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Western Sahara: Houston Agreement
Western Sahara: Houston Agreement
Date distributed (ymd): 970928
Document reposted by APIC
Region: North Africa
Issue Areas: +security/peace+
This posting contains the issue for September 14-20 of the weekly newsletter
of the Association in Support of a Free and Fair Referendum in Western
Sahara, reporting on the agreement signed in Houston between Morocco and
Polisario clearing away disagreements on implementation of the referendum
to decide the territory's future independence or integration into Morocco.
It also contains brief excerpts with additional background from the following
issue of the newsletter and from an article by Javier Valenzuela of the
Spanish newspaper El Pais.
ARSO (Association de soutien a un referendum libre et regulier au Sahara
CP 2229, CH-2800 DELEMONT 2, Switzerland;
Tel./Fax: +41 32 422 87 17;
ARSO WEEKLY NEWS
WEEK 38 14.-20.09.1997
14. - 16.09.97 Houston negociations: Agreement between Morocco and
the Polisario Front
After 3 days of talks behind closed doors in Houston, the UN Special
Envoy Mr. James Baker III announced on September 16 that the parties involved
in the conflict came to an agreement that laid the groundwork for an end
to their dispute over Western Sahara by agreeing to a code of conduct governing
a referendum that would decide the fate of the territory.
The U.N. mediator said the accord would be presented to the United Nations
to decide whether a referendum could be held, and when. At issue is whether
Western Sahara is incorporated into Morocco or becomes independent, as
supported by the Polisario Front. "We have agreed upon pretty much
everything that is necessary for the United Nations to reinstitute the
(referendum) process", he told. Baker, who described the Houston talks
as "fairly difficult", said the issue of who would vote had been
decided, but it was a "very, very complicated issue". "It
depends on tribes and tribal groupings and a whole host of other things.
I can tell you that I would estimate we would probably see a total electorate
in this case of something in the neighborhood of 80,000 voters, "
he said. In his opinion the vote could take place in "10 or 11 months",
and he affirmed that both sides had agreed to give the United Nations "all
the authority that it deems necessary in order to organize and conduct
a free and fair referendum." He said also there was no guarantee that
everything agreed to in this latest round of talks would be fully implemented.
"The proof of the pudding will be in the eating, " he added.
The agreement concerns following points:
- Transitional period
The two sides recognize the authority of the UN during the transitional
period in order to allow the organization of a transparent, free and fair
referendum. The agreement is included in a declaration about the function
and presence of the UN in the period between the end of voter identification
and the vote.
2. Code of conduct during the electoral period (3 weeks)
This agreement includes the possibility for both parties to have an
equal access to the medias and warrants freedom of speech and movement
during this time. International observers will be allowed to watch the
electoral campaign as well as the members of the Polisario support committee,
in which the international solidarity groups will be present.
3. Voter identification (8 - 10 months)
This point is matter of an other agreement setting the conditions of
the resuming of the voter identification and the appropriate criterias.
Morocco renounces to present global lists. The members of the contested
tribes can participate to identification but only as individuals without
beeing convoked. The Polisario accepts oral testimonies as identity evidence.
This formula is supposed to bring a total electorate of something around
80,000 voters. The identification process could be resumed in 4 - 6 weeks.
4. Agreement on confinement of Moroccan and Saharawi troops.
5. Agreement on release of POWs and political detainees.
6. Agreement on return of the refugees actually in the camps near Tindouf.
Comments and reactions
Mr A. Boukhari, Polisario Representative at the UN said the agreement
gives a new dynamism to the referendum and he reaffirmed the will of full
cooperation of the Saharawi part in order to realize a fair and free vote.
He repeated that the referendum will decide if Western Sahara will be independent
or a part of Morocco.
President of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic SADR and Polisario
leader Mohamed Abdelaziz said that agreement reached with Morocco laid
the ground for resolving the Western Sahara conflict and ending a colonial
situation of injustice and suffering lasting 23 years. "Hope is now
permitted..." He appealed to the international community "to
support the implementation of these agreements."
Mr Filali, who led the Moroccan delegation, told the Maghreb Arab Press
(MAP):" I believe, based on what has been decided since the first
meeting and after the conclusion of this round, and also on the basis of
the declarations made by both sides, that Morocco can look with optimism
at the future of its territories". Commenting on the talks during
this round, Mr Filali said they were not easy because there were some tense
and difficult times. "However, I believe that despite everything,
we have reached a logical compromise which will enable the organization
of this referendum, because this is what we wanted, and because this problem,
which has lasted for more than 20 years, must end..."
"The Secretary-General is extremely pleased that, through the good
offices of his Personal Envoy James A. Baker III, the parties to the dispute
in Western Sahara have reached agreement on issues that have held up the
implementation of the Settlement Plan for nearly two years. The SecretaryGeneral
congratulates the parties and expresses his high appreciation to Mr. Baker
for his skill in achieving an agreement on these difficult and complex
issues. The Secretary-General looks forward to the parties' cooperating
with the United Nations in fulfilling the commitments they have made so
that the Settlement Plan can be implemented."
