humanitarian agencies should continue to seek access to
populations in need, and insist on their impartiality, and
state their intentions and modus operandi clearly and
publicly. However, given the experience of aid agencies in
Uvira, it may be impossible in the short term to deliver even
basic life-saving services in South Kivu. The principle of
maintaining a joint approach to evacuation and/or suspension
of activites among the UN agencies and partners seems
well-established. External assessment  missions (a two-man
French team arrived Friday from Paris) will no  doubt
proliferate.

6.6 Options open to humanitarian agencies are extremely
limited. The current crisis is a "litmus test" of the
willingness of Rwandan refugees to return home. The
humanitarian community may wish to consider ways to guarantee
safe corridors for the refugees to reach Rwanda. For the
displaced refugees in South Kivu, there is no easy route to
the Rwandan  border.

6.7 The real crisis is not about refugees - they, in the
widening conflict, are both a symptom and a cause of the
problems of the Great Lakes. The status of the Banyamulenge
has been an issue for at least 200 years, but the arrival of
Burundian and Rwandan refugees over the last three years -
caused by internal conflicts - has brought the Banyamulenge's
predicament to a climax, and potentially drawn others into the
conflict.

6.8 Eastern Zaire - lush, fertile and well-watered, is now the
theatre of many unresolved regional political problems. The
widening conflict, unless cooled by talks, external military
intervention or ceasefire has the potential to generate a new
spiral of crises, putting more and more civilian populations
at risk, and at worst, breaking into full-scale war.

[ENDS]

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