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Zaire: WOA Statement
Any links to other sites in this file from 1996 are not clickable,
given the difficulty in maintaining up-to-date links in old files.
However, we hope they may still provide leads for your research.
Zaire: WOA Statement
Date distributed (ymd): 961119
Washington Notes on Africa Update
Central Africa Intervention Must Not Reinforce Hutu Extremists
or Mobutu Regime
November 19, 1996
ISSUE: Despite the return of hundreds of thousands of
refugees from Zaire to Rwanda over the weekend, conflict in
eastern Zaire still poses an immediate threat to the lives of
hundreds of thousands of refugees and Zaireans. International
military intervention to establish safe corridors for relief
and for refugees to return home is still urgent. Equally
important is an adequate international civilian presence to
support not only feeding but reintegration and protection of
human rights for returned refugees. It is extremely important,
however, that this intervention be carried out in such a way
as to address long-term issues, as stressed by the recent
Nairobi summit of East African leaders, by human rights
organizations, and by non-governmental groups.
The situation is changing rapidly. There is a risk that the
dramatic return of half a million refugees to Rwanda will
distract attention from the plight of refugees and displaced
Zaireans still not reachable (the affected area in eastern
Zaire is roughly equivalent in size to the US east coast from
Pennsylvania through North Carolina inclusive) and from the
massive needs to provide adequate support for resettlement of
the refugees. Plans for intervention must be adapted to
changes on the ground, but there is still a pressing need for
speedy and large-scale action by the international community.
The guidelines for the intervention adopted by the UN Security
Council on November 15 leave room for interpretation. Both
the U.S. and Canada, however, say that the force will not
attempt to separate the extremist Hutu military groups still
in eastern Zaire from genuine refugees. African states, as
well as humanitarian organizations and human rights observers
familiar with the situation, say that unless this is done the
intervention may well promote more conflict even while saving
some innocent people from starvation.
The international intervention in 1994 came too late to
prevent genocide in Rwanda. It served in practice to reinforce
the power of the military forces who orchestrated the
killings, who fled with the refugees to Zaire and who still
dominate the Rwandan refugee camps there. Unless carefully
designed to avoid such an outcome, the current intervention
could further reinforce the power of those responsible for
genocide, and of the Mobutu regime in Zaire.
The chances of avoiding these pitfalls can be increased if the
international community provides financial and logistical
support for significant participation in the operation by
troops from neutral African countries. In any case, short-
term military expediency and humanitarian imperatives must not
again be allowed to shove aside longer-term issues.
ACTION: Contact the President and your Members of Congress.
Tell them you support U.S. participation in a neutral
international military intervention to protect humanitarian
relief for refugees and displaced Zaireans in eastern Zaire,
but only under certain conditions. Make the following points:
* The intervention force should not be used, directly or
indirectly, to protect the military forces of Hutu extremists
who carried out the 1994 genocide, or the Mobutu regime in
Zaire.
* The United States should provide adequate financial and
logistical support to neutral African countries willing to
participate.
* The United States must give urgent attention to long-term
issues, in particular:
(1) creating conditions in Rwanda to facilitate the refugees'
return, including expanded human rights monitoring as well as
distribution of relief supplies, and
(2) stopping the flow of arms to extremist forces in the
region, including both the Hutu extremists now in Zaire and
the Burundi government led by Tutsi extremists.
WHEN: Immediately.
WRITE, PHONE OR FAX:
President Bill Clinton
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
White House comment line: (202) 456-1111
White House fax: (202) 456-2883
E-mail: president@whitehouse.gov.
The Honorable ________
U.S. Senate
Washington, DC 20510
The Honorable ________
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Capitol switchboard for reaching congressional offices: (202)
224-3121
BACKGROUND: The current crisis stems most directly from the
aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Those killings were
organized by the former Rwandan government which was led by
Hutu extremists with a Nazi-like ideology, explicitly
committed to the extermination of all Tutsis and moderate
Hutus. They killed more than 500,000 people in the three
months of April through June 1994.
There are many different forces involved in the current
conflict, and shifting battle lines. The major combatants on
one side are the former Rwandan government army and militia--
Hutu extremists responsible for genocide--who control the Hutu
refugee camps in eastern Zaire. They have generally been
supported by the Zairean government army, much of which,
however, has disintegrated and fled west deeper into Zaire.