TheAlgerian government exprimed its satisfaction calling the agreement
of "major importance" and affirmed its will to support its application.
The Spanish government declared also to be happy about the agreement
and underlined that it gives a real perspective of solution.
Des Sahraouis utiles, Boher Anne, L'Autre Afrique, No 16, 10.09.97
Le Maroc et le Front Polisario sur le terrain des concessions, Ahonto
Lucien, L'Autre Afrique, No 16, 10.09.97.
Declaration de Mohamed Abdelaziz, President de la RASD, Secretaire general
du Front Polisario, 17.09.97 (http://www.uv.es/~martinja/sa/n2/DecMA.html)
Acuerdo entre Marruecos y el Polisario para celebrar un referendum en
el Sahara en 1998, Valenzuela Javier, El Pais, 17.09.97
El acuerdo logrado en Houston no aclara si el referendum permitira un
Sahara independiente, Valenzuela Javier, Pedro Canales, El Pais, 18.09.97
Un referendum sur le Sahara occidental d'ici un an, selon M. Baker,
Journal de Geneve, 18.09.97
Einigung zwischen Marokko und der Polisario, Neue Zuercher Zeitung,
Toter Punkt Ueberwunden, Wandler Reiner, Der Bund, Bern, 18.09.97
A Big Step in the Western Sahara, International Herald Tribune, F-Neuilly-sur-Seine,
Marokko und Polisario einigen sich auf Referendum, Haubrich Walter,
Frankfurter Allgemeine, 18.09.97
Baker brokers referendum plan for Western Sahara, Khalaf Roula, Financial
Times, London, 18.09.97
Accord en vue au Sahara occidental, Le Monde, Paris, 19.09.97.
ARSO WEEKLY NEWS
WEEK 39 21.-27.09.1997 (Excerpts only)
24.09.97 The Report of the Secretary General on the situation concerning
Western Sahara, S/1997/742
(full text http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1997/s1997742.htm)
In his introduction Mr Annan underlines that neither party had indicated
any willingness to pursue any political solution other than implementation
of the settlement plan. He exposes the details of the mission of his Special
Envoy and the content of the agreements reached in the different discussion
rounds. He takes stock of the actual situation in the region. ...
The agreements of Houston create the conditions to proceed towards the
full implementation of the settlement plan, starting with the resumption
of the identification process. Mr Annan proposes to send at the beginning
of October a technical staff in the region in order to prepare the resumption
of the voter identification. The Minurso should rapidely be provided with
the needed human and financial ressources. By the end of the identification
process the list of persons judged eligible to vote would be published,
and the transition period could begin shortly thereafter, upon completion
of other steps required by D-day in accordance to the settlement plan.
On the basis of the original timetable the referendum of self-determination
would thus be held within a year.
The Secretary General recommends to the Security Council that the mandate
of the MINURSO will be extended for three weeks until October 20 1997,
and that it will be extended thereafter for a period of six months until
April 20 1998. The S.G. will submit a comprehensive report in November
including a detailed plan, timetable and financial implications for the
holding of the referendum.
25-28.09.97 International Conference of Support to the Peace Plan
for Western Sahara
More than 200 guests, among them Peace Nobel Prize winner Ramos Horta
and members of Parliaments of different countries, politicians of different
parties and NGO delegates, participate to this Conference in the refugee
camps near Tindouf. In his opening speech Mr Bachir Mustafa Sayed (full
text spanish: http://www.arso.org/bachir3.htm)
linked to some aspects of the agreements, like a lack of precision and
of sufficiant warranties for the application, which ask to be careful.
As open questions Bachir Sayed listed, under others, the control of
the northern borders of W.S., the control of the airspace, the presence
of the Moroccan settlers, the freedom of action during the referendum.
The Saharawi Minister of Foreign Affairs appealed for the constitution
of a "Task force" which would supervise the application of the
agreements and warrant the final result. He proposed James Baker as leader.
Mahfoud Ali Beiba, Saharawi Prime Minister explained that the identification
could be finished in 6 months, adding that the transitional period would
be of 4 months. Probably the refugees would vote in the Saharawi controled
liberated territories. He estimed that the direct contacts with Morocco
should be continued in order to overcome difficulties.
El Pais, September 17, 1997
(excerpts translated by APIC)
The disagreement on the number and the identity of voters in the self-determination
referendum has until now blocked implementation of the poll. Since the
cease-fire of September 1991, which should have led to a poll in 1992,
the Sahara peace process presided over by the UN has been at a standstill
due to the controversy between Rabat and Polisario over who should be considered
Saharan when the vote takes place. Finally, the number can be set at 80,000
Morocco argued that the Spanish census of 1974, which identified some
75,000 people, was faulty, given that at that time there were many Saharans
who, for political or economic reasons, did not live in the territory.
Polisario at the time accepted a modest increase in the number of potential
voters, but the list presented by Rabat--with more than 100,000 people
not included in the Spanish census--seemed to it much too large. The UN
insisted that the number of voters should not exceed 100,000.
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