On the other side are the Zairean rebels (mainly Zairean-born
Tutsis) who resisted efforts to expel them from Zaire, and won
control of the border area in eastern Zaire. They are
reportedly trained and armed by the current Rwandan
government, which has retaliated against raids from the Hutu
extremists in eastern Zaire, and may have troops supporting
the Zairean rebels inside Zaire.
After their defeat by the current Rwandan government
(predominantly Tutsi), most of the killers fled into
neighboring Zaire. They were accompanied by approximately one
million refugees. The 1994 humanitarian relief operation
focused on feeding these refugees. Since then, most of the
refugees have stayed in Zaire rather than returning to Rwanda,
many fearing reprisals or discrimination if they return.
Others have been intimidated by the Rwandan extremists who
control the refugee camps and threaten to kill those who do
try to return.
Other Hutu refugees have fled in recent years from Burundi,
where the military is led by Tutsi extremists. That regime is
being boycotted by neighboring states (including Rwanda) to
force it to allow political participation by the Hutu
majority.
The social gaps between Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi
and between Tutsi and other Zaireans in eastern Zaire have
deep historical roots, but have grown wider in the colonial
and independence periods. Often wrongly labelled a "tribal"
division, the distinction between Tutsi and Hutu (who within
each country share a common language and culture) is better
compared to a caste distinction, roughly translated as
"aristocrats" and "commoners." For extremists on both sides,
however, it has come to be perceived as a racial division.
The influx of refugees has further destabilized already
chaotic Zaire. Unscrupulous Zairean politicians and soldiers
have targeted local Zaireans of Tutsi origin, including many
whose families had been living in the area for over two
centuries. Last year in North Kivu province Hutu extremist
refugees together with local Zairean officials expelled Tutsis
from North Kivu. In September local Zairean officials
threatened also to expel the Tutsis of South Kivu (known as
Banyamulenge). Reportedly armed and trained by the Rwandan
government, however, the Banyamulenge fought back. The
Zairean army and Hutu refugees were driven out of major East
Zairean towns such as Uvira, Bukavu and Goma.
The undisciplined Zairean army has for the most part fled the
area, causing disruption to the west, including the next major
city, Kisangani. While relief supplies have begun to flow
again to some portions of eastern Zaire held by rebels, most
refugees or local Zaireans are dispersed in the countryside
without food, many still in areas still controlled by the
genocide organizers or in combat zones.
Over the weekend, as many as 400,000 refugees returned from
Zaire to Rwanda, overwhelming relief agencies on the border,
after the Mugunga refugee camp near Goma was abandoned by the
Hutu extremist forces who had held the refugees there. The
fate of as many more deeper in Zaire, both refugees and
Zaireans, both in North Kivu province and in South Kivu
province, is unknown.
The situation on the ground is changing daily. But it is
clear that urgent assistance is still needed, both in eastern
Zaire and in Rwanda as the refugees return to their home
areas. Military-supported logistics operations are required
in order that UN and non-governmental relief operations can
function inside eastern Zaire. In Rwanda the urgent need is
not only for relief supplies, but for an adequate
international human rights and non-governmental presence
throughout the country to facilitate the refugees' return.
Note: Updated information from a variety of sources can be
found most conveniently and quickly at
(1) http://www.info.usaid.gov/ofda/reliefweb/ (outside North
America at http://www.reliefweb.int/) and
(2) http://www.africanews.org/greatlakes.html.
Additional statements from U.S. non-governmental relief and
development organizations can be found at
http://www.interaction.org/zrcrisis.html. Statements by Human
Rights Watch/Africa are available at
gopher://gopher.humanrights.org:5000/11/int/hrw; HRW/Africa's
press releases and public letters are also available on a
mailing list (send a message to majordomo@igc.org with
"subscribe hrw-news-africa" in the body of the message.)
"When refugee camps were first established in Zaire [in 1994],
the international community permitted the civilian and
military authorities who had carried out a genocide [in
Rwanda] to reassert their control over the refugee population.
To fail to separate armed elements from unarmed refugees now
would simply repeat the mistake, postponing any real solution
to the crisis. The proposed international force cannot simply
hand out porridge; it must offer effective protection for the
lives and human rights of the refugees." Peter Takirambudde,
Director of Human Rights Watch/Africa, November 15, 1996.
************************************************************
This material is being reposted for wider distribution by the
Washington Office on Africa (WOA), a not-for-profit church,
trade union and civil rights group supported organization
that works with Congress on Africa-related legislation. WOA's
educational affiliate is the Africa Policy Information Center
(APIC).
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